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ABSTRACT
Détente or Razryadka?
The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions,
1969-1977
by
Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr.
Claremont Graduate University: 2013
The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union. After twenty-five years of the Cold War, President Nixon made a historic visit to
Moscow in May, 1972, to sign both the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.
SALT I froze the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides at then-current levels for five
years, while the ABM treaty limited defensive nuclear weapons permanently. The
leaders of the two superpowers also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific
and communication technology, as well as cultural exchanges. Several more US-Soviet
summits followed throughout the decade.
The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War.
Meanwhile, the Russians preferred razryadka. While both can be translated as “relaxing
tensions,” the difference in terms was indicative of a difference in understanding of what
“relaxing tensions” actually meant. For the Americans, détente meant peace through
arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges.
However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically by
respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining from
interference in nations of the developing world. For the Soviets, razryadka referred

strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of state-to-state relations:
arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect as a co-equal superpower.
One of the principle means of conducting US-Soviet detente was through a
private “backchannel” between US National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin. This dissertation
argues that transcripts of their telephone conversations from 1969-1977 reveal that the
backchannel enabled Kissinger and Dobrynin to establish a relationship which provided
the empathy needed to bridge many of the ideological differences between their two
countries. Consequently, the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel serves as a case study of
the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Détente, Razryadka, and the Kissinger-Dobrynin Special Relationship
“Now, what it all gets down to is how two great powers, the two major powers in the
world, are going to be able to talk about their differences rather than fight about them?
You’ve got to set up a relationship [italics mine] on a personal basis or in some fashion
whereby the differences can be discussed and the areas of self-interest can be discovered,
worked out, and then increased. And that is what détente is all about.”1
-Richard Nixon
The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union, known today as the period of “détente.” One of the most noteworthy events of
this era occurred when US President Richard Nixon made a historic visit to Moscow in
May, 1972, to sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) with Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The treaty had two components: the Interim Agreement
which froze offensive nuclear missiles at then-current levels for five years, and the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty (ABM) permanently limiting defensive nuclear weapons. Nixon
and Brezhnev also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific and communication
technology, as well as cultural exchanges. Several more US-Soviet summits followed
throughout the decade.
Originating in the late 1960s, détente was an effort to relax tensions after more
than twenty years of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, two
nations with competing social systems – democratic capitalism and communism,
respectively. The overriding concern was that the two superpowers might allow their
differences to spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear war. Several factors precipitated
the change from confrontation to negotiation including the development of nuclear parity
between the United States and Soviet Union, the emergence of powerful economic rivals
1

Frost/Nixon – The Complete Interviews, 400 min., Paradine Television Inc., 1977, DVD.
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in Western Europe and Japan, as well as the emergence of newly independent former
European colonies in the developing world where both Washington and Moscow
competed for influence.
However, by the end of the 1970s détente – the relaxing of tensions which had
brought so much hope and progress to efforts of avoiding confrontation and even a
potential nuclear war – was dead. While many believed that the immediate cause
stemmed from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal
of a second treaty known as SALT II from Senate consideration, a deeper examination
revealed fissures in the rapprochement almost from the very beginning. Accusations by
both sides of violating agreed upon limits in nuclear weapons plagued the period. In
addition, disagreements on the subjects of human rights and foreign interventions in the
developing world further endangered progress.
The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War, while
the Russians preferred razryadka. While both can be translated as “relaxing tensions,”
the difference in terms indicated a fundamental difference in understanding of what
“relaxing tensions” actually meant. For the Americans, détente meant peace through
arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges.
However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically in
terms of respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining
from interference in the affairs of newly formed nations in the developing world. For the
Soviets, razryadka referred strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of
state-to-state relations: arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect as
a co-equal superpower.

2

Despite these differences, there were numerous successes during détente’s early
period from 1969-1975. Accomplishments including the Interim Agreement and ABM
Treaty, dramatically increasing emigration for Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union, as
well as ending American involvement in the Vietnam War and bringing about a ceasefire
during the October, 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict attest to this. In this dissertation I will
argue that where progress was possible in US-Soviet relations, it was largely attributable
to an empathetic relationship which developed between American National Security
Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the
United States Anatoly Dobrynin.
Through a “backchannel” method of conducting diplomacy characterized by
private meetings and telephone calls, Kissinger and Dobrynin crafted détente away from
the State Department bureaucracy, the media, and the public. After their meetings faceto-face or over the telephone, Kissinger provided memoranda to Nixon summarizing the
discussions while Dobrynin did the same in telegrams to Brezhnev, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko, and other members of the Politburo in Moscow. However,
transcripts of their telephone conversations provide an as-it-happened sense of their
discussions. They also reveal that over time Kissinger and Dobrynin formed a
relationship as well as established empathy and trust, thereby enabling them to make
progress in US-Soviet relations in spite of vast ideological differences between their two
countries. Through a comprehensive study of the transcripts, this dissertation ultimately
provides a case study of the effectiveness of backchannels in international diplomacy.
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Historiography of Detente
The confusion over the meaning of détente which existed for years between the
American and Soviet governments and in the public has continued amongst scholars ever
since. In an early post-detente literature review, Brian White argued that observers had
not even been able to agree on whether détente described a condition or a policy. 2 As a
condition, some viewed detente as simply a new historical period following twenty-five
years of Cold War; others used the term to mean an intermediate location on a continuum
ranging from Cold War on one side, to entente, meaning “much closer ties,” on the
other.3 To some, détente was merely a “delusion,” and scarcely more than
“appeasement” of the Soviet Union.4 According to White, this represented the view of
“those merely skeptical of the achievements of détente, together with the growing
transnational lobby of critics, like [US] Senator Jackson, [Soviet dissident] Solzhenitsyn
and [Chinese] Vice-Chairman Deng.”5
As a policy, White continued, détente represented “an historical process evolving
piecemeal through dialogue towards stability and peace,” with scholars disagreeing as to
whether a relaxation of tensions began with Stalin’s death in 1953, the Nixon
administration and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in 1969, or the
Helsinki Accords in 1975.6 White concluded: “it is difficult not to be impressed by the
lack of specification in the literature; overlap and confusion abound.” 7

2

Brian White, “The Concept of Détente,” Review of International Studies Vol. 7, No. 3, (Jul., 1981): 165.
Ibid., 165, 166.
4
Ibid., 166.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid., 167.
7
Ibid., 169.
3
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The disagreement over détente extended to competing American and Soviet
definitions of relaxing tensions. Robert G. Kaiser wrote that the Americans “decided to
grant the Soviets at least the symbolic status of superpower,” by adopting détente. 8 He
explained that the change of course occurred because dealing with the USSR from a
“position of strength” had led to an unsatisfactory relationship built upon military
conflicts and increased defense spending. 9 While the United States had almost certainly
viewed the Soviet Union as a superpower since the 1950s, it may have taken the arrival
of détente to convince the Soviets that the Americans truly viewed them as equals.
Consequently, Kaiser explained that for Moscow détente was proof of a “correlation of
forces” in its favor.10 It was “a vital stage in the evolution of Soviet power – the moment
when no other nation could claim decisive superiority over the U.S.S.R.,” he added.11
The Americans and Soviets also had dramatically different reasons for engaging
in a rapprochement according to Dimitri K. Simes. He asked if the Americans had been
looking for “a convenient excuse to withdraw from a rough game of geopolitical
maneuvering for influence and resources.”12 However, Simes wrote that for the Soviets
détente “simultaneously reflected new strengths and weaknesses.” 13 On the one hand,
“the basis of détente was a change in the correlation of forces in the USSR’s favor.”14 On
the other, Moscow had a “growing recognition of a need for developing economic ties
with America.”15
8

Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: Goodbye to Détente,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, America
and the World 1980 (1980): 500.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., 501.
11
Ibid.
12
Dimitri K. Simes, “The Death of Détente?” International Security Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980): 3.
13
Ibid., 4.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
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Raymond L. Garthoff defined détente as simply “the shorthand description for the
policies subscribed to by both powers in the 1970s,” and stressed that the word “was not
a clearly defined concept held in common.” 16 Part of the problem, wrote Garthoff, was
that the Americans seemed to have confused “détente” with “entente.”17 Although both
were French terms, the former meant a relaxation of tension “as with the release of a
bowstring,” while the latter referred to “a positive development of close and cooperative
relations.”18 However, the Russian term razryadka only meant “a relaxation of
tension.”19 The American concept seemed to imply almost a kind of friendship, while the
Soviets considered the two sides to still be engaged in an ideological struggle, but to be
doing so in a more peaceful manner.
As the 1970s receded further into the background and historians had more time to
reflect, two main camps of scholarship emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. The first
equated détente with a distinct break from the past – a new era. Scholars in this group
cited the replacement of confrontation with negotiation, as well as the ability of both the
United States and the Soviet Union to turn their main focus away from foreign policy and
concentrate on domestic concerns. A second school of thought suggested that détente
merely represented a continuation of the Cold War by different means. Observers in this
category pointed towards the global chess game for influence which Washington and
Moscow continued to play via various proxies in the developing world. Several others
argued that détente was not a change in outlook by the superpowers, but simply the result
of diminished resources on both sides.
16

Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation – American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 24.
17
Ibid., 25.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
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Whether détente represented a new era or a continuation of the Cold War matters
because if superpower détente truly ushered in an era of change, it could be considered as
one of the turning points in ending the Cold War. However, if relaxing tensions was just
an example of great power posturing, it would indicate that other factors such as the
leadership of Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and others, activism by organizations
including Poland’s Solidarity trade union and Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77, and inherent
flaws in the communist system itself brought about the Cold War’s end.
Among those who viewed relaxing tensions as inaugurating a new era was
Nicholas O. Berry, who described détente as “end[ing] a period of crisis foreign policy
that began with the Second World War and that, after a short interlude, continued with
the cold war.”20 This led to “a novel condition in American politics,” as the adoption of
détente caused foreign affairs to recede and domestic issues to assert themselves as
preeminent, leading Congress to assume greater control of the agenda in Washington. 21
Likewise, former Soviet General and Director of the Institute of Military History
Dmitri Volkogonov asserted that the time between the Soviet invasions of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, an era closely associated with détente,
amounted to “the most peaceful time in Soviet history.”22 At the same time however, the
USSR’s “long pursuit of the USA in the build-up of nuclear weapons and the
development of rockets to deliver them culminated in the 1970s in an unstable military

20

Nicholas O. Berry, “Détente and the Troubled Presidency of the 1970s,” Presidential Studies Quarterly
Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring, 1985): 271.
21
Ibid., 271, 273.
22
Dmitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: The Free Press, 1998),
276.
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balance,” he added.23 Both superpowers eventually realized that a nuclear war would be
“tantamount to the destruction of the planet,” leading to a political and military détente.24
The notion that détente represented a new era could be seen in the scholarship of
the first few years of the 21st century as well. Richard C. Thornton explained that the
conflict in Vietnam caused changes in the US military relationship with the Soviet Union
and in the American economic relationship with West Germany and Japan. 25 These
developments “produced a prolonged, but carefully veiled, internal debate within the
American leadership which spanned four administrations and transcended party labels,”
wrote Thornton.26 The US sought to draw back its security commitments and have its
allies assume greater responsibility for their protection, but this required improved USSoviet relations to ensure that Moscow would not take advantage during the transition
period.27 Therefore Thornton defined détente as “a precondition to orderly
disengagement and the construction of a new global order.”28 Likewise, Chen Jian
explained that although China had previously acted as a “’buffer’” between the United
States and Soviet Union, in the early 1970s détente “redefine[d] the rules of the USSoviet confrontation,” and dramatically reduced the chances of nuclear war. 29 William
Tompson agreed that US-Soviet détente was part of “a new phase” in overall East-West
relations, but ascribed it mainly to the actions of several European leaders beginning in

23

Ibid.
Ibid., 276-277.
25
Richard C. Thornton, The Nixon-Kissinger Years – The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed.
(St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 2001), xi.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., xii, xiv.
28
Ibid., xiv.
29
Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001),
3.
24
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the mid-1960s. 30 Tompson explained that French President Charles de Gaulle’s efforts at
creating “a special Franco-Russian relationship” and West German Chancellor Willy
Brandt’s Ostpolitik, or new policy towards the Eastern bloc demonstrated Western
Europe’s concerns regarding “where the superpowers’ own management of their
relationship might lead.” 31
More recently, Melvin P. Leffler, Vladislav Zubok, and Jeremi Suri portrayed
détente as driven by various American and Soviet leaders desirous of breaking away from
the Cold War status quo. According to Leffler, relaxing tensions permitted Carter and
Brezhnev to turn their focus away from foreign affairs and concentrate on the home front:
“Détente was a respite to lessen the burdens of the arms race while Soviet and American
leaders tackled domestic priorities and insured their countries against the dangers of
nuclear war.”32 Leffler added that the policy offered both leaders “glimpses of a more
rational world where their two nations could compete peacefully and progress
economically. 33 Meanwhile Zubok argued that World War II had been “a major lifechanging experience” for Brezhnev, who firmly believed any future conflicts “must be
avoided at all costs.”34 Nevertheless, the Soviet General Secretary also presided over a
military build-up initiated shortly after his ascension to power in 1964, pleasing MarxistLeninist hard-liners who were suspicious of détente and remained a majority on the
Soviet Politburo.35 The ability to advocate for détente and yet not alienate his more

30

William Tompson, The Soviet Union under Brezhnev (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2003), 40.
Ibid., 40, 41.
32
Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind – The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 337.
33
Ibid.
34
Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire – The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 202.
35
Ibid., 204.
31

9

traditional colleagues caused Zubok to conclude: “It was Brezhnev’s personal and
increasingly emotional involvement and his talents as a domestic consensus builder that
proved to be the most important factor in securing the policy of détente in the period from
1968 to 1972.”36 However, Jeremi Suri emphasized Kissinger’s role, explaining that
Nixon’s National Security Advisor thought previous leaders had avoided “the hard work
of compromise with adversaries,” but by establishing personal relationships with each
other, diplomats from the United States and the Soviet Union “could integrate key issues
confronting their societies, build mutual trust, and insulate frank exchanges from political
exploitation in the public sphere.” 37 Thus détente was “an attempt to use superpower
cooperation, rather than conflict, to manage the multiplying centers of power around the
world.”38
Other scholars argued that détente was really nothing new. However, even within
this group there was disagreement. Some contended that détente was an ingenious way
for the US to continue containing the Soviet Union, but by other means due to reduced
resources, some viewed it as an effort by the Soviet Union to lull the West into a sense of
security while continuing its policy of expansion, while others saw nothing but a charade
where both sides engaged in symbolic summitry and treaties without truly confronting
their differences and considering how they might behave more peacefully.
John Lewis Gaddis argued in 1983 that détente did not represent a break from past
practice, but only a change in tactics in response to changed circumstances. Gaddis

36

Ibid., 223.
Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University, 2007), 223.
38
Ibid., 226.
37
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defined strategy as “the calculated relationship of ends and means.” 39 A good strategy
understands that there is a connection between what you are hoping to accomplish and
the tools you have at your disposal. 40 Therefore, governments must decide “shall
interests be restricted to keep them in line with available resources; or shall resources be
expanded to bring them into line with proclaimed interests?” 41 According to Gaddis,
when the Nixon Administration came into office in January, 1969, it had to find a way to
continue the US policy of containment, but with fewer resources due to expenses being
incurred from the Vietnam War and a stagnant economy. 42 It was for this reason that
Nixon and Kissinger “embraced ‘détente’ as a means of updating and reinvigorating
containment,” argued Gaddis (italics in original). 43
Jussi Hanhimaki and Robert Dallek agreed with Gaddis. Hanhimaki wrote:
“Kissinger effectively argued that America had overstretched and needed to cut back its
commitments without jeopardizing its central goal of containing Soviet power.”44
Détente thus replaced “military interventions and nation-building” with “creative
diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China” and a “search for strong regional
allies.”45 Similarly, Dallek argued that détente amounted to “foreign policy realism
which guarded against national devastation and any sort of major Soviet victory in the
Cold War.”46 He credited Nixon and Kissinger for attempting to make the case to

39

John Lewis Gaddis, “The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 62, No. 2 (Winter,
1983), 355.
40
Ibid., 356.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid., 358, 359.
43
Ibid., 359.
44
Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect – Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 486.
45
Ibid.
46
Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger – Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007),
305.
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conservatives that policies such as improving relations with China did not represent
surrender in the Cold War, but “fresh means of containing Soviet power.47
Several scholars were much more cynical about détente. Among them was
George F. Kennan, who wrote in 1977 that the early SALT successes as well as press
coverage of summits created an impression in the minds of numerous Americans that
détente had birthed a new “structure of peace.”48 Many in the US therefore expressed
shock when the Soviet government continued suppressing its political opponents as well
as encouraging revolutionary national liberation movements around the world. 49 “’The
atmosphere of détente’” was supposed to have precluded such actions. 50 On the contrary,
the Soviets had agreed to cooperate only in “specific and limited areas,” explained
Kennan. 51
Adam B. Ulam conceded that détente had originally been based upon “restraint,”
“reciprocity,” and “rhetoric.” 52 However, the Soviets failed to show restraint when
supporting the Marxist faction in the Angolan Civil War, while American efforts to lure
both Egypt and China away from the Soviet Union were “hardly in line with the spirit of
Soviet-American rapprochement.”53 Ulam argued that by 1975 reciprocity had likewise
vanished as “the USSR continued the pursuit of ‘unilateral advantages’” internationally. 54
Thus, according to Ulam, by the middle of the 1970s détente was mostly based upon just

47
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George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy, (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1977), 152.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous Relations – The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983), 140.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
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“rhetoric.”55 Similarly, Rand scholar Harry Gelman argued that “throughout the
Brezhnev era a profound sense of vulnerability – over both the legitimacy of party rule
and the stability of Soviet gains – powerfully reinforced the leadership’s felt need to keep
pressing for incremental gains…” 56 He added that détente did not significantly change
these beliefs. 57 Furthermore, Washington’s reactions to Moscow’s actions “combined to
put an end to any sense that the two superpowers were probing for mutuality of
interest.”58 Perhaps most cynically of all, Robert Conquest described détente as an effort
“to persuade the West not to match the Soviet armament drive.” 59 By creating the
illusion of relaxed tensions, the Soviets would enable “appeasers and pro-Soviet elements
to come to power” in the West.60
Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Keith L. Nelson were equally
dismissive of both superpowers. Lebow and Stein viewed détente as merely a strategy
used by both the Americans and the Soviets to try and rein in the other. 61 “Each side saw
the other’s gain as its loss and its gain as the other’s loss,” they wrote. 62 For the Soviet
Union, détente was “an opportunity to preserve and promote its influence and constrain
the United States,” while the United States “treated détente as a cover in the search for
unilateral gain in the Middle East and as a constraint on Soviet behavior.” 63 Meanwhile
Nelson asserted that if Washington and Moscow had had the means, they would have

55
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57
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60
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continued with the same domestic and foreign policies as before “even if these had meant
perpetuation of the Cold War” (italics mine).64 However, after its experience in Vietnam,
the US concluded that it could not continue spending on both the military and social
programs at the same levels. Likewise, the USSR realized that it needed trade with the
Americans in order to meet the needs of its population. Since the superpowers had
“realistically conservative leaders,” meaning they were uninterested in wide-ranging
domestic changes, they decided on a new approach to foreign policy. 65 In short,
Washington and Moscow chose to lessen their expenses abroad so as not to ask their
populations to make significant sacrifices at home.
Those arguing that detente marked a distinct change in US-Soviet relations were
correct to point out that the period was marked by less confrontation and more
negotiation. Undoubtedly, this eased the minds of many on both sides who were
concerned about military spending, the conflict in Vietnam, and even nuclear war.
However, one of the themes of this dissertation is that the Americans and Soviets
continued to hold the strongly conflicting ideologies which had helped to initiate the Cold
War in the first place. Because these differences were never adequately addressed during
the détente period, particularly US fears (rightly or wrongly) about what it viewed as the
destabilizing effects of Soviet support for national liberation movements, there was
always a limit to what could be accomplished via diplomacy. Consequently, détente was
merely a continuation of the Cold War, but by other means. Ultimately, the only thing
both sides truly agreed upon was the imperative of avoiding nuclear war.

64

Keith L. Nelson, The Making of Détente – Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), xv.
65
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Kissinger’s and Dobrynin’s Views of Detente
Few individuals were more closely associated with US-Soviet détente than Henry
Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin. Kissinger served as National Security Advisor and
later also Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford from 1969-1977.
Meanwhile Dobrynin held the post of Soviet Ambassador to the United States from 19621986, a period spanning all or part of the administrations of Presidents Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan.
Kissinger had a decidedly negative view of détente while in academia in the
1950s and 1960s. According to Steven F. Hayward, a scholar at the conservative Pacific
Research Institute for Public Policy in San Francisco, in the 1950s when Kissinger was a
professor at Harvard he had warned that the Soviet Union would use “détente and ‘peace
offensives’” in order to “divide and weaken domestic opposition in the West.”66 Then in
1965 he added that for the Soviets “’peaceful coexistence…is justified primarily as a
tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk.’”67
After arriving in Washington, however, Kissinger modified his views of détente
several times, according to Walter Isaacson.68 One of Kissinger’s biographers, Isaacson
noted that in 1974 detente was “’the search for a more productive relationship with the
Soviet Union;’” in July, 1975, several months after the fall of Saigon to the North
Vietnamese, it had morphed into “’a means to regulate a competitive relationship;’” and
finally in 1976 it was simply “’designed to prevent Soviet expansion.’”69 Clearly the
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changing definitions represented Kissinger’s effort to scale back expectations as the USSoviet relationship deteriorated.
Writing in 1982 after leaving office, Kissinger described détente as an adaptation
to a time when Congress and the American people were war-weary from Vietnam and
less inclined to endorse military interventions and big defense budgets. He seemed to
believe relaxing tensions was a necessity based upon the realities of the 1970s:
For the statesman in any event, a foreign policy issue does not present
itself as a theory but as a series of realities. And the realities of Nixon’s
first term were stark. We had to end a war in Indochina in the midst of a
virulent domestic assault on all the sinews of a strong foreign policy. It
was followed by the impotence of the Presidency as a result of Watergate.
Détente was not the cause of these conditions but one of the necessities for
mastering them. 70
Kissinger argued that despite what many conservatives believed, détente was not
surrender to the Soviets in the Cold War, but an effort to wage the ideological struggle
more efficiently and more in tune with national interests due to limited resources. 71
However, he also accused liberals of not assuming responsibility for driving America
towards isolationism through their resistance to military involvement and military
expenditures after Vietnam and Watergate.72
In general, Kissinger did not believe that Americans were prepared for détente. In
1994 he wrote, “[t]he combination of adversarial and cooperative conduct implicit in
détente with the Soviet Union,” did not conform to the American “black-and-white
assumption” that the world was divided into friends and enemies. 73 The reality, he
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argued, was that every country was “a combination of both.”74 Kissinger concluded that
détente “challenged American exceptionalism and its imperative that policy be based on
the affirmation of transcendent values.” 75
Like Kissinger, Anatoly Dobrynin had a distinguished academic background. His
doctoral thesis on the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt led him to studying American diplomatic history. 76 After graduating from the
Higher Diplomatic School, he then began his long career in the Soviet Foreign Ministry
in the late 1940s.77 In his 1995 memoirs Dobrynin identified détente for the Soviet Union
as first and foremost a reaction to the danger of nuclear war. For Brezhnev and other
high officials of the Communist Party, a nuclear confrontation was “utterly
unacceptable.”78 Military costs, improving relations with Western Europe, preventing a
US-Chinese alliance, and enhancing Brezhnev’s profile in the Soviet Union were other
motivating factors.79
On the other hand, Dobrynin believed that the American shift to détente resulted
from a “painful reassessment of the political maxims of the Cold War.” 80 US policymakers faced Soviet missile parity and witnessed traditional allies including West
Germany and France independently establishing improved relations with the Soviet
Union.81 Consequently, Washington felt compelled to abandon containment and take
another tack. Dobrynin also noted “social and economic problems” which had been
74
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“seriously aggravated by the national gamble in Vietnam,” causing the US to realize it
could no longer pay for both guns and butter – military spending to wage the Cold War
and social spending to fund President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs from the
1960s.82
Kissinger described detente as a practical necessity due to political, economic,
and social changes in America, but not as surrender in the Cold War. He sought to
appease both the left and the right. By suggesting that détente was merely a change in
tactics, Kissinger believed that he could appeal to conservatives who wanted to give no
quarter to communism. Likewise, by reducing America’s global commitments he hoped
to convince liberals that there would be no more Vietnams.
Meanwhile, Dobrynin thought US acceptance of détente demonstrated America’s
acknowledgement that it could no longer rely on military strength to get its way in the
world. For him, the American experience in Vietnam was a classic case of imperial
overreach. He believed that the United States had realized that it could no longer block
national liberation movements in the developing world, particularly when backed by the
strengthened Soviet military. This interpretation implied American acceptance of the
new status quo where the Soviet Union was an equal superpower and here to stay.
Thus Kissinger and Dobrynin were working from different premises while
working to relax international tensions. Reconciling these differences as well as other
distinctions between the wide-ranging American concept of détente and the Soviets’
more limited notion of razryadka was the central task of the Kissinger-Dobrynin
relationship. Although both continued to be self-interested advocates for their respective
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nations, they nevertheless forged a partnership which enabled them to overcome daunting
challenges while negotiating arms control, human rights, and foreign interventions.

The Backchannel
According to Nixon, Kissinger had suggested having a private dialogue with
Dobrynin even before they first met with the Soviet Ambassador on February 17, 1969, at
the White House.83 Nixon agreed, believing that such an arrangement might lead the
ambassador to “be more forthcoming.” 84 It began simply with Dobrynin arriving through
the East Wing door of the White House for weekly lunches. 85 In 1979 Kissinger
described the meetings as “a series of intimate exchanges that continued over eight
years.”86 He added, “Increasingly, the most sensitive business in US-Soviet relations
came to be handled between Dobrynin and me.”87 The private meetings provided a
forum to express points of view as well as test the reactions of each side to proposals. As
Kissinger put it,
We would, informally, clarify the basic purposes of our governments and
when our talks gave hope of specific agreements, the subject was moved
to conventional diplomatic channels. If formal negotiations there reached
a deadlock, the Channel would open up again. We developed some
procedures to avoid the sort of deadlock that can only be resolved as a test
of strength.88
He described how both he and Dobrynin could raise an issue and get a response in a
completely “non-committal” manner, thereby enabling them to “explore the terrain,” and
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“avoid major roadblocks.”89 In 1994 Kissinger elaborated, explaining the circumstances
surrounding the creation of what became known as “the backchannel” or simply “the
channel”:
During his first term, Nixon had shifted much of the conduct of diplomacy
into the White House, as he had announced he would during his
presidential campaign. Once the Soviet leaders had grasped that Nixon
would never delegate the key foreign policy decisions, a back-channel of
direct contact developed between Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
and the White House. In this manner, the President and the top leadership
in the Kremlin were able to deal directly with the most important issues. 90
In 1995 Dobrynin described the backchannel as part of a “two-tier
arrangement.”91 Although he continued to make “official contacts” with Secretary of
State William Rogers, Dobrynin explained that Nixon also sought “to exchange views
urgently and privately with the Soviet leadership.”92 He called the backchannel with
Kissinger, “unprecedented in my experience and perhaps in the annals of diplomacy,”
due to its “extensive use.”93 Furthermore, its role “should not be underestimated.”94 He
summed up its value in the following way:
Looking back, I can say with certainty that had it not been for that
channel, many key agreements on complicated and controversial issues
would have never been reached, and dangerous tension would not have
been eased… That was the beginning of our unique relations with the
administration of Nixon and Kissinger. We were on many issues both
opponents and partners in the preservation of peace. 95
In 2007 Kissinger and Dobrynin elaborated on how the backchannel operated.
Their meetings could be face-to-face or over the telephone. When they met in person, it
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was usually in the Map Room on the first floor of the White House, which Kissinger
described as “sheltered from the outside world by verdant bushes, creating an atmosphere
of seclusion, which removes the time pressures from the conversations – insofar as the
pace of White House business allows it.”96 The purpose of their conversations could be
to pass along communications from Nixon to Brezhnev and vice versa, or to break a
deadlock in official negotiations between the traditional American and Soviet
bureaucracies.97 Dobrynin explained that previously he had conducted backchannels
with members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, but only sporadically. 98 In
contrast, the backchannel with Kissinger functioned as a direct conduit between the
White House and the Kremlin on a permanent basis throughout Nixon’s presidency. 99
Secrecy was the defining characteristic of the backchannel. Its existence was only
known to a relative few both in Washington and Moscow.100 Furthermore, the
conversations in person or over the phone were conducted without secretaries, translators,
or note-takers. Afterwards Kissinger would compose a memorandum of conversation
(memcon) for Nixon while Dobrynin would transmit a telegram to Moscow. 101 In 2007
these were collected in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972 by the
Historian of the U.S. Department of State and the History and Records Department of the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Kissinger explained that in order to truly
get a sense of how the backchannel functioned, it was also necessary to read the
transcripts of his telephone conversations (telcons) with Dobrynin which were only
96
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printed in fragments for that collection. 102 This dissertation provides a comprehensive
study of those transcripts.
Kissinger and Dobrynin did not invent backchannels, but the Nixon
administration probably surpassed any of its predecessors in the degree to which it relied
upon this form of diplomacy. Kissinger also conducted backchannels with West German
State Secretary Egon Bahr, US Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, US
Ambassador William Porter at the Vietnam talks in Paris, and US Ambassador to
Pakistan Joseph Farland. 103 This should not be surprising in light of Nixon’s welldocumented disdain for those whom he considered “east coast liberals” within the various
federal government bureaucracies. Nixon provided a blunt explanation for why he and
Kissinger were so secretive: “”[T]here have been more backchannel games played in this
administration than any in history because we couldn’t trust the God damned State
Department[!]’”104 However, the backchannel with Dobrynin was probably unique in
terms of the frequency and ease of its use due to the close proximity of the White House
and the Soviet embassy in Washington, as well as the installation of a direct “hotline”
between Kissinger’s White House office and Dobrynin’s embassy office.
Backchannel diplomacy necessarily entailed secrecy, something for which the
Nixon administration was often criticized. Liberals feared that Nixon and Kissinger were
placing too much emphasis on geostrategic interests and balance of power theory while
neglecting human rights concerns. Meanwhile, conservatives argued that the
administration was endangering American national security by making arms control
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agreements which they believed favored the Soviet side. Additionally, Kissinger
conceded that the administration was “cavalier” in its treatment of the regular civil
service bureaucracy. 105 “Hell hath no fury like a bureaucrat scorned, and the Nixon
White House compounded the problem by the insensitivity with which it overrode
established procedure,” he wrote.106 In particular, Secretary of State William Rogers was
cast aside. Such domestic pressures eventually combined with the conflicting American
and Soviet views of relaxing tensions, ending détente and reigniting fears of nuclear war.
Most scholars seemed conflicted about the Nixon administration’s use of
backchannels. In general they acknowledged its success in improving US-Soviet
relations, but also pointed out how undemocratic it was by leaving many important voices
out of policymaking. Isaacson argued that each of the various backchannels “on its own,
could probably have been justified as necessary for creative diplomacy.” 107 However,
they also “complicated American foreign policy,” “wasted the time and creativity of
Kissinger’s staff,” and were utilized more to ensure that the White House got credit for
diplomatic breakthroughs than they were for reasons of national security. 108 Hanhimaki
admitted that the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel “unquestionably, yielded important
results,” but added that it also curtailed constitutional checks and balances because
decision-making was kept away from Congress and the public. 109 Suri stated that the
backchannel “facilitated” what he called “Kissinger’s détente strategy,” specifically “to
use superpower cooperation, rather than conflict, to manage multiplying centers of power
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around the world.”110 However, like Hanhimaki, he emphasized that the public,
Congress, and expert members of the Foreign Service were left out of the process. 111
Dallek was less inclined to see the positive side of backchannels. He explained
that Nixon and Kissinger endorsed their use because they “feared a loss of control” if
policy making was left in the traditional channels. 112 However, he considered such
concerns to be “overblown” and suggested that back channels were also intended “to
guard against sharing accolades for administration successes.”113
Alistair Horne appeared to be the most approving of backchannel diplomacy. He
described the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship as “remarkable” and “unlike anything
similar known under other U.S. and Soviet administrations during the Cold War.” 114 He
wrote that Kissinger and Dobrynin “were astonishingly open with each other, with
Kissinger giving the Russian classified material that another U.S. statesman would have
jibbed at.”115 However, even Horne questioned the effectiveness of the backchannel
because although Dobrynin was “superbly in the loop” in Washington, it was not clear if
he was similarly “kept in the loop with candor” in Moscow.116
Two recent dissertations expressed similarly mixed views of the backchannel.
Richard A. Moss argued that the backchannel functioned as a kind of “safety valve” to air
views and gave its participants “a personal stake” in détente’s success. 117 Furthermore,
he asserted that his study of the US-Soviet backchannel “mitigate[d] some of [the]
110
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criticisms levied against Nixon and Kissinger in their secretive conduct of diplomacy.” 118
Nevertheless, he viewed it as “a weak foundation for long-term détente.”119 Meanwhile,
Michael V. Paulauskas argued that Kissinger and Dobrynin forged a friendship via
backchannel communications, which either could then use as “leverage” in
negotiations. 120 However, he noted that one of the backchannel’s drawbacks was that
Dobrynin often suffered from the Kremlin’s “repeated unwillingness to fully disclose
information to him.”121 This manifested itself most dangerously when conflicts arose in
the developing world in places like Angola and Afghanistan.122
For some, back channel diplomacy is tainted due to its association with the
scandal-ridden Nixon administration. Nevertheless, recent literature on back channel
negotiations (BCN) has documented its numerous positive effects on resolving
international conflicts. The literature cited the private nature of BCN as essential for
allowing representatives of hostile nations to begin negotiations amidst heated rhetoric
from politicians and the public on both sides. Furthermore, the shared project of
maintaining secrecy helped the negotiators to establish a relationship based upon trust.
For example, Anthony Wanis-St. John, who focused on the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute, claimed that all of the major signed agreements between Israel and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) resulted from the use of back channels “alone
or in combination with front channels.” 123 This included the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords
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where Israel and the PLO attained mutual recognition and the Palestinians acquired selfrule. Privacy was particularly necessary in cases such as this one where the two sides did
not recognize the legitimacy of the other. According to Wanis-St. John, back channels
enabled leaders to isolate negotiations from “internal opponents (those most likely to
oppose peace talks),” but this also caused difficulty “creating a broad consensus” to
implement an agreement.124 On the other hand traditional “front channel negotiations”
often encountered problems attaining an agreement in the first place.125 The answer,
explained Wanis-St. John, was to “combine early but diminishing use of secrecy with
gradually increasing public efforts to expand the central coalition on each side.” 126
Niall O’Dochartaigh contended that back channels resulted in the development of
cooperative relationships between negotiators for the British government and the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), helping lead to a historic 1998 settlement in Northern Ireland. 127
He argued that back channels “can contribute to a strong sense of joint enterprise and a
common project” including keeping the negotiations secret.128 This in turn helps lead to
“a surprisingly robust negotiating relationship built on trust, continuity of personnel and a
relationship of reciprocal exchange and limited compromise.”129
Mikael Weissmann analyzed China’s role in establishing back channels between
North Korea and other countries including the United States which are concerned about
Pyongyang’s nuclear program.130 He explained that “Personal networks and BCN [back
124
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channel negotiations] have been crucial ingredients for China’s success in breaking
escalation spirals, and in initiating cooperation, communication, and agreements, which
has mitigated and de-escalated the conflict (at least temporarily).” 131 One method Beijing
used in negotiations was “informal pressure and signaling,” including expressing support
for United Nations sanctions whenever it believed that Pyongyang had exceeded proper
boundaries. 132 Weismann concluded that from the time of the first trilateral meetings held
in Beijing in 2003, Chinese involvement was indispensable and “most probably”
prevented military action against North Korea.133
The notion of using a “back door” or making “backroom deals” can
understandably connote underhandedness and seem counter to expectations of honesty
and openness in negotiations. However, similar to the cases cited above, the US-Soviet
backchannel enabled Kissinger and Dobrynin to establish a relationship, and over time,
fostered the empathy required to provide both with a sense of what was possible in
negotiations and what would be “non-starters.” Both understood the domestic political
restraints that the other would face when it came time to “sell” an agreement.
Based upon my study of the transcripts I have identified four characteristics of the
Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel which help to explain its success: privacy, durability,
ease and frequency of communication, and personality, the last of which I believe is too
often overlooked in history, which is after all the study of human beings and their actions
individually or collectively. Hence a second theme of this dissertation is the vital role of
personal relationships in conducting diplomacy.
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Sources
According to Dobrynin, during his face-to-face meetings with Kissinger there
were neither interpreters nor secretaries present.134 “This meant there was no official
record of our meetings except what we kept ourselves,” he added. 135 Nevertheless, he
claimed there were never any disagreements about what had been said.136 After those
meetings, Kissinger typically prepared a memorandum of conversation (memcon) for
Nixon while Dobrynin usually transmitted a telegram to Moscow. Obviously both would
have had the opportunity to summarize their meetings in a way which they believed
would please their respective superiors.
However, Kissinger explained that his secretaries transcribed “the overwhelming
majority” of all his telephone conversations during his tenure as National Security
Advisor and Secretary of State.137 At first, the secretaries listened to the conversations on
a “dead key” extension and drafted summaries, but eventually they began typing
unedited, verbatim transcripts from shorthand notes or tape recordings. 138 It is not known
what happened to the secretarial notes, but the tapes were immediately destroyed after
being transcribed.139 Kissinger described the purpose of the telephone conversation
transcripts or telcons as “to enable me to follow up on promises made or understandings
reached and to incorporate them into memoranda to the President or other records.”140
These private phone conversations with various leaders took place when Kissinger was at
134
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the White House, the State Department, San Clemente, Key Biscayne, Paris, New York,
his home, and during airplane flights.141
However, most of the phone conversations between Kissinger and Dobrynin
probably occurred when Kissinger was in his White House office and Dobrynin was in
his office at the Soviet embassy in Washington. Dobrynin explained how secrecy was
ensured by the installation of a “hot line” in 1972:
Later, as our contacts became more frequent and we met almost daily, the
president ordered the installation of a direct and secure telephone line
between the White House and the Soviet embassy for the exclusive use of
Kissinger and me; we would just lift our receivers and talk, without
dialing.142
Consequently, the telcons between Kissinger and Dobrynin provide a previously
unavailable, as-it happened, and behind-the-scenes account of American-Soviet
diplomacy during the extremely consequential years of the 1970s. It is not known if
Dobrynin also recorded the phone conversations, so the telcons are probably the only
such source available to historians of the period.
When Kissinger left office in 1977, he had the telcons placed temporarily at
David Rockefeller’s estate before giving them to the Library of Congress. 143 They were
not to be seen by the public until five years after Kissinger’s death and even then only if
the people with whom he was speaking were deceased or had given their approval. 144
According to Bruce P. Montgomery, associate professor and faculty director of archives
at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Kissinger had first obtained an opinion from a
State Department legal advisor (who served under him) that the transcripts were his
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personal property. 145 Kissinger’s opponents argued that the transcripts from January,
1969, to August, 1974, were covered by the Presidential Records and Materials
Preservation Act (1974), a statute passed specifically to enable Congress to acquire
Nixon’s tapes and records about the Watergate affair. 146 Meanwhile, State Department
transcripts were said to be covered by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).147
In the late 1970s the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press fought to
obtain access to the telcons in federal district court and the US court of appeals, both of
which ruled that the transcripts were government records and should be released under
FOIA.148 Nevertheless, in 1980 the Supreme Court in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press overturned the lower courts and claimed that the telcons were
not part of the Executive branch and therefore not covered by FOIA. 149 However, the
Court added that the Federal Records Act gave the Archivist of the United States as well
as the Attorney General the power to retrieve records if they had not been removed
properly. 150 Consequently the National Archives requested and Secretary of State
Edmund Muskie agreed in 1980 to review the telcons at the Library of Congress so they
could potentially be returned to the State department, but no further steps were taken.151
For the next dozen years, Republican administrations under Ronald Reagan and then
George H.W. Bush held the White House. Kissinger clearly benefitted from the presence
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of friendly administrations in his efforts to keep the telcons unavailable at the Library of
Congress.
This period also coincided with when Kissinger was using memoranda of
conversations based upon the transcripts to write his memoirs from the Nixon era, White
House Years (1979) and Years of Upheaval (1982).152 The two volumes were “a work
evidently written with great care to his [Kissinger’s] place in history and to perpetuating
his image as the consummate strategic thinker who executed sweeping and highly
successful radical shifts in American foreign policy,” wrote Montgomery. 153 However, if
the transcripts were released they might “support an alternative assessment.” 154
Nevertheless, Montgomery concluded that Kissinger did not seek to permanently keep
the transcripts from the historical record. Based upon the terms of Kissinger’s donation
to the Library of Congress, “[h]e appeared more intent on sealing the documents until the
extraordinary passions of the Watergate and Vietnam years had subsided and until after
his death,” wrote Montgomery. 155
The telcons became known to the wider public during the Democratic
administration of Bill Clinton, which was much more open to reviewing and releasing the
transcripts which had long been dormant at the Library of Congress. After Nixon’s death
in 1994, many of his presidential materials were released by the National Archives,
including Kissinger’s National Security office files which contained copies of a small
portion of the transcripts.156 Then in 1997 the State Department began publishing some
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of its copies of the telcons in its Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.157
Repeated FOIA requests to release more of Nixon’s documents by William Burr and
others at the private National Security Archive housed at George Washington University
led to the publication of The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing
and Moscow (1999).158 However, this volume did not include any of the telephone
conversation transcripts with Dobrynin, only a summary of one of their face-to-face
meetings prepared by Kissinger for a memorandum. 159 Finally, in January, 2001, the
National Security Archive threatened to go to court if the National Archives did not take
steps to retrieve Kissinger’s originals. 160 Having published the final volume of his
memoirs, Years of Renewal in 1999, Kissinger may have been more inclined to release
his papers since his version of history was now complete. Hence, State Department legal
advisor William H. Taft IV was able to convince Kissinger to acquiesce and in August,
2001, release 10,000 pages of copies of the telephone conversation transcripts held at the
Library of Congress from his tenure as Secretary of State, 1973-1977.161 The following
February he consented to 20,000 more pages pertaining to his years as Nixon’s National
Security Advisor from 1969-1973.162
After review, the 20,000 pages of the Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation
Transcripts (Telcons) were released by the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) on May 26, 2004. 163 That collection is housed at the Richard M.
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Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California and covers January 21, 1969, to
August 8, 1974, (from Nixon’s first inauguration until his resignation) in thirty archival
boxes.164 Boxes 27 and 28 comprise the Anatoly Dobrynin file. 165 The State
Department’s collection is on-line and spans from August 9, 1974, until the end of the
Ford Administration on January 20, 1977.166 A few transcripts were withheld and some
were redacted.167
Burr argued that the transcripts revealed Kissinger had committed several “’sins
of omission’” in writing his memoirs, among them “the extraordinary degree to which
Nixon and Kissinger tilted U.S. policy toward Beijing.” 168 He even accused Kissinger of
seeking to “deceive and manipulate” the Soviets, including Dobrynin. 169 Thus Burr
viewed Nixon and Kissinger as favoring the Chinese against the Soviets, rather than
simply playing them both against each other as readers of Kissinger’s memoirs might
have been led to believe. Matthew Jones agreed. He concluded that Nixon and Kissinger
viewed the Soviets as a greater threat than the Chinese, and “rather than developing a
subtle ‘triangular diplomacy,’” the administration gravitated towards “an implicit SinoAmerican condominium.”170 With specific regard to the US-Soviet relationship, I will
argue that the transcripts reveal that the historiography on détente which described it as
“a new era” failed to recognize the continued ideological differences complicating USSoviet diplomacy in three main areas: arms control, human rights, and especially foreign
interventions in the developing world.
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Although the transcripts were the main primary source for this dissertation, I also
utilized the writings of various leading American and Soviet figures of the détente era.
Henry Kissinger’s massive three volume memoirs were particularly crucial to filling in
gaps between conversation transcripts. Anatoly Dobrynin’s memoirs, while not as
comprehensive, filled in other gaps. Additionally, the 1994 conference report of Brown
University’s Carter-Brezhnev Project provided a first-hand account of a pivotal March,
1977, US-Soviet summit in Moscow. The conference, entitled “SALT II and the Growth
of Mistrust,” featured former members of the Carter administration, former Soviet
officials, and scholars who met from May 6-9, 1994, at Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons
Island, Georgia.
Secondary sources including scholarly articles and monographs on the détente
years by John Lewis Gaddis, Adam B. Ulam, Harry Gelman, and Raymond L. Garthoff,
general histories of the Cold War by Gaddis, Vladislav Zubok, and Melvin Leffler, as
well as biographies of Nixon, Kissinger, Brezhnev, KGB head Yuri Andropov, and
Politburo member Mikhail Suslov were invaluable for providing a historical context to
the discussions in the transcripts. I also consulted several dissertations and video
recordings including David Frost’s extensive 1977 interviews with Richard Nixon.

Organization and Focus
This dissertation examines the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship as it developed in
the backchannel through a study of transcripts of their telephone conversations. Each
chapter begins with an overview of the scholarship analyzing the conflicting American
and Soviet views on a particular issue, and then provides three examples of how
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Kissinger and Dobrynin negotiated their way through various challenges. Chapter 1
focuses on arms control, contrasting American balance of power theory with the Soviet
correlation of forces doctrine before demonstrating how Kissinger and Dobrynin
negotiated the two main components of SALT I – the Interim Agreement on offensive
nuclear weapons and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as well as made substantial
progress towards SALT II. Chapter 2 juxtaposes the Western notion of “inalienable”
human rights with the Soviet concept of “conditional” or “contingent” rights. The
majority of the chapter then examines the efforts of Kissinger and Dobrynin to salvage a
US-Soviet trade bill after an amendment was added tying the Soviets’ Most Favored
Nation trading status to increases in Jewish emigration. This is followed by backchannel
discussions on the Helsinki Accords as well as several individual cases involving family
reunification and dissidents. The third chapter examines US-Soviet conflicts in the
developing world and to what extent these were based upon security and economic
interests or reflected ideological considerations. The Kissinger-Dobrynin discussions
here are on Vietnam, the October, 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the civil war in Angola
from 1975-1976. The dissertation’s conclusion argues that the Kissinger-Dobrynin
backchannel led to the creation of a relationship due to its privacy, durability, frequency
and ease of communication, and the personalities of its participants. Furthermore, this
relationship helped to establish empathy which facilitated many of détente’s successes
from 1969-1975. The Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel therefore serves as a case study
of the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 1
Arms Control: A Balance of Power or the Correlation of Forces?
“…the ABM treaty and the offensive freeze,.…were either a turning point or another
impulse to the superpower arms race, either an augury of a more peaceful international
order or a pause before a new set of crises.”1
-Henry Kissinger
“The first summit allowed both sides to overcome strong mutual suspicions and become
engaged in more constructive relationships, though they continued to pursue their own
goals in the international arena.”2
-Anatoly Dobrynin
In the 1970s the United States and the Soviet Union, the world’s two
superpowers, sought to control the growth of the world’s deadliest weapons. During the
preceding twenty-five years, both nations had built massive nuclear arsenals. The fear
that the Cold War could turn nuclear overrode every other aspect of US-Soviet relations.
In this chapter I will argue that Kissinger and Dobrynin bridged their respective
governments’ competing visions of the superpower relationship as well as overcame
Washington’s and Moscow’s differing goals for arms control to produce the Interim
Agreement on Offensive Weapons and the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (collectively
known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or SALT I). They also made
substantial progress towards a second treaty culminating in the 1974 Vladivostok
Accords. However, SALT II was not signed until after Kissinger left office. The
telephone transcripts showed that Kissinger and Dobrynin were successful in reaching
arms control agreements because each perceived that the other was well-intentioned and
truly committed to preventing nuclear war.
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After discussing the American balance of power and Soviet correlation of forces
theories of international relations which undergirded Washington’s and Moscow’s
conflicting views of superpower diplomacy, I will present a third interpretation –
Organski’s and Kugler’s power transition theory – as an alternative which better
illustrates the nature of the American-Soviet strategic relationship as it developed in the
1970s. Next, I will provide extensive excerpts of discussions between Kissinger and
Dobrynin demonstrating how they successfully negotiated SALT I, ABM, and made
great gains towards SALT II.

Arms Control and Detente
After the Americans exploded atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end
the Second World War in 1945, from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s they developed
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs).3 The Atlas and Titan I ICBMs had ranges of 5,000 miles, and were succeeded
by the Minuteman and Titan II.4 The US also produced the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs
(stationed in Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey and therefore surrounding the Soviet
Union), as well as the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Polaris. 5
In 1949 the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon. By 1957 it had tested
an ICBM, with mass production under way two years later.6 In the summer of 1962 the
Soviets began constructing sites in Cuba for the installation of intermediate range nuclear

3

James M. Morris, America’s Armed Forces – A History, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1991), 324.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Bevin Alexander, How America Got It Right – The U.S. March To Military and Political Supremacy,
(New York: Crown Forum, 2005), 167.

37

missiles capable of travelling 2,000 miles and hitting the Panama Canal as well as most
American cities, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis. 7 After the crisis passed, Moscow
initiated an arms buildup under Leonid Brezhnev in 1964. For the next twenty years,
Soviet defense spending increased by an average of 4-5 percent in real terms.8
By considering arms control, both Democratic and Republican administrations in
the United States tacitly acknowledged that the Soviets had significantly narrowed the
gap in strategic weapons. There would have been little reason for the United States to
limit its nuclear arsenal and allow the Soviet Union to catch up if Washington still held a
significant advantage. Consequently, the Johnson administration first proposed arms
control in 1966, but Moscow did not commit until 1968 as they approached parity.9
However, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that year delayed negotiations until the
administration of Richard Nixon. 10 According to Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War
Studies at London’s King’s College, by 1970 the Soviets had matched the Americans in
ICBMs and also made great gains in SLBMs. 11 He added that the USSR maintained
superiority in both throughout much of the decade, while the US retained a large edge in
bombers and overall missile quality. 12 At the time of the first summit between Nixon and
Brezhnev in May, 1972, the totals for each in ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers were: United
States –1054, 656, and 450; Soviet Union –1607, 740, and 200.13
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For the Americans arms control was a practical response to the reality that a
balance of power existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. A rough
equivalence in strategic weapons required a change in strategy for Washington. The US
could no longer rely upon its overwhelming nuclear superiority to prevent a Soviet attack
on itself or its allies in Western Europe. Nuclear parity ensured mutually assured
destruction (MAD) – the certainty that if either nation attacked the other, retaliation and
millions of dead on both sides would result. Nixon and Kissinger believed that despite no
longer having a nuclear preponderance, they could maintain international stability by
agreeing with Moscow to limit their respective nuclear arsenals.
Rather than a balance of power, for the Soviet Union arms control negotiations
provided further evidence that the long-awaited and inevitable “correlation of forces” was
occurring. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, these political and economic forces
would propel socialism to worldwide preeminence. The Soviets viewed the attainment of
nuclear parity as an important step in this process. Thus while balance of power theory
implied that the two superpowers had achieved a stabilization in international relations,
the correlation of forces doctrine suggested a changing of the guard in world politics.
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Balance of Power
Balance of power – a classic theory of international relations – grew out of the
European great power politics of the nineteenth century. According to Kenneth Waltz,
the theory assumed that states were individual actors in an international system of nations
struggling for survival. 14 The states used the methods they had available for selfpreservation or even domination. 15 These could be internal, such as increasing economic
or military strength, or external by forming relationships with another nation or group of
nations. 16 Balance of power also presumed that states would act rationally, that is they
would never initiate a conflict in which they were certain to lose or even face
annihilation.
A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler explained that according to balance of power
theory, when power was relatively balanced between states or groups of states there
would be peace.17 In contrast, when power became unevenly distributed, the chances of
war increased. 18 In such a case the stronger nation or group of nations which always
sought to maximize its power would attack the weaker. 19
The balance of power and relative stability of post-World War II Europe was not
the intentional creation of either of the superpowers in the view of John J. Mearsheimer.
In fact, self-interested nations often created stability inadvertently through actions
designed to ensure their security, but not necessarily peace. 20 The Americans supported
14
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Western Europe with economic and military resources to lessen the chances of a
successful Soviet attack which could alter the balance of power.21 Likewise, the Soviets’
occupation of Eastern Europe could be viewed as an effort to preserve their security.
Of course, the Cold War introduced a new component to balance of power
politics: nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union
had reached a level of mutually assured destruction by the 1970s, this did not rule out the
possibility of a conventional war as long as both sides believed such a conflict would not
escalate into a nuclear one, according to Mearsheimer. 22 The answer is not certain
because as he pointed out, “(thankfully) there is not much history to draw on.” 23
Nevertheless, even in the age of MAD both nations continued to have security concerns
and desired a balance in conventional as well as nuclear forces. 24

The Correlation of Forces
Another theory of international relations, the Soviet doctrine of the correlation of
forces, differed from balance of power theory in both its origins and policy implications.
Julian Lider explained that Soviet scholars rejected balance of power because it was
“traditional,” “bourgeois,” and an example of “political realism,” a philosophy associated
with the leading capitalist countries. 25 On the other hand, the idea of a correlation of
forces derived from Marxist-Leninist theory that objective, scientifically provable laws
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governed the unfolding of history.26 These laws dictated that socialism would eventually
replace capitalism around the world, and the correlation of forces demonstrated these
historical laws in action. 27 Finally, while Nixon and Kissinger applied balance of power
theory to a world they saw as multi-polar due to the rise of China, Western Europe, and
Japan, the Soviet correlation of forces concept implied two blocs of nations with
irreconcilable differences. 28
According to William B. Husband, Moscow believed that Washington’s foreign
policy was based purely on military strength, particularly as demonstrated by American
reliance on “nuclear intimidation” to advance its interests just after the end of World War
II.29 The Soviets believed this approach to international affairs was terribly misguided
because it ignored or undervalued the importance of “political and economic processes as
vital historical forces,” wrote Husband. 30 These included the withering of the old
European colonial empires, the spread of socialism to many newly independent nations in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the economic resurgence of capitalist nations like
West Germany and Japan. From Moscow’s perspective, Washington had only changed
course and sought arms control after “international setbacks” resulting from these
political and economic changes around the globe. 31
The Soviets believed that capitalism faced a crisis around the globe “as a system,”
wrote Lider (emphasis in original). 32 With the ability to blunt the power of America’s
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reactionary impulses, Soviet military parity would allow the laws of social development
to unfold naturally. Thus the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war
between socialism and capitalism was “replaced by the assumption of the inevitability of
the ideological struggle” between rival blocs of nations led by the United States and the
Soviet Union, according to Lider.33 Consequently, Husband explained that the Soviets
were genuinely interested in arms limitations and lessening the dangers of nuclear war. 34
Indeed, they welcomed peace due to their certainty that in a long-term and non-military
ideological struggle, their eventual triumph was preordained by the laws of history. 35

Power Transition Theory
Rather than a balance of power or the correlation of forces, another theory of
international relations may provide a better explanation for what was taking place in the
US-Soviet strategic relationship during the 1960s and 1970s. Organski and Kugler
rejected balance of power theory, espousing power transition theory instead. It originated
in the 1950s and held assumptions directly at odds with the balance of power
interpretation. 36 It argued that nations were more likely to go to war when they had
similar political, economic, and military strength if one was seeking to surpass the other,
and in case of war the initiator of conflict would come from the weaker side, not the one
holding greater power.37 This was because under power transition theory it was not the
stronger nation, or the defender, which acted in order to maximize its strength and
influence, but the weaker nation, called the challenger, which behaved aggressively due
33
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to its dissatisfaction with the international status quo.38 The chances of war increased
when the challenger reached a level of strength equal to eighty percent or higher of the
dominant nation’s GNP.39 Therefore, unlike balance of power theory which stated that
changes in alliances caused a redistribution of power, power transition theory assumed
that changes in power resulted from developments within nations. 40 The Soviet military
buildup in the years after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 could be interpreted as an
example of such an internal development.
Did the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s meet the description of an
unsatisfied challenger seeking to make a power transition and surpass the dominant
nation – the United States? It seems plausible in light of a cursory overview of USSoviet relations during the post-World War II period. Ronald L. Tammen explained how
a cold war develops whenever a nation is dissatisfied with its status in the international
arena, yet lacks the means to do anything about it.41 During times such as these, there
may be relative stability between states, but not without animosity. 42 The Soviet
withdrawal behind the Iron Curtain at the start of the Cold War could be seen as an
unsatisfied state refusing to participate in the US-engineered post-war international order,
suggested Tammen. 43 However, over the course of the next twenty-five years the Soviet
Union grew into a potential challenger, mostly on the strength of nuclear weapons. 44
Although they had attained a rough nuclear parity, Tammen stipulated that the Soviets
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remained behind the Americans in overall power due to “deficiencies in political,
economic, and social resources.” 45
Nevertheless, it is difficult to overlook the dramatic increase in Soviet military
spending in the 1960s and 1970s. Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner defined a
challenger to the status quo as dissatisfied “if the prospective rules of the system that it
would like to impose are different ‘enough’ from those already established by the current
dominant country.”46 Certainly the contrast between Soviet socialism and American
capitalism seemed to meet this description. In addition, Lemke and Werner argued that
an increase in military spending by the challenger relative to that spent by the dominant
nation could signal a willingness to wage war.47 However, if the dominant nation built
up at a faster rate than the challenger, it could indicate that it was more dedicated to
preserving the status quo than the challenger was to upsetting it. 48 Thus the US military
buildup under Ronald Reagan during the 1980s could be viewed as an attempt to offset
Soviet efforts at completing a power transition.
Lemke and Werner used two factors to determine if a nation was committed to
changing the status quo. First, a country had to undergo an extraordinary military
buildup, defined as “[w]henever the average annual military increase within a decade is
greater than the cumulative annual average for all previous years.” 49 Second, the nation’s
“extraordinary military expenditure increase for the decade in question minus the
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dominant country’s military expenditure increase for the decade” had to exceed zero. 50
In other words, the challenger had to be building up faster than it had ever done
previously, and at a greater rate than the dominant nation. By this standard, the Soviet
Union was committed to change during the 1970s because its extraordinary military
buildup was greater than US military expenditures. 51 However, it should be noted that
using these metrics, the Soviet Union could be identified as committed to change
throughout much of its existence, particularly during Stalin’s forced rapid
industrialization program in the 1930s.52
The differential in military expenditures is reflective of the Soviet buildup, but
also of the American build-down as the US sought to disengage from the Vietnam War.
In 1970, US defense spending represented 40.8% of the total federal budget. 53 By 1978 it
had fallen to 23.8%, the lowest since the Second World War. 54 Although the USSR did
not surpass the United States in total power by the end of the détente period, the
difference narrowed, and according to Organski and Kugler it was “precisely, the
relationship between the challenger and the dominant country that, in the transition
model, [was] likely to occasion a major war.”55 Furthermore, “the model insist[ed] that
attempts to arrest the gains of the faster-growing nation [would] fail.” 56 The challenger’s
eventual completion of the power transition past the dominant nation was all but
certain.57
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Because it was the nuclear age, however, the Soviets and Americans never
confronted each other directly. According to power transition theory, throughout the
1970s the US desired to remain the dominant power and sought to preserve the
international status quo, while the USSR attempted to disrupt it in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. 58 The purpose behind destabilization was to effect “a more pro-Soviet
alignment,” and eventually “abet an open challenge to the United States at the global
level,” wrote Tammen. 59 Consequently, the US and the USSR found themselves on
opposite sides of revolutionary national liberation movements around the world.

SALT I
SALT I represented an effort to preserve the US-Soviet strategic equilibrium.
Signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on May 26, 1972, at the first Moscow summit, the treaty
embodied a rough balance between each arsenal. 60 The Interim Offensive Agreement
froze the number of each side’s ICBMs and SLBMs for five years. 61 At the moment of
signing, the Soviets outnumbered the Americans in total missile launchers (ICBMs and
SLBMs) 2,348 to 1,710.62 The addition of Soviet ICBMS under construction at the time
eventually raised the total to 2,359.63 However, the US had developed the technology to
equip missiles with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) or
multiple nuclear warheads on a single missile – something the Soviets had not yet even
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tested.64 Additionally, SALT I did not apply to strategic bombers where the US held a
significant advantage.65
Although the agreement only enacted temporary limits, Dobrynin explained that
the five-year interim period was to allow time for further negotiations leading to actual
reductions in the numbers of weapons. 66 Kissinger called the treaty, “a snapshot, as of
the moment of signature, of the strategic relationship as it had evolved over the previous
decade.”67 He asserted that that the Soviets had dramatically increased ICBM
construction after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.68 According to Adam Ulam, while
the American ICBM total had held at 1,054 since 1965, the Soviet force increased from
570 in 1967, to 900 in 1968, to 1050 in 1969.69 Kissinger explained that by the time of
the SALT signing, Moscow had long surpassed Washington in ICBMs.70
Although SALT I was limited, it is difficult to overstate the importance of at least
initiating arm control negotiations due to the completely unprecedented and
unimaginably destructive power of nuclear weapons. The US atom bomb dropped on
Nagasaki at the end of World War II, “Fat Man,” as well as the first Soviet atomic
weapon detonated in 1949 each released about 20 kilotons or 20,000 tons of TNT.71 In
1952 the US detonated the first thermonuclear weapon, which yielded 10,000 kilotons or
10,000,000 tons of TNT – the equivalent of five-hundred Nagasakis!72 In the years
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leading up to détente and throughout the end of the Cold War, both nations built more of
these devastatingly powerful “megaton” bombs with the explosive power of a million or
more tons of TNT.73
Structural differences in the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals greatly
complicated arms control. Usually the best that negotiators could agree upon was a
rough equivalence, and so both nations had to be willing to allow the other numerical
superiority in some areas in order to achieve an approximate overall balance. For
example, the Soviet Union based their force structure primarily on large, groundlaunched ICBMs. Geographical proximity to Europe, the original Cold War battlefield,
as well as a lack of ports dictated that Soviet reliance on air and submarine-launched
weapons would be secondary. In contrast, the distance of the United States from Europe
as well as America’s dual coastlines necessitated a more diversified arsenal – the nuclear
“triad”: ground-based ICBMs, submarines, and perhaps most significantly to Moscow –
bombers. US aircraft in Europe and on aircraft carriers in the surrounding waters deeply
concerned the Soviets, but the Americans never wanted to include these forward-based
systems in negotiations.74 This probably reflected American concerns that if its allies in
Western Europe went unprotected, the Soviets might take military action with their large
conventional forces. Meanwhile, the Americans were worried about Soviet superiority in
both the number of ICBMs and in total “throw weight” (total lifting power of missiles –
this issue grew in importance as the practice of equipping missiles with multiple
warheads became prevalent). Additionally, as talks dragged on both sides continued to
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conduct research and improve their arsenals, leading Dobrynin to observe that “military
technology was running ahead of the protracted negotiations.” 75
Differences between the American and Soviet government bureaucracies added to
the confusion. Kissinger had far more knowledge about American military planning and
weaponry than Dobrynin did of Soviet military matters. As a member of the National
Security Council, Kissinger had access to the Secretary of Defense and the President.
After adding the title of Secretary of State, Kissinger had his feet in both the military and
diplomatic realms of the federal government. Ultimately, however, Kissinger answered
exclusively to Nixon.
In contrast, Dobrynin had many bosses, but less access to information. Any
message that he passed to Kissinger had to first be approved by the Politburo
membership. 76 Furthermore, Dobrynin claimed that he and other members of the Foreign
Ministry communicated only sparingly with the Defense Ministry. He gave the
impression that he learned more about the Soviet arsenal from Americans like Kissinger
than from his own military. In 1994 while at a conference attended by former Soviet and
US officials entitled “SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust,” Dobrynin explained:
“Military planning in Russia was top secret. It’s unbelievable: in your country, it’s a
loose cannon. You discuss all military things, rightly or wrongly.” 77 He added that
Moscow would give him instructions such as: “’Do not compromise on this issue; merely
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inform the Americans of our position on this issue.’” 78 Since diplomacy and defense
were kept separate, Dobrynin asserted that he never really knew what his government’s
long term military plans were.79 Perhaps most surprisingly, Dobrynin claimed that he
and others in the Foreign Ministry did not even know the names of their weapons, so they
used American names for Soviet weapons instead. 80 For example, when discussing the
Soviet bomber called Backfire by the Americans, participants at the aforementioned
conference erupted in laughter when Dobrynin asked: “By the way, why is it Backfire
and not Forwardfire?”81
Under Nixon, American nuclear strategy diverged from that of his Cold War
predecessors. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson had all maintained
varying degrees of US nuclear superiority over the USSR.82 However, at his first
presidential press conference on January 27, 1969, Nixon declared that his administration
would pursue “’sufficiency not superiority’” in nuclear weapons. 83 This strategy shaped
Nixon’s vision of arms control, which did not require both sides to have identical
arsenals. First, Nixon viewed the Soviets as a land power and the U.S. as a sea power. 84
Second, he argued that while the Soviet Union had larger weapons, America had better
weapons.85 Third, even if it was possible politically and financially to counter the Soviet
buildup and reach superiority in each and every category of weaponry, it would be long
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after both nations had already acquired the means to destroy each other.86 Additionally,
from the time of their first meeting with Dobrynin on February 17, 1969, Nixon and
Kissinger made it clear that progress on arms control would have to be connected to
Soviet cooperation in resolving various international problems including Vietnam and
West German access to Berlin. 87 The policy became known as linkage.
The SALT negotiations took place on two levels: the official talks and through the
backchannel. For almost three years the official negotiations alternated between Helsinki
and Vienna, with Gerard Smith and Vladimir Semenov leading the American and Soviet
delegations respectively. 88 The backchannel discussions between Kissinger and
Dobrynin took over if the two sides reached an impasse. 89 As Kissinger explained,
“[w]henever a deadlock persisted in these formal talks,” he and Dobrynin “would work
out an agreement in principle on the stalemated issue,” leaving technical details as well as
language to the formal delegations. 90 Likewise, Dobrynin explained how the
backchannel served as “a more convenient means for both governments to compromise a
deadlock and reach a final decision at the crucial moments of negotiation.” 91 Both
lamented that members of the official negotiating teams did not receive enough credit for
their work.
Establishing nuclear equivalence between arsenals with different force structures
was perhaps the most significant obstacle in the earliest discussions. For example, in a
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conversation from July 28, 1970, Kissinger referenced the Soviet SS-9s, 300 extra-large
ICBMs of which the United States had no equivalent:
K: I am sitting on [the] back patio thinking about peaceful coexistence.
D: Good for you, Henry. I am living with the same thought. I will be in
Moscow thinking in the same way.
Then later:
K: When are you leaving?
D: Tomorrow night.
K: When are you coming back?
D: I hope by four weeks—just enough to gain strength to conduct
discussions.
K: That will give you an unfair advantage.
D: What about you?
K: I am working on the budget. You are building so many SS-9’s. You
are upsetting the balance.92
Despite the playful tone, Kissinger had raised a potentially significant issue for the SALT
negotiations. As he explained, the Nixon administration’s predecessors had based
American strategic forces on small, accurate missiles such as the Minuteman ICBM and
the Poseidon SLBM, both of which were designed to carry MIRVs. 93 On the other hand,
the Soviet arsenal featured less accurate, but larger missiles capable of carrying greater
payloads, meaning that once the Soviets developed MIRVs, they could potentially deliver
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more of them in a single launch. 94 Kissinger believed that American technology could
mute the Soviet edge in size and strength of missiles, but not indefinitely. 95
The backchannel did not always run smoothly at first. During arms control
discussions the Soviets were chiefly interested in an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty to
limit American defensive weapons. The Soviets feared that an American ABM system
could protect the United States from a missile attack, thereby mitigating the effect of
Moscow’s superior ICBM arsenal. Thus the Americans would be in a position to launch
a possible first-strike while remaining confident that their ABM system would protect
them from the ensuing Soviet retaliatory second strike. On the other hand, the Americans
were concerned about the massive build-up of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons since the
1960s. Eventually, the White House made a proposal through the backchannel to link an
antiballistic missile treaty with a second agreement to temporarily freeze offensive
weapons. Before the Kremlin responded however, Soviet arms control negotiator
Vladimir Semenov began discussing a strikingly similar proposal with his American
counterpart in the regular diplomatic negotiations in Vienna, Ambassador Gerard
Smith. 96 This led to the following conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin on May
11, 1971:
K: I just had a talk with Gerry Smith and apparently our channel in not
working properly. Semonov is going along accepting my proposition to
you which Gerry Smith doesn’t know about…
D: Semenov didn’t have instructions and I have a telegram that says it.
K: Semenov on a boat trip went into great detail and Smith is so surprised
that he has propositions we didn’t make to him. Proposed ABM
agreement, a freeze on offensive missiles—Smith never heard of it…
94
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D: He has no authority.
K: We are in the position now that as far as Smith is concerned a Soviet
proposition exists and the President doesn’t have a response to his
proposal.
D: They haven’t discussed it in the govt. I know what I am telling you.
The [Foreign] Minister [Andrei Gromyko] directed him and he is not
authorized. Gromyko is not deceiving me.
K: The President can only conclude one of two things. Either there’s
confusion in Moscow which we don’t believe or a deliberate attempt to
mobilize his people against him or by-pass him.
D: It’s not so. On this matter Semonov has no authority. What [sic] he
makes a hint—I don’t know.
K: In order to keep our channel intact and avoid on either side a
refusal…Now we are in a position that as far as I am concerned it has to
be treated formally. [outside of the backchannel] Smith is telling
everyone what Semenov said… 97
If the White House had made a proposal through the backchannel and not
received a response via the same route, this could present several problems. First of all,
as Kissinger told Dobrynin, Nixon would take it “as a personal affront,” adding “What
would Brezhnev think if he proposed to us through a channel and we went to a
subordinate official and made a reply,[?]” 98 Secondly, if diplomatic subordinates were in
discussions on a proposal before there was an agreement at the top, it could create
bureaucratic momentum resulting in one side or the other feeling pressured into making a
decision they had not intended to, simply because they did not want to appear as being
obstructionist. Needless to say, this was not an auspicious beginning to the relationship.
The conversation became heated as both men attempted to determine what had
gone wrong:
97
98
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K: We have a serious problem now—
D: ??? reply. [sic]
K: We have to construct a reply from Smith to Semonov and I can’t say
it’s not the Soviet position because no one knows I have talked with you.
D: I know the story and you must way [say] what you will to the
President. Semonov when I was in Moscow he was told not to talk.
K: I don’t understand it. You can reject the proposal but why when we are
trying to do so many things…
D: Only two days ago I __________ that emphasized the same point. If
you do not believe it—
K: There’s no sense in your lying. I just want to be sure you want to work
with me.
D: This case they discuss through you and me. [The Kremlin has] No
reason for misleading me.
Then later:
K: You can argue with me but the fact is our government believes you
have made a formal proposition to which we have to reply and the
President believes he made a proposition to you and you are replying in a
bureaucratic channel and he will think you are trying to box him in. It’s
not going to be considered a friendly gesture.
D: What can I say when I tell you it was not an intention? What else can I
tell you?99
Despite his anger, Kissinger eventually calmed down and was willing to give Dobrynin
the benefit of the doubt. “I will grant that this was done in good faith on your side,” he
said.100 Even at this early point in their relationship, Kissinger seems to have begun to
trust Dobrynin – a little. Dobrynin then asked if Semenov’s proposal to Smith had been
official, adding “Semenov can discuss many things for 5 hours and you can construe
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what you want and he will say he said nothing. Was it formal?” 101 Kissinger replied that
Semenov had made the same proposal that Deputy National Security Advisor Alexander
Haig had given Dobrynin through the channel. 102 Dobrynin then assured Kissinger:
“[Semenov] has his instructions. I don’t know whether—I don’t know. Semonov has to
follow instructions or he will lose his job.”103
After reviewing a memo from Smith and a telegram from Semenov, Kissinger and
Dobrynin were able to reconstruct what had happened. 104 Apparently Semenov had put
forward a previous Soviet proposal, already rejected by Kissinger, stating that any freeze
of offensive weapons would only take place after an ABM deal had been reached. 105
The distinction was not insignificant. If an ABM treaty was signed first and subsequently
the SALT talks broke down, it would put the United States in the position of having
agreed to limit its defensive weapons while leaving the Soviets with a substantial edge in
offensive missiles and with no restrictions on continuing their buildup.
Having allowed the dust to settle, Kissinger and Dobrynin agreed to what would
become the golden rule of their relationship: Nothing would ever be discussed with
either “bureaucracy” until there was an agreement “in principle” in the backchannel. 106
“It’s not in the good of our relationship that while you and I are discussing something,
subordinates are discussing the same thing,” said Kissinger. 107 “The crucial point is after
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2 and a half years and months of discussions with you and me, we will get something
important,” he added.108
The Soviets eventually accepted the White House proposal. At the 1972 Moscow
summit Nixon and Brezhnev signed SALT I, which included both a five-year interim
agreement limiting the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons and an anti-ballistic
missile treaty (ABM) permanently restricting defensive missiles. A misunderstanding
that could have easily led to a breakdown in talks (as would occur during the initial trip to
Moscow by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 1977) instead resulted in one of the signal
achievements of the détente era. It also served to remind both Dobrynin and Kissinger
that during times of great stress and even frustration with each other that they could reach
agreements and make progress in improving relations.
Critics of SALT I in the United States believed that by freezing the status quo, the
treaty conceded numerical superiority to the Soviets and endangered US security.
Kissinger’s response to such charges amounted to: “if there was an imbalance, SALT did
not create it; it reflected self-limiting decisions made over a decade.”109 Of course, this
subtle attempt at criticizing previous administrations was just one of many instances
where Kissinger portrayed himself as a kind of victim of political and historical
circumstances. Nevertheless, he was hopeful that the mood of both the public and
Congress would change during the Interim Agreement’s five years and the United States
could then begin “to catch up.”110 Furthermore, SALT I did not prevent either side from
modernizing or improving their current stockpiles. 111 The US could proceed with
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research and development on new programs including the B-1 bomber, the MX missile,
the cruise missile, and the Trident submarine-missile system. 112 As Kissinger put it, “We
were determined to avoid ever again being in a situation where only the Soviets had
strategic programs under way.”113
SALT I faced criticism in the Soviet Union as well. According to Georgi
Arbatov, a member of both the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Central Committee
of the Communist Party, Brezhnev “treated the military as a very important power base,”
and gave it “virtually anything it asked for.”114 However, arms control was an anathema
to many in the Soviet military who viewed the weapons buildup with great pride.
During one Politburo debate over SALT I, Defense Minister Marshall Andrei Grechko
claimed that he was responsible for the nation’s security and could not support the
treaty.115 Nevertheless, Brezhnev “insisted on approval of the text,” wrote Arbatov.116
Furthermore, the Soviet General Secretary argued that as commander-in-chief he was the
rightful guardian of Soviet national security, and “ripped into Grechko,” for implying
anything to the contrary.117
Such interchanges help to illustrate an important point made by the former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert M. Gates. As an intelligence advisor
for SALT, Gates observed that “internal negotiations in both our government and the
Soviets’ were probably tougher and dirtier than between the two countries.” 118 Thus as
112
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supporters of detente and SALT, Dobrynin and Kissinger both faced domestic opposition
to their diplomatic endeavors and undoubtedly could relate to each other’s predicament.
After the signing in Moscow, there awaited another challenge for SALT I in the
Senate, where the Constitution required the treaty to be ratified by a two-thirds vote. Led
by Senators Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-Washington) and Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona),
a coalition of conservatives expressed alarm at the rough equivalence formulation. 119
According to Freedman, SALT I implied “a trade of Soviet numerical superiority in
missiles for US superiority in technology and bombers.” 120 However, Jackson and others
sought an exact equivalence in total weapons or “’equal aggregates,’” something
Kissinger believed was financially impossible at a time of defense cuts. 121 Jackson and
his colleagues had to settle for an amendment to the treaty which required parity in future
SALT treaties and specified that SALT I was in no way to be construed as allowing the
United States to ever fall behind the Soviet Union in strategic security. 122
The notion of amending a treaty after it had already been negotiated and signed
must have been extremely concerning to the Soviets. On August 7, 1972, Kissinger
spoke with Dobrynin and attempted to assuage Moscow’s fears that Jackson’s
amendment would substantively alter the SALT I agreement:
K: Now, Anatol, I wanted to talk to you about the Jackson Amendment.
D: Yes.
K: Here is what we have decided to do. We’ve been working with him
[Jackson] all weekend.
D: Yes.
119
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K: And it has now become a matter of prestige and so forth. So what we
have done is to try to get his agreement to a formulation which is
essentially meaningless.
Then later:
K: …What we are saying [in a White House statement] - - the Jackson
amendment does not constitute a reservation or interpretation to the
agreement in any legal sense.
D: Yeah. Will it be statement by the White House, yes?
K: After it is transmitted, yes.
D: Yeah, it will be statement by the White House.
K: Yes.
D: Okay.
K: But we have also gotten him to change the amendment that you have
seen. It has been totally emasculated now.
D: I would like to see if possible the text really.
K: Well, you will get it. I am sending it over to you.
D: Okay.123
This exchange implied that Kissinger either thought he had manipulated Jackson into
watering down the language of the amendment, or that Jackson was not entirely sincere
and merely wanted to sound hawkish on national security. However, it was Jackson’s
own assistant, Richard Perle, who wrote the amendment and later worked tirelessly in
consultation with twenty-five senators to get it passed.124
After reviewing the proposed amendment, Dobrynin remained confused. He and
Kissinger spoke again about an hour and a half later to clarify the situation:
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K: Did you get that material?
D: Yes, I’m just reading it. You see, one question I would like to ask you
really here. It was there before and it is now again in this one…you
should request the President to seek a future treat[y] and that inter alia
would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic
forces inferior to the [levels] provided for the Soviet Union. What do you
really mean exactly because - Then later…
K: Well, it doesn’t mean one for one in each category. It means, you
know, that the total strategic impact of these categories - - all of this is
drawn from things which we’ve already publicly said.
D: No, no; I know. This is rather a matter of interpretation for my own
and for Moscow. It doesn’t really mean one for one.
K: It means the principle of equal security.
D: The principle of equal security; not really one by one because - K: Not one by one in each category.
D: Oh, I see. So it doesn’t really change what we signed upon?
K: No.125
As they wrapped up the conversation, Dobrynin thanked Kissinger for his explanation
and said that he thought the White House statement and the amendment would be
acceptable to Moscow.126 “Of course, you understand, Henry, that we have discussed
with you on very informal basis,” said Dobrynin. 127 Kissinger understood that Dobrynin
could not unilaterally give his approval and that their conversation had just been “in a
spirit of what we can do to help relations.” 128 Kissinger added, “See how easy I am to get
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along with.”129 Dobrynin laughed as he thanked him again and said goodbye. 130 They
had successfully maneuvered around a potential minefield. Arms control – one of the
foremost goals of détente – had nearly been derailed by American domestic politics.
Another ratification-related conversation on September 18, 1972, was
simultaneously revealing and potentially embarrassing. Dobrynin inquired as to how
things were proceeding in the Senate:
D: First, maybe you will tell me about SALT - - Not SALT, but about
ratification.
K: Yeah, I’ll have a definite answer by tomorrow evening.
D: Oh, I see.
K: But I think we can manage it by the end of the week but I’ll give you a
definite date tomorrow.
D: Because this is really for our ratification. [italics mine]
K: Yeah, I understand that.131
It is apparent from this exchange that for Dobrynin and Kissinger much more than the
SALT agreement was at stake. They had both spent a great deal of time and energy as
well as faced a substantial amount of skepticism about détente back home, particularly so
in Kissinger’s case. Both viewed ratification as validating them and their diplomacy.
Such a mutual investment in relaxing tensions was essential for détente’s success.
Kissinger then continued:
K: I’m calling you about something else which is slightly embarrassing to
me in the light of my discussions in Moscow.
D: What about?
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K: It’s the following - - whenever they pass something through the
Congress, our Congressional liaison people just type up a note for the
President and get him to make a phone call to the sponsor saying, you
know, he’s glad it passed and I found out to my horror that the people did
that with the Jackson Amendment and so he called Jackson today.
D: Uh-ooh!
K: And I, you know, hope it won’t come out but if it does come out, I
want you to know how it happened.
D: Yeah.
And later:
K: Well, I want to express my apologies.
D: Yeah, I understand
K: And it is no indication - - it is so stupid that I don’t know how to
express it but it may not come out publicly but I wanted you to hear it
from me.
D: Yeah, I understand. It is better not to come but if it comes, what could
you do? Nothing really. 132
Kissinger understood that the Jackson Amendment had been a tough pill for the Soviet
leadership to swallow. The White House reluctantly acquiesced in the amendment’s
attachment to the SALT I treaty in order to garner enough votes in the Senate for
ratification. Still, the Soviets had been forced to sit by while it must have seemed like the
Americans were changing the deal reached in Moscow merely three months before. If
the White House appeared to be celebrating by congratulating Jackson on passing his
amendment it could have seemed underhanded and two-faced to the Kremlin.
Kissinger’s apology as well as Dobrynin’s understanding of this standard political
procedure further indicated the developing empathy in their relationship.
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ABM
Along with the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons, SALT I also included
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). The United States and the Soviet Union each
agreed that any missile defense system would not exceed a maximum of 200 launchers. 133
According to Garthoff, by limiting themselves to this “strategically insignificant” level of
anti-ballistic missiles, the superpowers “contributed to containing one important area of
arms competition.”134
Instead of deploying extensive anti-ballistic missile systems to defend themselves
from a nuclear attack, the superpowers relied on mutually assured destruction (MAD) in
order to deter one another. Richard K. Betts defined deterrence as “a strategy for
combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war.” 135 It grew
naturally from balance of power theory. 136 Prior to MAD, there had been various other
theories of deterrence, particularly those of RAND’s Bernard Brodie. However, MAD
was probably first associated with President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, and contended that a nation needed only enough nuclear weapons to deter an
attack.137 Nuclear stability would prevail as long as each side had the means to deter a
first-strike by possessing enough weapons to destroy the other with a retaliatory secondstrike. 138 The deployment of an extensive ABM system by either side would have
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threatened the delicate nuclear balance between the superpowers by insulating a potential
aggressor from retaliation, thereby making the risks of launching a first-strike less
costly. 139
From the beginning of the Nixon administration, Kissinger believed that one of
the most attractive features of developing an anti-ballistic missile system would be the
ability to offer to limit it in exchange for an offensive arms agreement. 140 Nixon agreed,
stating “I felt that tactically we needed the ABM as a bargaining chip” because the
Soviets already possessed such a system around Moscow.141 Nixon reasoned that if the
US entered SALT discussions without one, something else more valuable might have to
be given up: “we had to have it in order to be able to agree to forgo it.”142 However, the
development of an anti-ballistic missile system sparked great controversy in Washington.
Some feared that it would be destabilizing and inaugurate a brand new arms race. When
the Senate approved funding on August 6, 1969, it did so by the single tie-breaking vote
of Vice-President Spiro Agnew.143
The linking of the ABM agreement to an offensive freeze proved to be a
watershed moment for détente. It not only culminated in SALT I – arguably the greatest
achievement in US-Soviet diplomacy up to that time – but also broke the Cold War ice
after twenty-five years. In this conversation from March 26, 1971, Kissinger and
Dobrynin brought up several remaining issues including how many ABM sites each side

139

Holmes, ed., Roberts.
Kissinger, White House Years, 208.
141
Nixon, 415.
142
Ibid.
143
Steven F. Hayward, The Age of Reagan – The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964-1980 (Roseville, CA:
Prima Publishing, 2001), 274.
140

66

would be permitted to have, where they would be located, and when to initiate
negotiations for the offensive freeze:
K: You and I are going steady. We should exchange telephone numbers.
D: That is right. I will give you my Moscow number. 290-2520.
K: I will not ask you what the area code is.
D: It is in Moscow.
K: I have talked to the President about it [your proposal] and do not
completely understand it. Is this in response to our letter?
D: You do not? It is in connection with our last talk and your draft.
K: I will tell you how we are prepared to work it. We are prepared to
agree in principle to separate ABM agreement. Then negotiators would
begin discussion of what it would be like – [M]oscow versus Washington,
Washington versus –
D: Only involved the place? How many _____ etc?
K: At that point they would begin discussing what sort of agreement.
Then when they know what sort of agreement would discuss radars and so
forth. Simultaneously would discuss freeze. If that is possible agreement
would be immediate.
D: I have to check but –
K: When they begin drafting agreement they should talk about freeze.
D: They would discuss how many, etc. I don’t know. It seems to be a
little bit in the later stage. The will argue about (how many radars and all
the little things.)
K: Not crucial to us. After you say agreement on ABM – agreement has
been reached.
D: What is your position?
K: Certain start on ABM but also discuss freeze.
D: Simultaneously concluded on separate agreement and freezing at the
same time.
67

K: Exactly. 144
Differences in the American and Soviet force structures complicated ABM
negotiations just as they had the rest of the SALT talks. Consequently, just a week before
the official May 20, 1971, announcement that the superpowers had reached an agreement
on an offensive freeze and an ABM deal, Kissinger and Dobrynin still had a few details
to work out. Dobrynin pushed for including the phrase “equal limitations” in the
announcement while Kissinger objected, arguing that it made more sense to use
“equitable limitations” since each side had different radars and weapons. Dobrynin was
extremely anxious about agreeing to any wording which could potentially upset Moscow.
As he explained, the terminology that the Politburo decided upon was the result of
numerous meetings involving the entire Soviet bureaucracy:
K: What do you want?
D: I would like to put it in terms of limitation of this agreement should be
equal.
K: We aimed at drawing up the text of an agreement limiting ABMs; that
such an agreement should be equitable.
D: It’s not a question of both sides on an equal basis.
K: What do you mean by “equal.” [?]
D: When I mentioned this to you…
K: What you propose is your problem.
D: I understand. Terms of limitation should be equal…
K: Except “equal” doesn’t have any precise meaning in these terms.
D: What you pur, “…terms of limitation will be the same.” I think
“equal” but maybe “the same” or some other word. I am only trying to be
144
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close to what we said, whether terms should be “the same” or “close” or
maybe something else.
K: The trouble with “equal” is that since our weapons and radars are so
different I am not in position to say this has to be the same numbers.
There has to be some flexibility. “equitable” seems to me to be a good
word.
Then later…
D: I hope some day [sic] you will be an ambassador and be sitting in a
capital not so close to your source of power.
K: I understand.
D: If it was my proposal… But they [the Kremlin] gave me the text. To
prepare a letter is one thing, but in drafting this letter there were six
meetings of the whole government.
K: You haven’t changed the text. I think “equitable” means much more
than “just”. Will you accept “should be based on the principle of
equality?”
D: On equality? All right.
K: On the principle of equality.
D: Can’t you say it without “principle?”
K: It just doesn’t make any sense.
D: “Principle of equality”….. “principle of equality”. All right. You are
taking advantage of me. It’s your native language.
K: [sarcastically] You see, I want to tell you as a friend, what we want to
propose is an arrangement so that we can keep 20 radars and you can keep
one – we have to keep some flexibility for that. Now, I have had another
long session with the President…are we through; have you any other
complaints?
D: No.
K: You were easier to deal with when we bought Alaska.
D: We didn’t have Kissinger then. 145
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Even when conversations became heated and they grew frustrated, neither Kissinger nor
Dobrynin were above a little good-natured kidding.
ABM did not completely prohibit defensive weapons – each side was permitted to
defend a few sites. The Soviets particularly wanted to defend Moscow, while the
Americans focused more on their ICBM fields. 146 During a preliminary meeting in
Moscow, Brezhnev proposed to Kissinger that each side protect its capital and one
field.147 On May 17, 1972, just days before the first summit, Kissinger told Dobrynin
that Nixon had agreed to Brezhnev’s idea. 148 Nevertheless, Dobrynin still hoped to cajole
Kissinger into dropping the number of sites down to just one:
D: Yes, I understand. But one ABM [is] just as good as two.
K: Just stick with the formula which we discussed in Moscow.
D: Moscow, yeah. Okay.
K: Good.
D: Thank you.
K: In other words, we insist on accepting your proposals; that’s a tough
position for you to be in.
D: (laughter)149
When the ABM treaty finally achieved ratification, it allowed both nations to deploy just
two sites – one for each country’s capital and a second for an ICBM field.150 Each site
could have a maximum of one hundred land-based, stationary anti-ballistic missile
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launchers.151 Dobrynin later called this “a grave mistake on both sides,” and suggested
that if the superpowers had agreed on a “zero option,” the entire Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars” controversy of the 1980s could have been avoided. 152
In 1974 by mutual agreement both the United States and the Soviet Union
reduced the number of ABM sites to one, with the Soviets maintaining their system
around Moscow and the Americans planning to protect a single missile field in Grand
Forks, North Dakota.153 Theoretically, having only one ABM location each strengthened
deterrence even further. However, in 1975 and perhaps indicative of the general
Congressional view of defense spending at the time, the US unilaterally cancelled plans
for any ABM sites at all. 154 The remaining Soviet site at Moscow may have been more
intended for protection against China than anyone else. 155 Furthermore, the ongoing
development of MIRV technology threatened to make a realistic anti-ballistic missile
defense system less likely anyway. 156
Kissinger did not view the demise of an American ABM system as a total loss.
For him ABM’s prime purpose had been to motivate the Soviets to agree to a freeze in
offensive strategic forces, which they did. 157 Nevertheless, he expressed regret at the
Congressional decision to do away with an anti-ballistic missile defense system despite
claiming that he had only reluctantly agreed to it at the time.158
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The ABM Treaty became an issue once again in the 1980s during the Reagan
administration. In 1983 satellite photographs identified a radar station at Krasnoyarsk in
Siberia.159 The construction of a second anti-ballistic missile site violated the ABM
agreement as it had been revised by Nixon and Brezhnev in 1974 at the third summit.
After years of denials, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted in 1989
that “’the construction of this station, equal in size to the Egyptian pyramids, constituted
an open violation of the ABM treaty.’” 160
One of the original provisions of the ABM treaty was the right of either party to
withdraw from the agreement after providing six months’ notice. 161 Thus, when
President George W. Bush announced his intention to resume research on President
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the US pulled out of the ABM agreement in 2002.

SALT II
The Vietnam experience as well as Watergate cast a pall over the SALT II
negotiations. Although the Vietnam War ended for the United States as Nixon’s second
term began in 1973, that conflict had already done significant damage to the American
psyche. While the US continued to engage in strategic arms limitations talks, Kissinger
hoped to compensate for this by simultaneously increasing America’s conventional
forces. He portrayed himself as stuck between Congressional liberals resisting defense
spending and conservatives opposing arms control due to its “ideological ambiguity.” 162
Kissinger seemed to view the left as wanting surrender while the right wanted a crusade.
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The combination of this struggle with Congress as well as the Watergate scandal led him
to conclude that by the beginning of the President’s second term, “the political and moral
authority he [Nixon] needed to pursue simultaneously the military balance and a
sophisticated policy of arms control was beginning to erode.”163
Nevertheless, SALT continued. In the backchannel Kissinger began kidding
Dobrynin about the possibility of completely eliminating the SS-9s, the Soviets’ largest
missiles. This served as a running joke between the two, with Dobrynin usually
humoring his counterpart and then politely moving on to another subject. For example,
on March 6, 1973, as part of the early discussions for SALT II, Dobrynin told Kissinger
that Brezhnev had invited him to Moscow:
K: When does he want me to come? I hope not before the second half of
April.
D: When will you be ready to come?
K: Well, that depends on you. You’re agreeing to all our propositions?
D: Well, this is the point we’re going to discuss with you. (laughter)
K: Well, what would make a good impression, Anatol, - - I don’t want to
suggest to you but I think it would speed the SALT discussions if you
proposed that you will dismantle all SS-9s in the next phase of SALT, we
would make very rapid progress.
D: Yeah.
K: Just the big ones as a sign of good will.
D: Yeah.
K: (laughter)
D: (laughter) I think it’s a good idea. 164
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Of course the 300 powerful Soviet SS-9s represented one of the principle areas of
imbalance between the superpower arsenals, and undoubtedly drew the ire of Nixon’s
and Kissinger’s conservative critics who demanded “perfect symmetry.” 165 However,
Kissinger remained unworried about an exact numerical equivalence in every weapons
category, preferring to concern himself with overall strategic security.
By this time Kissinger and Dobrynin had been working together for well over
four years. A conversation on May 26, 1973, while planning for the second summit
demonstrated awareness on the part of both that they had started to build a shared history:
HK: Do you know today is the anniversary of our agreeing to the SALT
Agreement?
AD: Yes, I know. You are an exception because usually Americans do
not remember for a long time in their foreign policy, but you do.
HK: Now Anatol...
AD: (laughing) 166
The discussion and the ability to poke fun at one another demonstrated a growing level of
comfort and familiarity between two tough and experienced diplomats. They knew that
they had accomplished a great deal and were optimistic about their chances for further
success with SALT II and beyond.
The emerging capability to place multiple nuclear warheads upon a single missile
presented one of the foremost challenges in the SALT II talks. These MIRVs (multiple
independently-targeted re-entry vehicles) gave each side the potential to magnify its
arsenal without violating SALT I’s limits on missile construction. One missile could be
used to launch multiple warheads, each of which could then hit a separate target. In this
165
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context, the presence of the 300 heavy Soviet SS-9s with greater throw weight and hence
an ability to carry more warheads than anything the Americans possessed was no joking
matter. However, Nixon believed one of the reasons the second summit in June, 1973,
did not produce a SALT II agreement was that the Soviets were not far enough along in
their MIRV program to be comfortable talking about limits. 167 A conversation from July
11, 1973, between Kissinger and Dobrynin helped to illustrate this point. First, Kissinger
expressed frustration that the Soviets had not responded to an American MIRV proposal:
K: What we would like are some observations from you on the MIRV
question. Not that you agree with us, but something that enables us to get
a discussion started.
D: Well you see on MIRV question, really, it looks to me my reaction, and
this is not official reaction, but I think this one for us it looks to us just one
to stop our development.
K: Well, that…
D: One sided and…
K: No, no, but another possibility is that you destroy 60 SS-9s the first
year and then we go from there. We take that very seriously.
D: Well, Henry, let’s put it…
K: …the trouble is we’ve made a proposal to you. You think it’s onesided. I understand that, because it is one-sided. So then, could you – I’m
not even asking for a counterproposal, I’m just asking for something that
enables me to react to it.168
To illustrate his point, Kissinger referenced their shared history. He reminded Dobrynin
of how their previous negotiations on SALT I evolved: “You see in ’71 you said you
must have only defense [referring to ABM] and then we said no it has to include offense
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[the Interim Agreement].”169 Kissinger correctly recalled that although he and Dobrynin
had originally been far apart on SALT I, they had at least put forward their initial
positions when negotiations began. However in the current case, Kissinger argued
“we’re in no position to make a compromise because we don’t really know what you
have in mind.”170 Dobrynin stated that he understood, but he needed to refer to Moscow,
particularly in the case of something as technically complex as MIRVs. 171 The appeal to
their past negotiations apparently worked, because a few days later on July 17 Dobrynin
got back to Kissinger with news that the Soviets were indeed ready to begin discussing
MIRV limits.172
Nixon appointed Kissinger to be his Secretary of State in 1973 as well as continue
as National Security Advisor. According to Dobrynin, Kissinger called him from San
Clemente, California (location of Nixon’s “western White House”) on August 22, and let
him know about the appointment.173 Kissinger assured Dobrynin that things would
continue as before, “including lunches and dinners,” after he replaced outgoing Secretary
William Rogers:
D: Well I send you congratulations in a letter or how. You prefer now to
be much more formal so to speak.
K: And I won’t insist on protocol, Anatol, if you just call me Excellency
we’ll get along fine.
D: That is exactly what I will say. So congratulations, the very best. It is
final I guess.
K: Yeh, that’s right, but of course I don’t need to tell you that if anything
it may make it easier to do the things you and I have been doing together.
169
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D: I think it will. 174
Dobrynin opined that the change improved Soviet-American relations because it ended
what he called “the confused and uncertain situation in which the White House kept the
secretary of state and indeed his entire department in the dark.” 175 Now it would be much
easier to get agreements from the backchannel into the official negotiations and avoid the
kind of problem which occurred previously between Smith and Semenov. 176 The
installment of Kissinger as Secretary of State in addition to maintaining his duties as
National Security Advisor also indicated that Nixon was further tightening his grip on
foreign policy.
1973 was also a significant year for the Soviet military. According to Kissinger,
at that time the Soviets had four new missiles in development, two of which were MIRVcapable and in the testing stage by the summer.177 The SS-17, a newer and lighter ICBM
designed to replace the SS-11, could carry three or four warheads while the SS-18, a
potential replacement for the huge SS-9, was capable of delivering eight warheads. 178
The Soviets considered these modernizations of earlier missiles and technically not
violations of SALT I’s limits. 179 However some critics alleged that the Soviet Union was
getting around the treaty’s ceilings on missiles by simply adding more warheads. 180
Although obviously a defender of the treaty, even Kissinger charged the Soviets with
“using the quantitative freeze to engage in a qualitative race.” 181 He feared a potential
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Soviet strike on the US Minuteman land-based ICBM forces by the middle of the
eighties. 182
Brezhnev’s staunch support for arms control and détente was not enough to derail
the Soviet military’s agenda. Especially in the late 70s and early 80s “they got away with
a lot,” according to Arbatov.183 Even after attaining parity in conventional and nuclear
weapons, the military was able to “develop and accumulate arms of all types,” he
added.184 Arbatov claimed that Moscow outpaced Washington in long-range strategic
delivery systems, mega-tonnage, and throw weight, as well as in medium-range
weapons.185 Gates believed that the buildup “enabled the Soviets to close the strategic
gap and establish a favorable military balance in Europe, and offered them the potential
to gain superiority in a number of areas – depending on what the United States did.”186
Although some asserted after the Cold War that Moscow’s nuclear and conventional
arsenal had not posed a serious threat, “few in either political party or in the American
government generally in 1976 or 1977…would have agreed,” wrote Gates.187
Furthermore, he considered the “sober assessments of Soviet military power” by both the
Ford and Carter administrations to be “quite accurate.”188
The MIRV differential favoring the Americans as well as the Soviet potential to
narrow the gap and ultimately overtake the US drove both sides to seek limitations. The
Soviets also hoped to avoid the embarrassment of signing an agreement highlighting the
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fact that they had yet to actually deploy any MIRVed missiles. Cognizant of this fact, on
June 5, 1974, Kissinger presented the following proposal:
K: One other thing that I thought about on the SALT discussion we had
yesterday. We have no interest in making you sign something that’s
embarrassing for you. I’m trying to figure out some way of expressing
this in a way that the differential in numbers…If we expressed it for
example in terms of each side will stop deployment as of a certain date or
deploy up to “X” percent of its total force. You see what I mean?
Whichever number is higher.
D: To total existence.
K: Supposing we said, each side will stop deployment of MIRV missiles
as of and let’s say March 1, 1975, let me just think out loud. That would
stop our program at 1100. Or deploy up to “X” percent of its total force in
MIRV missiles, whichever number is higher.
D: “X” percent on what date?
K: Well, through 1979. You see if we said whatever number you and we
agree on, supposing it’s 750, we could express that as a percentage of your
total force.
D: Of total force, you mean on missiles?
K: Yes. You see in that way there wouldn’t be any - - the agreement
wouldn’t look as if any differential were put in. If each side has the right
to do the same thing.
D: I understand.
K: No, you won’t have [to]
D: Mention to you about what we have now.
K: No, but you have the choice either to stop on March 1975 or to build up
to 30 or 40 percent or whatever the number is we agree on, of your total
force. Whichever number is higher. We would stop in March 1975. Or
whenever we have 1100. You would go up to the percentage because in
March ’75 you won’t have anything yet.
D: This is exactly the point.

79

K: I want to find a formula which sounds equivalent.189
According to Kissinger’s plan, after a certain date the US would cease affixing MIRVs to
its missiles. However, recognizing that the Soviets had yet to deploy any such weapons,
Moscow would be permitted to do so until a predetermined percentage of their force had
MIRVs. Kissinger was seeking to find a formula that limited both sides while avoiding
mentioning any hard numbers. Dobrynin could then tell his superiors back in Moscow
that they would not have to sign a treaty expressing a numerical differential: “We can
state it in such a way that even if a differential results it will not be expressed in such an
embarrassing manner,” said Kissinger.190
Kissinger’s offer would allow Dobrynin to save face with Moscow, and the USSR
to save face with the US. It demonstrated Kissinger’s desire to reach an accord, his
respect for Dobrynin, and an understanding of the Soviets’ need to be treated as a coequal superpower. It epitomized the empathetic form of diplomacy necessary to bring
about a thaw in Cold War tensions.
Later that month and amidst a Congressional investigation of Watergate, Nixon
returned to Moscow for the third summit. The fact that the Soviets had yet to deploy any
MIRVed missiles continued to complicate arms talks. This meant that any arrangement
would probably result in only the US halting its MIRV program with the Soviets then
being permitted to proceed until they had reached the agreed upon limit. 191 Such a deal
would face strong opposition from conservatives in Congress. Consequently, Kissinger
sought a freeze, but at a level which would give the United States a significant edge in

189

[January 1974-August 1974. Box #28.]
Ibid.
191
Nixon, 1031.
190

80

MIRVs due to the Soviet overall superiority in ICBMs. 192 He reasoned that if the Soviets
had more missiles, the US ought to be able to compensate by having more warheads.
According to Nixon, Brezhnev did not see it that way and hence no SALT II agreement
emerged from the third summit.193
Richard Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974, in light of the Watergate affair
posed several potential challenges for the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship. Would the
new president, Gerald Ford, adopt the policies of his predecessor? Would he be content
to conduct relations with the Soviet Union through the backchannel? Dobrynin reported
that when he met with Ford at the Soviet embassy the previous January, the VicePresident had said that if he became president “’by the chance of fate’” he would
continue détente and with Kissinger as his secretary of state.194 Accordingly, the day
before taking office Ford telephoned Kissinger and asked him to continue in his post at
the State Department.195 On August 12 Kissinger put Dobrynin at ease about the change
of administrations, but not before kidding him about the nomination of an old nemesis to
head the Defense Department:
K: I was just talking to the President and he said: When is Dobrynin
coming back? I said he’s supposed to come back early in September but if
I’m any judge of him, he’ll be back long before that.
D: (Laughter)
K: I just got through saying it. You’re making me a great man.
D: (Laughter) Well, Brezhnev thought I would feel much better close to
you than to being on his [dacha] on the Black Sea.
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K: No, but unfortunately we are going to make [Senator Henry] Jackson
Secretary of Defense so you came back too late.
D: (Laughter) No, I think it’s on the contrary. [I came back] Just to
congratulate him on this _____ in time. Don’t you think so?
Then later:
K: Well, I’m delighted you’re here. And you know I need not tell you that
things will continue as they were.
D: Yeah. Yes, thank you, Henry, very much. 196
Kissinger drew a stark contrast between Nixon and Ford. Although he believed
his former boss to be “one of the most gifted of American Presidents,” he added that
Nixon was also “obsessively incapable of overruling an interlocutor or even disagreeing
with him,” at least face-to-face.197 Kissinger described never knowing for sure what
Nixon would do, even after something appeared to have been decided, but under Ford
“what one saw was what one got.”198 A much more self-assured man, Ford felt free to
disagree and did not seem as concerned about who received the credit.199
Ford held his only summit with Brezhnev in November, 1974, at Vladivostok.
The different concerns of each side reflected structural differences and vulnerabilities in
their respective arsenals. The Americans generally focused on Soviet land-based ICBMs,
while the Soviets concentrated on American submarines and bombers. According to
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Ford and Kissinger wanted the Soviets to give
up a large part of their “heavy” ICBMs. 200 With their great throw weight, each one of
these missiles could potentially deliver several warheads at a time. Brezhnev responded
196
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that the heavy ICBMs were essential to Soviet security because of US nuclear weapons in
“forward position” in Europe.201 The Americans continued to insist that these missiles on
submarines and aircraft carriers in European waters were non-negotiable. According to
Ford, “We maintained our position from previous negotiations that our Forward Base
System of F-4s, F-111s and FB-111s as well as the nuclear weapons we had deployed in
Western Europe not be counted in our agreed-upon total of strategic weapons.”202
Brezhnev then requested that the US stop work on the Trident submarine as well as plans
to build the B-1 bomber.203 Ford again refused, claiming “We simply couldn’t rely on
our aging B-52s.”204
Nevertheless, the two sides did reach an agreement with significant arms
limitations. Each superpower could have a maximum of 2,400 total strategic arms
carriers, whether land, sea, or air-based and with a maximum of 1,320 equipped with
MIRVs.205 The limits would be in force from October, 1977 to December, 1985.206 The
Vladivostok Accords thereby enshrined the principle of “absolute equality” as demanded
by Jackson’s amendment to SALT I in 1972. 207 However, Dobrynin believed that the
Americans were never truly prepared to accept this new status quo with the Soviet
Union.208
Although Ford and Brezhnev reached a tentative agreement on SALT II, domestic
politics in both countries inhibited further progress. According to Ford, Brezhnev
201

Ibid.
Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 216.
203
Ibid.
204
Ibid.
205
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 336.
206
Ibid., 338.
207
Richard W. Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Détente – Relaxation of Tension in US-Soviet Relations,
1953-84 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 170.
208
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 337.
202

83

mentioned at Vladivostok that “some members of his Politburo didn’t believe détente was
a good idea.”209 Although the Politburo had attained a relative level of stability after the
purges of Stalin and reorganizations under Khrushchev, this also resulted in a
conservative and aged oligarchy, most of whom held lifetime positions.210 Brezhnev was
unquestionably the leader, but was also required to heed the opinions of his colleagues. 211
To complicate matters, while at the summit he suffered the first in a series of seizures
signaling arteriosclerosis of the brain which would eventually prove fatal. 212 From the
mid-1970s onward, Brezhnev was little more than a figurehead for the regime in
Moscow.213 His declining health played right into the hands of his more hard-line
opponents until his death in 1982.
Soviet politics also posed problems for Dobrynin. Some in the Party’s Central
Committee, the KGB, and the Foreign Ministry, perhaps jealous of his privileged position
as Soviet Ambassador to the United States, accused Dobrynin of becoming too
“Americanized” due to his long tenure and numerous connections in Washington. 214 The
charge could have implied that Dobrynin had grown too cozy with Kissinger and
therefore did not advocate sufficiently for the Soviet Union in its relations with the
United States.
In the US, Kissinger observed that many of the original motivations for engaging
in détente and arms control no longer existed by the time Ford entered office. 215 For
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example, Soviet cooperation in international matters such as ending the Vietnam War,
settling the question of free access to West Berlin, and restraint in the Middle East had
already been largely accomplished.216 As Kissinger put it, the main driving force for
SALT II was simply to keep détente going. 217 Therefore reaching a deal did not carry the
same urgency, leaving opponents less amenable to accepting a new treaty.
And there were many opponents. Liberals criticized the Vladivostok agreement
because it allowed both sides to build up to the ceilings. 218 Conservatives argued that
even though the Soviets had agreed to numerical equality, they still possessed the large
SS-18 missiles which had greater throw weight and could carry more warheads in a
single launch. 219 Furthermore, there was the question of how to verify that each side was
adhering to the treaty’s limits in the first place. 220
Technological issues also interfered with a SALT II agreement. SALT I
permitted the development of new weapons, and both the US and the USSR had taken
advantage of this. The Americans developed cruise missiles (which Kissinger described
as “pilotless airplanes” 221) that could fly below radar and carry nuclear weapons to their
target with great accuracy – something which the Soviets wanted counted in the
Vladivostok limits.222 On the other hand, the Soviet Union possessed a new bomber
dubbed “Backfire,” but since it could not reach American territory, the Soviets argued
that it was not technically a strategic weapon. 223 The Americans responded that if it was
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refueled in the air the new plane could reach the US homeland. 224 Kissinger conceded
that that argument could be made for almost any plane, however. 225
In response to political and international developments including the fall of
Saigon in April, Ford made several major changes to his cabinet in October, 1975. The
President told Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, a moderate Republican loathed by the
right wing of the party, that he would not be Ford’s running mate in 1976.226 White
House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld replaced James Schlesinger as Secretary of
Defense and George H.W. Bush, the future forty-first president, replaced William Colby
as CIA director.227 Most significantly for détente and the backchannel, Kissinger lost his
post as National Security Advisor to Brent Scowcroft, but remained Secretary of State.228
Kissinger no longer had as much access to the President nor did he chair several
interdepartmental policy-making committees.229 The “Halloween Massacre” of the
cabinet including Kissinger’s demotion represented Ford’s attempt to distance himself
from détente, and thereby mute political pressure from the right so he could focus on the
general election.230
Thus 1976 began with no SALT II agreement in sight and with Ford facing the
reality that some Americans believed détente had been an all around foreign policy
disaster. The President, who upon being appointed by Nixon to the vice-presidency
humbly stated, “I’m a Ford, not a Lincoln,” encountered accusations of being an
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accidental president who only held the office due to Nixon’s resignation. 231 His need to
be formally elected to the White House intensified the significance of the impending
presidential election in November. Consequently, his administration stopped using the
word détente in its discussions of Soviet-American relations in favor of peace through
strength. In light of such developments from 1974-1976, Dobrynin referred to
Vladivostok as the high point of détente, but also as the beginning of its decline. 232
Kissinger and Dobrynin had too much invested in détente and were determined to
press forward with SALT II. On January 16, 1976, they discussed plans for another
Kissinger visit to Moscow:
K: I am committing political suicide going to Moscow at this time.
D: I would not go that far but I understand [the] political danger.
K: I am doing it because we owe it to history to try and make another
effort. If we fail they will say he should not have gone and if we succeed
all hell will break loose.233
Kissinger left for Moscow on January 19, and met Brezhnev two days later. 234 He
believed Brezhnev poisoned the proceedings when in answer to a reporter’s question
about the recent Marxist takeover in Angola the Soviet leader “rubb[ed] our noses in our
defeat” and thereby “destroyed whatever sentiment was left in the United States for
agreements with the Kremlin.” 235 Nevertheless, the meetings proceeded and American
cruise missiles and the Soviet backfire bomber remained issues of contention. 236 After
some haggling, Kissinger and Brezhnev compromised over maximum flight ranges and
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numerical limitations for each. 237 Having tentatively reached a deal, the Americans and
Soviets predicted a SALT II treaty later in the year.238
However, after a January 21 meeting of the National Security Council the
Pentagon rejected the agreement.239 Dobrynin cited the growing tension between
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Kissinger as making it almost impossible for the
White House to have one articulate view on SALT.240 Former California Governor
Ronald Reagan, an adamant critic of détente and arms control with the Soviet Union,
further dampened chances for an arms control treaty by running against Ford in the 1976
Republican primaries.241 In February, Ford decided that there should be no more talks on
SALT II until after the election. 242 American domestic politics was preventing progress
on a second arms agreement just when a new treaty became more pressing for Brezhnev’s
leadership due to the upcoming Communist Party Congress scheduled later that year. 243
Meanwhile détente’s critics on the right had begun to organize. The Committee
on the Present Danger viewed the Ford administration as naïve and therefore sought to
publicize what it perceived as the negative strategic consequences for the United States of
the Soviet buildup.244 Beginning with Paul Nitze, who had helped draft the Marshall Plan
under Truman, the organization grew to include former members of the Johnson, Nixon,
and Ford administrations as well. 245 On March 12, 1976, Eugene V. Rostow – Under
Secretary of State for Johnson, David Packard – Deputy Defense Secretary under Nixon,
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James Schlesinger – Ford’s former Defense Secretary, and many other foreign and
defense policy experts met for an organizational meeting at the Metropolitan Club in
Washington, D.C.246 Other members included anticommunist labor leaders George
Meany, Jay Lovestone, and Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO, Rachelle Horowitz and
Albert Shanker of the teachers union, John H. Lyons of the steelworkers, J.G. Turner of
the engineers, and Martin Ward from the plumbers.247 In addition to the group’s
founding document, “Common Sense and the Common Danger,” numerous other
committee papers provided intellectual fodder for the right in general and for the
presidential campaigns of Ronald Reagan in particular in 1976 and 1980. 248
Perhaps sensing the final outcome, Kissinger and Dobrynin occasionally spoke
nostalgically during the presidential campaign. At one meeting in June, Dobrynin
described Kissinger as “gloomy.” 249 The Secretary of State had largely lost the
President’s ear to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the new National Security Advisor,
Scowcroft. It was an unusual position for Kissinger, and as Dobrynin put it, “enforced
idleness…was not his natural state.”250 In a conversation on October 29, Kissinger
blamed Congress, the North Vietnamese, and the Soviets for straining détente and SovietAmerican relations.251 To which Dobrynin replied, “’We are no saints, but neither are the
Americans.’”252 Kissinger assured his colleague that his words were merely “’a short
historical excursus,’” and not meant to start an argument.253
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Ultimately, a Kissinger-Dobrynin engineered SALT II agreement was not to be.
In 1976, Jimmy Carter narrowly defeated Ford to win the presidency. The negative
blowback from Ford’s pardon of Nixon may have been the difference. Ford’s defeat also
meant the end of Henry Kissinger’s tenure as Secretary of State. Likewise, it signaled the
end of the eight year Kissinger-Dobrynin special relationship as it had developed in the
backchannel. Nevertheless, Dobrynin called détente Kissinger’s “indisputable personal
achievement as a statesman.” 254
The day after the election on November 3, Dobrynin offered his condolences to
Kissinger and both men pondered what might have been:
D: I just wanted to say to you that I am going to miss you - - in the future I
mean.
K: I will miss you too. If it is possible to have a Marxist friend…
D: No problem. It was so narrow.
K: If we had obtained a SALT agreement we would have won.
D: That is my impression. I think it would have changed the outcome.
K: I will stand outside the government for what I have stood for inside.
You can be sure of that.
D: I know. Perhaps we can sit down quietly sometime and talk.
K: I would like that. I owe you an apology. Believe me I did not know
what they were doing. It was inexcusable.
D: It is o.k.
K: O.K., Anatol, thank you.255
Kissinger’s mention of an apology to Dobrynin probably stemmed from the nature of the
Ford campaign. Ford felt pressure from liberals to distance himself from détente because
254
255

Ibid.
Kissinger Transcripts. U.S. Department of State.

90

of its association with Nixon and Watergate. Meanwhile, the charge by Reagan and other
conservatives that détente had been nothing more than appeasement of the Soviet Union
drove the administration to abandon even mentioning the term. For Dobrynin and
Kissinger, after nearly eight years of working together a repudiation of the policy must
have felt like a repudiation of them and their relationship as well.
Kissinger and Dobrynin had their greatest successes in the arms control arena for
two reasons. First, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that reigning in
the growth of nuclear weapons was a necessity and an appropriate topic for state-to-state
relations. Secondly, despite the competing visions of the superpower relationship
embodied in the American balance of power and Soviet correlation of forces doctrines,
the transcripts revealed that Kissinger and Dobrynin each perceived that the other was
well-intentioned and sincerely committed to preventing the unthinkable – nuclear war.
However, when the issue was human rights – touching on the relationship between a state
and its people, or foreign interventions – involving one or the other superpower and a
third nation, the Americans and Soviets had radically divergent opinions as to the
appropriateness of its inclusion in bilateral negotiations. The issues of human rights and
foreign interventions also brought ideological differences between the Americans and
Soviets into greater focus. These differences would test Kissinger and Dobrynin as well
as the fate of détente.
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CHAPTER 2
Human Rights: A Diplomatic Issue or an Internal Affair?
“An attempt to transform the Soviet system – not by starting an historical process of
erosion, the means we favored, but by insisting on instant conversion – was certain to be
fiercely resisted by the Soviet Politburo. What are Bolsheviks if not experts in the
seizure and holding of power?”1
-Henry Kissinger
“So the crucial difference in the Soviet and American approaches to the issue was that
while the Americans wanted to export to the Soviet Union its free humanitarian and
commercial values, the Soviet government simply wanted the commercial benefits of
trade, but not the political values.” 2
- Anatoly Dobrynin
As with arms control, conflicting American and Soviet views of human rights
complicated détente. Despite being one of the most controversial issues of the time,
however, the topic appeared relatively infrequently in the Kissinger-Dobrynin telcons.
While SALT, ABM, Vietnam, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War merited numerous
and lengthy discussions, human rights conversations were relatively few and far between.
Although it would be easy to conclude that neither Kissinger nor Dobrynin cared about
the issue, that would be an oversimplification. In their view the central purpose of
détente was to maintain peace and preserve the greatest human right – the right to life.
Nevertheless, human rights ended up playing a major role in American domestic
opposition to détente as well as in the Soviet response to that opposition.
In this chapter I will argue that the telephone transcripts show that Kissinger and
Dobrynin understood the domestic pressures and limitations faced by the other when
dealing with the human rights issue. Kissinger recognized Moscow’s sensitivity to
discussions of internal matters, and so brought up human rights with Dobrynin somewhat
1
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reluctantly and only when necessary to improve the overall political and public
atmosphere for détente. Likewise, Dobrynin sought concessions from his government on
Jewish emigration and other human rights concerns due to his understanding of the
issue’s potential effects on American public opinion and by extension upon relaxing
tensions. However, as the issue was taken out of the backchannel and public diplomacy
replaced private diplomacy, it resulted in intensified repression in the short term and
harm to détente in the long term.
The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I will discuss the scholarship’s
views regarding the effects of human rights on détente and vice versa. Then I will
present conversations demonstrating how Kissinger and Dobrynin dealt with three
contentious issues: Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, the Helsinki Accords, and
individual cases involving family reunification, defectors, and political prisoners.

Human Rights and Détente
The Russian people had long endured oppression. Writer and editor on Soviet
affairs Abraham Brumberg noted that “the history of Russia [was] replete with struggles
against tyranny – from the peasant revolts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to
the revolutionary outbreaks of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” 3 The Russian
Revolution of 1917 resulted in more of the same. “The movement for a just and classless
society in Russia began with unbridled violence, denying millions of people all rights
except the right to support Bolshevik policy,” wrote Volkogonov.4 Likewise, historians
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with such divergent viewpoints as Richard Pipes, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Martin Malia all
agreed that the revolution leading to the birth of the Soviet state was littered with human
rights atrocities.5 This continued under Stalin when all resistance was crushed. 6
After a period of de-Stalinization under Khrushchev, Brezhnev’s regime from
1964-1982 resulted in a regression and the birth of the dissident movement. According to
Robert V. Daniels, the Soviet leadership “did everything it could short of mass
executions to put a lid on the expression of dissident thought,” starting with the 1966 trial
of writers Andrei Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel. 7 Government methods of intimidation and
punishment included “selective trials and imprisonment,” internal and external exile, and
obstruction of educational or professional advancement, explained Robert Strayer.8
Although a complete return to Stalinism was not politically possible, Volkogonov
claimed that Brezhnev believed in returning to some aspects of it. 9 Meanwhile Zubok
argued that the majority of the Soviet leadership in this era favored abandoning deStalinization and supported “greater suppression of cultural diversity, and the freezing of
liberal trends in culture and art.”10 However, according to Strayer, “[h]ere and there,
‘oases of open thinking’ permitted some original work, even in the social sciences.” 11
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By the 1970s the dissident movement stood at several thousand. 12 Although small
in numbers, they developed an array of tactics to combat the Soviet regime. Chief among
these was taking advantage of increased contact with the Western press as a result of
détente.13 Activists such as Aleksandr Ginzburg publicized violations of the Soviet
Constitution and laws, as well as of international agreements like the 1948 UN
Declaration on Human Rights and the 1975 Helsinki Accords.14
The KGB under Yuri Andropov from 1967-1982 played a key role in punishing
dissidents who engaged in such activities. According to Zhores Medvedev, the Soviet
security service “began to be more careful in the preparation of cases, to plant evidence,
to infiltrate dissident organizations and to use more technical methods of surveillance.” 15
Classifying political opponents as mentally ill and using psychiatric institutions for
punishment increased as well. 16 Arnold Beichman and Mikhail S. Bernstam referred to
the use of psychiatry and pharmaceuticals as “the unique achievement of the secret police
during the Andropov era.”17 Thus when Andropov became General Secretary in 1982 it
represented “a logical conclusion” to a period of intensified repression, according to
British historian Paul Johnson. 18
However, Brezhnevism was not Stalinism. Unlike the arbitrariness of the past,
“most of the time, Brezhnev’s KGB arrested people for something [italics in original] – if
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not for a genuine criminal act, then for their literary, religious, or political opposition to
the Soviet system,” according to Anne Applebaum.19 In other words, dissidents in the
1970s at least “knew why they had been arrested.”20 Furthermore, Amnesty International
estimated that in the mid-1970s at most ten-thousand of the one million people held in
Soviet prisons were there for political crimes, a low number compared to under Stalin. 21
The scholarship from the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated that détente may
have led to a new emphasis on human rights in international relations, but only
inadvertently so. For example, Frederick C. Barghoorn explained that human rights did
not become an issue in East-West relations until Soviet dissidents began to speak out.
Andrei Sakharov and others, perhaps emboldened by greater contact with the West,
argued that a government which “deprives its own citizens of elementary civil rights and
freedoms” would not “promote humane and democratic values” in its foreign policy. 22
However, Karl E. Birnbaum asserted that détente encouraged human rights advocates in
the West as well. “In the United States and Western Europe a growing interest in ‘the
human dimension’ of world politics [was] seen by many as a natural and healthy reaction
to an overemphasis on great power diplomacy, elitist cynicism, and to excessive
secretness during the recent past,” wrote Birnbaum.23 Predictably, with increased
expectations came increased conflicts between communist governments and their
citizens.24 Communist leaders often viewed human rights as a subversive threat and
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activists as either “’criminal elements’” or “’foreign agents.’” 25 Meanwhile, the West had
to balance its support for individual rights and the independence of Eastern bloc nations
with its desire to pursue détente with the Soviet Union.26
Simes stipulated that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States originally
intended for detente to address human rights. If anything, the Kremlin increased its
emphasis on ideology as a means to rally the domestic audience in support for the regime
and insulate it from the effects of increased contact with the West, he explained. 27 Nixon
and Kissinger aided this effort by not linking détente to political reforms within the
Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc. 28 Consequently, during the first summit in 1972 the
Soviets did not hesitate to arrest Jewish activists and hold them for the duration of
Nixon’s visit.29
Thus President Carter’s public focus on human rights represented more than a
change in approach. According to Simes, Moscow saw it as a fundamental attack on
détente because it believed the point of relaxing tensions with Washington was “to
strengthen the Kremlin’s international positions” as well as “improve the performance of
the troubled Soviet economy through investments, credits, and technology transfers.”30
Demands for domestic reforms contradicted the Soviet view of détente “as a substitute
for internal innovations” and a “’peaceful offensive’ against the West,” he added. 31
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Sandy Vogelgesang, a State Department official under President Carter, explained
that one of the principle reasons for the injection of human rights into international
diplomacy in the 1970s was simply greater awareness. Vogelgesang credited global
communications, international organizations like the United Nations, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with publicizing “man’s inhumanity to man” as
never before.32 Violations ranged from appalling poverty, to torture, to “death squads.” 33
Most troubling of all, prospects for improvement looked dim. By the end of the decade
Amnesty International claimed serious violations were occurring in over one hundred
countries, and Freedom House noted that authoritarian governments outnumbered
democratic ones 2:1.34

The Role of Ideology
Some of the initial scholarship asserted that ideology lay at the root of the conflict
over human rights. Mary Hawkesworth argued that from the Soviet point of view the
United States had no credibility on the issue because “the capitalist, by definition, [was]
the offender of human rights.”35 Therefore, American human rights advocacy amounted
to mere “deceptive propaganda,” designed to destroy socialism. 36
Furthermore according to Hawkesworth, bourgeois liberalism and MarxismLeninism operated from different premises. Western-style liberalism evolved from
natural law theory and assumed certain moral absolutes including the inherent value of all
32
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people. 37 On the other hand, Marxism-Leninism argued that morals were relative. The
theory rejected Western values because it considered them to be mere creations of the
property-owning class (bourgeoisie) as a means of protecting its dominant position in
society.38 Writing of the bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels argued:
Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois
production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the
will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character
and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of
your class. 39
In essence, the Marxist-Leninist viewed Western notions of human rights as illegitimate
because they emanated from class-based societies, and as long as classes existed there
could be neither freedom nor equality. 40
In contrast to the American notion of unalienable natural rights granted from the
Creator as expressed in the Declaration of Independence (1776), the Soviet Constitution
of 1977 espoused what Hawkesworth called “the contingency of rights,” based upon
whether an individual did work beneficial to all of society.

41

Only those who did such

work could enjoy economic rights like food, clothing, shelter, work, rest, and education,
which the Soviets prioritized above American political rights such as freedom of speech,
the press, and religion. 42
Also citing ideological considerations was Geoffrey Edwards, rapporteur to the
Helsinki Review Group – monitors of compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Accords on
human rights. He claimed that the Soviet Constitution contained “an uneasy dualism”
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between the rights of the individual and those of the state.43 In general, the West believed
that when conflicts arose between the individual and the state, the rights of the former
must prevail, whereas the East favored the latter, he added. 44 While the Soviet
Constitution did list specific individual rights, it stipulated that the interests of the party
and state took precedence. Additionally, rights were “’inseparable’” from “’duties and
obligations.’”45 Although the Soviet Constitution guaranteed equality for all citizens, the
exception made for political opponents of the state rendered this provision as well as the
human rights protections of the Helsinki Accords essentially meaningless. 46 “In a
people’s state, it would seem, only enemy agents, criminals and the insane could be
opposed to the system,” wrote Edwards.47

Human Rights vs. Détente?
From the mid-1980s on the scholarship was nearly unanimous that détente led to
increased repression behind the Iron Curtain. With increased repression came greater
Western demands to respect human rights norms, ultimately leading to greater conflict
and contributing to the demise of détente. Perhaps this result should not have been
surprising. The Soviets rarely if ever expressed concerns about discrimination or the
status of civil rights in the United States, and so were baffled by the Americans’ interest
in Moscow’s domestic policies. As Ulam noted in 1983: “It ran against the grain for the
Kremlin to countenance American interference and protests on matters as sensitive as the
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official treatment of dissidents, whether and in what numbers Soviet Jews would be
allowed to emigrate, etc.”48 Furthermore, Gelman argued that there was an inherent
tension between Washington’s demands for human rights reforms and Moscow’s
conception of détente. At the same time that the Americans pressed for internal reforms
in the Soviet Union, the Soviets actually intensified their repression against dissidents “as
a precaution against the ideological contamination” which they anticipated from relaxed
tensions, explained Gelman.49 Richard W. Stevenson claimed that although Americans
initially accepted détente’s neutral position on human rights, as time went on many in the
US became concerned by the Soviet “intensification of the ideological struggle” and
“internal police measures.”50
Joshua Muravcik credited President Jimmy Carter with permanently making
human rights a part of American foreign policy. Although he described this as “a good
idea,” Muravcik also conceded, “implementing this idea [was] difficult.” 51 One
challenge was how to encourage respect for human rights in another society from the
outside. 52 The other was preventing this goal from interfering with other important
foreign policy goals.53 The complexity of pursing détente with the Soviet Union while
promoting human rights was a perfect illustration of this conundrum.

48

Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous Relations – The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983), 120-121.
49
Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984), 148.
50
Richard W. Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Détente – Relaxations of Tension in US-Soviet Relations,
1954-84 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 183.
51
Joshua Muravcik, The Uncertain Crusade – Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy
(Lanham, Maryland: Hamilton Press, 1986), xix.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.

101

Many scholars agreed with Nelson that the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson
Amendments (1974) “dealt détente a stunning blow.”54 In passing these two pieces of
legislation, Congress tied the US-Soviet Trade Act of 1975 to increased levels of
emigration for Soviet Jews. According to Nelson, it left Brezhnev with no choice but to
abandon “what he most wanted and promised” – increased trade with America. 55
Thereafter, US-Soviet trade was cut nearly in half. 56
According to Volkogonov, the human rights issue illustrated the contradictions in
Soviet society at the time of détente. “Paradoxically, at the very moment when the Soviet
Union achieved military-strategic parity with the USA, and at the peak of its nuclear
might, it began to experience growing spiritual uncertainty,” he wrote. 57 Moscow could
not explain away human rights abuses, citizens wishing to emigrate, or economic
underperformance. 58 Consequently, “Brezhnev was the leader of a state whose military
power did not correspond to its spiritual base,” he concluded. 59

Dissident Intolerance
Some Soviet citizens sought refuge in the West where they were often lionized for
standing up to political oppression. However, Kennan observed as early as 1972 that
many of them, “’however such people might hate their Soviet masters, [had] ideas about
democracy [which] were primitive and curious in the extreme.’” 60 Simes noted in 1978
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that despite their experiences many exiles “display[ed] remarkable intolerance of even
minor disagreement.”61 In the mid-80s Stephen F. Cohen agreed, describing many
émigrés as having a level of tolerance which “[did] not greatly exceed that of their former
government.”62 Cohen explained that some even viewed fellow dissident and historian
Roy Medvedev as a traitor simply because he advocated returning to what he considered
the pure democratic socialism of Lenin, uncorrupted by Stalin. 63
Soviet exile and author of The Gulag Archipelago Alexander Solzhenitsyn was
one of the most notoriously illiberal exiles. Solzhenitsyn expressed “warm words” for
Spain’s fascist dictator Franco, and seemed bothered by the “’surplus’ of freedom in the
West,” wrote Simes. 64 Nevertheless, Hayward called Gulag “a turning point in the
intellectual life of the Cold War – a mortal wound to the socialist faith.” 65 He credited
Solzhenitsyn’s opus with leading French intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy, a former leader
of the French Socialist Party, to “break with the French left.”66
Besides shining a light on human rights abuses in the Soviet prison system,
Solzhenitsyn aggressively attacked détente. He urged the United States to end sales of
food and technology and to cease signing treaties with the Soviet Union. 67 However,
Solzhenitsyn’s “extreme anti-liberalism…quickly alienated him from his liberal
champions in the West,” noted Heyward.68
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Henry Kissinger and Human Rights
Biographies and other works focusing on Kissinger have much to say regarding
the relationship between human rights and détente. Hugh M. Arnold argued that much of
the criticism of détente was directed at Kissinger personally because he placed security
and economics ahead of all else. 69 Kissinger acknowledged that his secretive style and
reliance on principles like “national interest” and “balance of power” in foreign policy
offended believers in Wilsonian liberal idealism. 70
One of the most notable examples occurred in Chile. According to Horne, Nixon
feared that just as Truman had “lost China” and Kennedy had “lost Cuba” to
communism, he might be blamed for “losing Chile,” after Salvador Allende was
democratically elected president in 1970. 71 Consequently, Kissinger and CIA Director
Richard Helms “became galvanized into action.”72 As Arnold explained, Kissinger is
believed to have contributed to the September, 1973, military overthrow of Allende due
to his socialist orientation, but to have disregarded accusations of torture on the part of
Augusto Pinochet’s successor regime because it was deemed pro-American. 73
Nevertheless, Horne argued that memcons and telcons “show an exceptional paucity of
communication between Kissinger, the White House, and security organs concerning
Chile in the run-up to September 1973.”74 By the time of the coup, “Chile was distinctly
off even the back burner,” he concluded. 75 However, Dallek asserted that first the White
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House sought to prevent Allende from taking office as a democratically elected president,
and then used economic and political tools including the CIA to support his opponents
thereafter.76 In doing so, Nixon and Kissinger violated “traditional U.S. claims to the
right of national self-determination for all peoples,” he argued. 77 Dallek noted that not
even the reports of four thousand deaths prevented the White House from recognizing
and supporting the new government in Santiago. 78 Kissinger believed that protests
against Pinochet were part of “a more general impulse to punish other U.S. allies for
human rights abuses that would open the way to left-leaning regimes around the globe.”79
However, despite his reputation for being amoral and even callous, Kissinger did
not completely ignore human rights. Arnold’s study of the Department of State Bulletin
from 1969-1976 found “a marked increase in emphasis on human rights issues by
Kissinger as time passed,” including “twice as many references to human rights concerns
in 1976 as in all previous years combined.”80 Furthermore, “Kissinger drastically shifted
his focus and emphasis on the issue from the expression of perfunctory, obligatory
niceties to strong statements of condemnation…” wrote Arnold. 81
Certainly politics drove much of the change in Kissinger’s posture. First,
Congress bristled at the Nixon and Ford administrations’ apparent “indifference” to
human rights and sought to gain control of foreign policy. 82 Then in 1976 Jimmy Carter
gave human rights a central position in his campaign for the presidency. If not just to
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defend his record, but to also ensure Ford’s election and protect his own position as
Secretary of State, Kissinger spoke more frequently and intensely on human rights.
Nevertheless, Kissinger never completely abandoned his belief that private
diplomacy was the best way to handle human rights questions. Countries viewed as
strategically significant, including Iran and South Korea, continued to evade public
condemnation for their abuses, leading Arnold to quip: “The trouble with the quiet
diplomacy approach was that it was sometimes inaudible.” 83
Some scholars argued that Kissinger’s apparent apathy on human rights matters
not only damaged détente, but also emboldened critics on the left and right. For example,
Isaacson wrote:
One common theme expressed by conservatives, neoconservatives, and
many liberals was that the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to détente was
too cold and calculating, too focused on a realpolitik concern with power
balances, and thus gave short shrift to human rights and the fundamental
ideals that should undergird American policy. 84
Jimmy Carter “embraced this human rights line of attack against détente,” said
Isaacson. 85 Meanwhile, conservatives led by Ronald Reagan denounced negotiations for
a European security conference (ultimately culminating in the 1975 Helsinki Accords)
which would grant legitimacy to the communist regimes in the Eastern bloc, and thereby
make permanent the Soviet gains from World War II. For the right, such talks amounted
to “new Yalta-like sellouts of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.”86 Consequently Isaacson
noted that attacking détente “helped propel the careers of two future presidents.” 87
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Likewise, Hanhimaki argued that Jimmy Carter used Kissinger’s human rights
record to great effect in his presidential race against Gerald Ford. “Morality had a
contingent quality in his foreign policy and Kissinger could not explain it away,” wrote
Hanhimaki. 88 For example, Kissinger “pushed Rhodesia toward accepting a transition
from apartheid to majority rule,” but would not “openly” pursue human rights with the
Soviets.89 Kissinger denied there was a “double standard” and claimed his
“nonconfrontational policies” with Moscow led to increased emigration from the Soviet
Union.90 Kissinger also cited the Helsinki Accords where for the first time communist
nations acknowledged human rights as an issue in international diplomacy. 91
Politically, the injection of human rights into détente put Kissinger “on the
rhetorical defensive,” wrote Suri. 92 Kissinger had “shaped public discussions about
foreign policy during his first years in office,” he explained. 93 However, “atrocities
committed by American allies, combined with the images of suffering from the Vietnam
War, raised broad international concern about the human effects of foreign policy in the
1970s.”94 Congress intervened by forcing Kissinger to create a position later known as
the assistant secretary of state for human rights, as well as by conducting investigations
via the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations (also known as “the
Church Committee”) which reported on CIA covert activities in Chile. 95
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Two of the newest biographies of Kissinger have emphasized his life experiences
and worldview in an attempt to explain his stance on human rights. For example, in 2007
Dallek suggested that Kissinger’s contacts with Holocaust survivors deeply influenced
him. Himself Jewish, Kissinger learned from camp victims that “[i]mpulses to dwell on
past horrors would produce sorrow and self-pity,” and signified weakness.96 The
survivors who fared best after the war were those who “’applied themselves to the peace
with the same singleness of purpose and sometimes the same disregard of accepted
standards,’” which they had adopted in the camps. 97 Additionally, Kissinger learned to
be “sensibly suspicious of human nature and human behavior,” and therefore “distrusted
the good intentions of others,” wrote Dallek. 98 Like many survivors, Kissinger also
questioned the purpose of religion and the existence of God.99
In 2009 Horne described Kissinger’s worldview as “pessimistic,” “strongly
influenced by his German provenance,” and “always that of the historian, concerned
primarily with statecraft.”100 Any sacrifice of human rights to realpolitik came from a
belief in “the overriding importance of order in an essentially anarchic world.” 101
Kissinger believed that preserving order provided “the maximum well-being of the
majority of citizens.”102 In this regard, Horne believed that Kissinger bore a great
similarity to nineteenth century European diplomats including Austria’s Metternich and
Britain’s Castlereagh. 103
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Just recently, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide
by Gary J. Bass documented the White House’s role in the 1970-1971 Pakistani Civil
War. According to Bass, when East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, launched a
separatist movement from dominant West Pakistan, the military government in Islamabad
responded in brutal fashion.104 Despite CIA and State Department estimates that as many
as 200,000 Bengalis had been killed with 10,000,000 more being forced to flee to India,
“Nixon and Kissinger stood stoutly behind Pakistan’s generals,” wrote Bass. 105 Viewing
Pakistan as a vital Cold War ally (Islamabad was helping Washington with its opening to
Beijing) as opposed to its rival India with “pro-Soviet leanings,” the White House
ignored the reports of Archer K. Blood, US general counsel in East Pakistan, as well as
US Ambassador to India Kenneth B. Keating (formerly a Republican senator from New
York) that a human rights catastrophe and even genocide was being perpetrated upon the
Hindu minority in Bangladesh.106

Jewish Emigration
In the 1970s American Jewish activists began pressuring the Soviet Union to alter
its emigration policies, which Dobrynin believed did more damage to détente than any
other issue. 107 According to him, “Jewish extremist groups” picketed the Soviet embassy
on nearly a daily basis and Soviet offices in Washington and New York were exposed to
explosions and rifle shots.108 Privately, Jewish leaders and the White House condemned
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such actions by groups including Meir Kahane’s Jewish Defense League. 109 Dobrynin
also credited the US State Department for providing security and recommending Soviet
diplomats and their families exercise extreme caution.110
Emigration embarrassed the Soviets because it suggested that communism had
failed to create the ideal society. Kissinger understood this well. For his part, Dobrynin
knew the saliency of human rights to the American public. By opting for quiet
diplomacy both could feel free to reply to each other’s requests on emigration and other
issues favorably without appearing to “capitulate.”111 Kissinger described how he and
Dobrynin handled the issue privately:
No formal requests were made, and no formal responses were given.
Soviet actions were noted without being acknowledged. Indeed, the
emigration practices of the Soviet Union were steadily improving, though
no claim to that effect was ever made by Washington. The Nixon
Administration stuck to these ground rules so meticulously that it never
claimed any credit for improving Soviet emigration practices-even during
election campaigns-…”112
As détente’s fortunes flourished via the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel, so did
those of Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. From 1970-1973 the numbers increased
steadily: 1,000 in 1970, 15,000 in 1971, 30,000 in 1972, and finally 35,000 in 1973.113
The 65,000 emigrants from 1972-1973 corresponded to when détente was at its height. 114
Moscow’s change in policy probably resulted from several factors including a desire for a
“safety valve” to release pressure from a “disaffected but homogenous” group of
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citizens.115 The expectation that Washington would reciprocate with some future gesture
of its own could have also played a part.116 Nevertheless, many Soviet Jews continued to
suffer from delays, harassment, and refusals. 117
Jewish Emigrants from the Soviet Union, 1970-1975
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However, if the issue arose outside of the backchannel then Kissinger and
Dobrynin handled it quite differently. When a staff member brought a letter calling
attention to the plight of Soviet Jews directly to Nixon, Dobrynin expressed his concern
to Kissinger. After some investigation, the following discussion occurred on February
15, 1972:
K: …I have looked into this matter of the letter about the Jewish problem.
D: Yes.
K: There is no consolation in the result, but I can assure you it was the
result of an overeager staff man who brought it in without explaining what
it was about. I can tell you privately that the President is extremely angry.
D: I don’t care about the specifics of it.
K: I just wanted you to know. If we want to needle you, we will find
another way to do it.
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D: It creates some publicity which goes back home.
K: You let your people know about this.
D: I would like it not to happen in the future. In this particular case, it
doesn’t matter.
K: It will not happen in the future without my telling you first.118
Kissinger’s embarrassment as well as Dobrynin’s annoyance at what they both viewed as
a violation of diplomatic etiquette was readily apparent. They had an understanding that
such issues would be handled privately, through the backchannel. Kissinger assured
Dobrynin that in the future he would notify him of anything posing such potential
negative publicity. However, “the Jewish problem” was not going away.
Based upon an agreement signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the June, 1972,
Moscow summit, the Trade Reform Act of 1972 held numerous potential benefits for
both superpowers. The USSR would obtain Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status
and thereby benefit from lower tariffs on Russian imports including vodka, while the US
would finally receive $722 million owed from the World War II lend-lease program. 119
Although MFN only provided the same trading benefits which over one hundred other
nations enjoyed, Kissinger believed that to the Soviets it conferred legitimacy, respect,
and above all, equality. 120 Nixon and Kissinger also calculated that MFN could be
offered as a quid pro quo in exchange for Soviet restraint internationally. 121 Both
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countries would prosper from a greater exchange of goods, with the added benefit for the
US of increasing democracy’s influence behind the Iron Curtain. 122
However, on August 3 Moscow began charging a 25,000 exit tax on emigrants.123
The Soviets justified the tax as a means to reimburse the government for educational
expenses. 124 Once again, Kissinger’s nemesis Senator Jackson entered the debate. On
October 4 he and seventy-one co-sponsors introduced an amendment to the trade bill. 125
What would become known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment mandated that the United
States would only award MFN status to countries with non-market based economies
provided that they removed their emigration restrictions. 126 The intent behind the
legislation was primarily to force the Soviet Union to allow its Jewish citizens to leave
the country. Democratic Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio introduced his
corresponding bill in the House on October 10.127
The White House had no official comment on the tax. 128 However, the public had
much to say. Special consultant to the president on Israel and Jewish affairs Leonard
Garment told Kissinger, “The Russian issue is flooding my desk.” 129 Kissinger called the
American Jewish community “self-serving.”130 To him Jackson-Vanik represented a
cynical attempt to “extend the conventional criticism of Nixon’s alleged moral
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insensitivity into new areas of policy, including foreign affairs, in which Nixon’s
competence had heretofore gone unchallenged.”131
To Dobrynin, the amendment was part of “a vitriolic but politically sophisticated
campaign” which damaged American-Soviet relations from then on.132 However, he also
could not understand why his government would not remove its restrictions on Jewish
emigration. His believed that doing so would have eliminated a persistent source of
conflict with the West and particularly the Americans. 133 He also claimed that the
Politburo never gave a reasonable answer when queried privately on the issue. 134 Some
Soviet leaders held to Stalin’s view of emigrants as traitors, others argued that Jews had
knowledge of state secrets due to their work in scientific fields, and some feared that
increased Jewish emigration would alienate Moscow’s allies in the Arab world.135
Indeed, the Kremlin was probably eager to return to the good graces of Egypt in
particular after its president, Anwar Sadat, expelled all Soviet troops in July. 136
However, with remarkable candor Dobrynin opined that the real reason for restricting
Jewish emigration derived from Moscow’s fear “of emigration in general (irrespective of
nationality or religion) lest an escape hatch from the happy land of socialism seem to
offer a degree of liberalization that might destabilize the domestic situation.” 137
Ultimately, the answer to the mystery of the exit tax may lie with Politburo
member and Chief Party Ideologist Mikhail Suslov. According to biographer Serge
Petroff, “Suslov continued to remind the leadership that the Soviet Union had an
131
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ideological rather than a national basis for its existence.”138 Consequently, even at a state
of détente Suslov tended to advocate for an increased emphasis on the ideological
struggle with the West in order to inoculate the Soviet Union from the corrupting effects
of greater Western contact.139 Dobrynin reported that Suslov had been left in charge in
Moscow while Brezhnev and Gromyko were vacationing on the Black Sea. 140 He
suspected that Suslov personally opposed both détente and relaxing emigration rules and
so agreed to the tax.141
Despite Kissinger’s and Dobrynin’s previous success in the backchannel, Senator
Jackson would not be satisfied with quiet diplomacy when it came to human rights – he
believed that American advocacy had to be unambiguous. 142 Dobrynin claimed that
Jackson sought victory over the Soviets in order to further his political career. 143
Meanwhile Kissinger called it a “pity” that although the White House and the Senator
had the same goals on emigration, they could not agree upon the same “tactics.” 144
Regardless of how well-intentioned he may have been, Jackson undoubtedly had political
motives as well for introducing his amendment. In addition to attracting Jewish votes in
his home state, he had plans to run for president in 1976.145 Likewise, co-sponsor Vanik
served many Jewish constituents in his Cleveland, Ohio congressional district. 146
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As the controversy intensified, Treasury Secretary George Schultz was scheduled
to visit Moscow in the spring of 1973 for talks on expanding trade. On March 12,
Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed the visit as well as the need to keep talk of Jewish
emigration quiet because of its potentially detrimental effects on détente:
D: You know, we could discuss right now why I decided to call you, not
because of the situation, but chiefly I received a telegram from Brezhnev
in connection with [what] you asked about Shultz [sic].
K: Yeah.
D: he just ask[ed] me to tell you that definitely he is going to receive
Shultz.
K: That’s a good idea.
D: So, you may be sure that Brezhnev will receive Shultz. And he said to
me, I told you so, so what is the question.
K: Evidently, Anatol, it might be just as well if you didn’t raise the Jewish
question with Shultz.
D: Don’t raise with Shultz.
K: Don’t raise it, because, unless there is something positive you want to
say, because if you do raise and then you see, he is not quite as devious as
I am, he may report something honestly which causes us trouble with the
Congress.
D: I see, okay.147
As the Treasury Secretary making an official visit, Schultz operated outside of the
backchannel and could be called upon to comment publicly or even testify before
Congress about the trip. Kissinger’s concern for avoiding any public mention of Jewish
emigration led him to ask Dobrynin to not bring up the subject with Schultz. While one
could question the ethics of conducting foreign policy in this manner, it demonstrated
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how Kissinger understood Soviet sensitivity vis-à-vis their domestic policies. It also
showed both men’s dedication to quiet diplomacy in order to protect detente.
As the White House sought a compromise with the Senate on MFN, Dobrynin
persistently inquired about its progress. On March 17, Kissinger explained that he could
see the light at the end of the tunnel, provided he had Dobrynin’s permission to pass on a
letter to the senators specifying proposed Soviet compromises:
K: Well, on the MFN I can already answer.
D: Yes, what is answer.
K: We think it will go through the House in the first week of August.
D: I see.
K: And in the Senate, oh, sometime during October we think.
Then later…
K: We can give them the text you gave us[?]
D: I think it is better to say, not to give them the text.
K: Not to give it. Just to read it.
D: I think you can give just a summary, that’s all.
K: Okay, fine. 148
Although willing to deliver concessions on emigration, perhaps even tentatively agreeing
to a certain amount of exit visas to be granted annually, Dobrynin resisted putting them in
writing, perhaps out of fear that the information could leak. The Soviet Union did not
want it to appear as if thousands of its citizens desired to leave the country.
Initially it appeared to the White House that the exit tax alone had caused the
controversy.149 Remove the tax, and you removed the problem. On March 30, Dobrynin
148
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delivered a private message from the Soviet leadership to Kissinger asserting that
emigration was an internal affair and criticizing the “’noisy campaign’” which was
“’artificial and ill-meaning.’”150 Nevertheless, the Soviets would end the emigration tax
except for certain circumstances related to security concerns. 151 On April 16, Kissinger
and Dobrynin agreed on the exact wording of a statement announcing the suspension of
the exit tax which was then submitted to Congress. 152
Two days later, Nixon announced at the White House that the Soviets had agreed
to drop the exit tax for Soviet Jews wishing to immigrate to Israel. 153 However,
Kissinger alleged that due to the brewing Watergate scandal Congress was not in the
mood for compromise. 154 Indeed, several politicians may have already smelled blood in
the water and been thinking ahead to the 1974 Congressional mid-term elections.
However, the White House did not help itself by excluding Congress from negotiations
with the Kremlin over the issue.155 Consequently, Jackson and numerous others
increased their demands to include a guaranteed minimum number of exit visas and eased
emigration restrictions for all Soviet citizens, not just Jews. 156 According to Dobrynin,
this suggested that the number of people wishing to leave the Soviet Union was
endless. 157 Such an implication could only be taken extremely negatively by Moscow.
The White House remained undeterred. The commitment to obtaining MFN for
the Soviets was such that Nixon had Kissinger tell Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to
149
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stay out of the debate.158 On April 22 Kissinger discussed with Dobrynin a recent
conversation he had held with the Israeli ambassador:
D: …you said that you spoke with the Ambassador about this—
K: Oh, oh, well, I told the Ambassador that we would take very serious
measures if they obstructed MFN. And between you and me, even going
to airplane deliveries.
D: That you mentioned him directly this way?
K: Yeah. I mean, don’t publish this.
D: No, Henry. But did you ever see anything published which we discuss
with you?
K: No.
D: I don’t know anything we have.
K: No, but I mean, we were very tough. And if you could see the reaction
of the Jewish leaders, I think that it was not uninfluenced by them.
D: All right, Henry.
K: We will push it through, Anatol.159
Kissinger’s statement to the Israeli ambassador was probably not an idle threat. When
war broke out between the Arabs and Israelis that October, the White House did not
respond with an airlift right away due to concern that such a move would hurt
Washington’s role as a peacemaker thereafter. Furthermore, when the Israelis later
appeared to be advancing on Cairo en route to a total victory, Nixon and Kissinger
compelled them to withdraw. Consequently, it seems highly likely that Kissinger would
indeed punish Tel Aviv if they interfered with MFN. Not even the protests of America’s
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most important strategic ally in the Middle East would stop Kissinger from coming
through for Dobrynin on this prime carrot of détente.
The second Nixon-Brezhnev summit was held in May, 1973, in Washington as
well as at Nixon’s “Western White House” in San Clemente, California. Dobrynin
blamed the MFN-emigration controversy in part for the failure of this second meeting to
advance American-Soviet economic ties. 160
Meanwhile, negotiations continued in the backchannel. On July 3, Kissinger
spoke to Dobrynin from San Clemente. 161 While in California, several prominent Jewish
leaders had asked to visit with him, but Kissinger insisted on meeting in Washington
instead.162 Kissinger sought Dobrynin’s help in obtaining emigration concessions to
relay to Jewish leaders at a forthcoming meeting in order to rally support for MFN:
HK: And you see frankly if there is anything…that I could tell them then it
would be worth seeing them and it would help with the legislation.
AD: I think it would be better to delay it when you will be back here.
HK: Well, I’ll certainly—I tell you now I will not see them here, because I
don’t want to create the impression that we are having a special meeting
that requires a long trip…I’m wondering Anatol whether you could find
out for me by the time I get back next week whether there is anything at
all that I can say…
AD: Okay, I check with him [Brezhnev] once more, but now he is in
Moscow—I will check with him and what he really has in mind… 163
About two weeks later on the 19th, Dobrynin responded to a query by Kissinger
concerning a list of Jewish families which had been passed along to the Soviets:
D: …this is answer about the question you raise yesterday. First about this
list of some Jewish families.
160
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K: Yes.
D: …the final decision is not yet taken because they vote one way or
another over security restrictions.
K: How many?
D: More than 80. Around 80 or 90, something like that. They are now –
their applications are being considered in the light of developments.
K: Can I say that? Oh, that explains the discrepancy in numbers?
D: You may say, but it is not decided whether they will give them
permission or not. So this is the only thing I could tell, but you may say 164
The Soviets often refused visas to citizens on the basis of security restrictions. How
legitimate these claims were was debatable, but what is clear is that détente drove the
Politburo to consider such requests in much greater numbers than ever before.
The next Congressional session brought more developments. On September 14,
1973, Andrei Sakharov – dissident, physicist, and father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb –
sent an impassioned letter to the US Congress urging passage of Jackson-Vanik:
…there are tens of thousands of citizens in the Soviet Union – Jews,
Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Estonians
Latvians, Turks and members of other ethnic groups – who want to leave
the country and who have been seeking to exercise that right for years and
for decades at the cost of endless difficulty and humiliation. You know
that prisons, labor camps, and mental hospitals are full of people who have
sought to exercise this legitimate right.165
Then in a refutation of the Kissinger-Dobrynin approach, Sakharov added that “’quiet
diplomacy’” could only help “a few individuals in Moscow and some other cities.” 166
Finally, he called on “the Congress of the United States, reflecting the will and the
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traditional love of freedom of the American people,” to pass the amendment.167 About
two weeks later on the 27th, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote a piece for the
Wall Street Journal explaining that although he supported increased US-Soviet trade,
Sakharov’s endorsement of Jackson-Vanik had swayed him. 168 “’Always trust the man
on the firing line,’” wrote Schlesinger.169
The October, 1973 Arab-Israeli War temporarily placed the trade bill on the backburner. Moscow’s desire for MFN led the Soviets to continue allowing Jewish
emigration over the objections of the Arabs. 170 However, the Soviet role in arming the
Egyptians and Syrians against Israel may have provided Jackson with the added
encouragement and support from the public he needed in order to continue pushing for
his amendment.171
On December 11, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment easily passed in the House 319
to 80.172 On the 26th Nixon relayed to Dobrynin his “profound contempt” for the
“liberals, Zionists, and conservatives” who had blocked MFN. 173 “We must not let
temporary setbacks, no matter how discouraging, interfere with or poison the relations
between the two superpowers,” he added.174 The next stop was the Senate, and if it did as
well there Congress would have more than enough votes to override a presidential veto.
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By 1974, the controversy over Jewish emigration had held up the trade bill for
over a year. After being armed by Dobrynin with the latest Soviet statistics on Jewish
emigration, Kissinger met with Jackson on March 6.175 Kissinger proposed a
compromise whereby the Soviets would receive MFN, but the Senate would have the
right to review Moscow’s emigration policies on a regular basis. 176 Jackson rejected the
idea, instead insisting on a written guarantee of dramatic increases in emigration. 177
After months of further negotiations, Kissinger phoned Dobrynin on June 5 to
report that he might have a deal with Jackson as well as Democratic Senators Jacob Javits
of New York and Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut. When it took several rings before
Dobrynin answered, Kissinger could not resist one of his verbal jabs:
K: There’s almost no sense tapping you anymore if you don’t pick it up.[!]
I had breakfast this morning with Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff. You know,
it’s a little premature, but I think we will be successful.
D: Along what lines?
K: Along the lines we discussed yesterday.
D: For trade?
K: For trade and credits.
D: Along what lines?
K: Well, the 45,000.
D: 45?
K: Well, the number…
D: Oh, you mean about this…
K: Jewish question.
175
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Then later:
K: …he will modify his amendments so that MFN is possible and credits
will not be restricted. You know with a review maybe every year.
D: I understand. When we meet next time you are going to show me this
letter.
K: I will not send the letter without discussing it with you.
D: OK. In one way or the other it’s better to get rid of all these issues. 178
Dobrynin’s patience was clearly growing thin. However, Kissinger believed he had
finally reached a compromise with Jackson and the other senators whereby the Soviets
would get MFN, but the senate would retain the right to an annual review based upon
emigration statistics. The agreement would be summarized in a letter to Jackson, which
Kissinger would give Dobrynin an opportunity to preview. Consequently, there would be
no surprises or misunderstandings.
Despite their best efforts, circumstances continued to work against Kissinger and
Dobrynin. On June 30 the President’s ability to use export-import bank credits came up
for Congressional renewal. 179 Senators Adlai Stevenson III of Illinois, Jackson, and
eighteen others introduced the Stevenson Amendment placing a $300 million limit on all
US export-import bank loans to the Soviet Union with any loan over $50 million being
subject to a possible review.180 The final version of the amendment prohibited the use of
funds for development and energy as well. 181
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The Jackson and Stevenson amendments were draining Moscow’s incentive for
cooperating on human rights issues. Even if the Soviets met the Senate’s numbers on
emigration and thereby obtained MFN, the amount of money they could borrow for trade
would be tightly controlled.182 If the White House could deliver neither MFN nor credits
to the Soviets, Nixon and Kissinger would be without two of their main instruments for
conducting détente. In Kissinger’s view, by this time “[the] carrot had for all practical
purposes ceased to exist.”183
On August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford became the thirty-eighth President of the United
States after the Watergate affair forced Nixon to resign. According to Gates, one of the
things the Soviets liked most about working with Nixon and Kissinger was that they
“never tried to cause the Soviets trouble at home, to question seriously their internal
policies or the legitimacy of their rule.” 184 However, after Nixon exited Gates saw a shift
in US policy. 185 This probably had little to do with any changes implemented by Ford.
Due to Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, power in Washington had been moving
steadily away from the presidency and toward Congress for at least a year by this time
and would continue to do so throughout the 1970s.
On August 14, Dobrynin gave Ford an “unwritten guarantee” that 50,000 Soviet
Jews would be permitted to emigrate every year. 186 (Ford stated that the figure was
55,000).187 Dobrynin refused to put it in writing due to fear that Jackson would use the
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information for political propaganda. 188 The next day, the President attempted to break
the impasse over Jackson-Vanik and MFN by inviting Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff to the
Oval Office for breakfast.189 Ford relayed Dobrynin’s assurances and Jackson
reciprocated by lowering his demand to 75,000 after having been as high as 100,000. 190
Although Javits and Ribicoff were satisfied with Dobrynin’s word, Jackson still
insisted that any guarantee had to be in writing.191 According to Ford, Jackson accused
the White House of “being too soft on the Russians.”192 Nevertheless, they finally
reached a deal on October 18 whereby the Senator would alter his legislation based upon
an “understanding” that the Soviets would provide 60,000 exit visas annually. 193
Jackson, who had presidential aspirations, felt compelled to make the news
public. When he announced the deal before the press on the White House lawn, the
Soviets were outraged.194 Kissinger told Dobrynin that the President was furious with
Jackson, even going so far as to say that the Senator had “’behaved like a swine.’” 195
Although the White House later explained that the Soviets had never agreed to an exact
number, the damage had been done.196
Things began to move quickly. On December 3 Kissinger testified before the
Senate Finance Committee.197 He stressed that the Soviets had not committed to a
definite number of actual Jewish emigrants. 198 Nevertheless, on the 13th the Senate
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passed the trade bill with the amendments, 77-4.199 After ironing out differences in the
conference committee, on December 20 the bill went to the White House.200 Ford signed
it into law on January 3, 1975, and praised it for the economic benefits to both countries,
but also criticized the legislation for conditions and restrictions uniquely placed upon the
Soviet Union. 201 The President revealed that he never seriously considered a veto
because the legislation had passed both houses comfortably. 202
With the passage of Jackson-Vanik, for the first time the United States of America
had passed legislation promoting international human rights. 203 It was a significant
milestone. However, the Soviets were unimpressed. On January 10 Dobrynin delivered
a private statement to Kissinger explaining that Moscow was rejecting Congress’s
conditions and cancelling the trade agreement altogether.204
Kissinger was confused by Dobrynin’s statement. It sounded to him as if the
Soviets were not merely repudiating the trade agreement, but also détente and everything
for which he and Dobrynin had been working. On January 13, Kissinger sought a
clarification, but Dobrynin’s response only added to his fears:
K: The one thing that concerns me is that you keep making references to - that you are freed of your obligations in 1972. I don’t know what
obligations you are talking about.
D: There are several things there…they consider as it was for three years - unconditional so they consider to terminate it as it is. So it is probably
needed to be discussed at a later date of course between our agencies who
deal with the trade one-by-one. We didn’t go into the details because you
know under the ’72 as you remember - - it’s for three years.
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K: But only those items that were covered in the trade agreement. I mean
you don’t mean for example the maritime agreement.
D: No, no. Only the trade agreement.
K: Okay.
D: So this is within the…..
K: You are not denouncing the SALT agreement?
D: Well, well, I think we will come to that one on a later date - - no, no, I
am joking.205 (italics mine)
This was a most curious exchange. Kissinger was unclear where the Soviets now stood
on détente. Inexplicably, Dobrynin at first saw fit to make a joke and let Kissinger
believe the worst. Could this have been a Freudian slip, revealing such disgust amongst
the Soviet leadership that they had considered abandoning détente? Moscow must have
been thoroughly fed up with the American legislative process by this point. The delay in
getting SALT I ratified had been bad enough, but this time the Kremlin found Jackson’s
interference in its internal affairs to be intolerable.
Dobrynin quickly changed the subject to whether or not President Ford would
publicly condemn Congress’s action:
D: Will the President [lead?] with this in general in his own statement or
he will just only give domestic affairs mostly, I mean on Wednesday.
K: I think the President will not mention it specifically but I will give a
speech next week in which I will hit it very hard.
D: Where are you going to make it?
K: In Los Angeles.
D: Oh, in Los Angeles.
K: Assuming you don’t keep attacking me in Pravda.
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D: On the contrary. A special concession after which everybody will
listen with special care.
K: Okay, Anatol.206
Kissinger’s speech would not criticize the Soviets for disavowing the trade agreement,
but attack Congress for its actions, which he believed had prompted a diplomatic
catastrophe. Dobrynin seemed somewhat disappointed that Kissinger would not be
condemning the bill from Washington, thereby denying the speech an official
imprimatur. Nevertheless, he seemed satisfied with Kissinger’s reaction. As usual,
Kissinger told Dobrynin that he could review the official State Department response to
the Soviet withdrawal before anything was said publicly. 207 Despite a massive setback
for détente, both men sought to maintain the relationship as before.
That was not the end of the controversy. On February 3, 1975, Kissinger phoned
New York Times publisher Punch Sulzberger to furiously protest a column by William
Safire. A former Nixon speechwriter, Safire had left the administration and later
discovered that he was one of many who had been wiretapped in an effort to uncover
leaks.208 The column alleged that Kissinger and Dobrynin had conspired to cancel the
trade agreement due to the passage of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments. In
doing so, the Soviets would avoid capitulating on Jewish emigration while the White
House could benefit politically by blaming Congress for interfering with foreign policy.
Unable to reach Sulzberger, Kissinger phoned editor John Oakes, who attempted to calm
down the still-irate Secretary of State:
K: …now today Saffire [sic] accuses the Secretary of State of colluding
with a Soviet Ambassador for domestic political gain on an issue which
206
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again I [initiated?] the whole thing of moving emigration before Jackson
was ever heard of. It’s unbelievable that this sort of thing can happen.
O: I have to tell you, I think the Saffire thing was really outrageous
myself…I want you to know the publisher [Sulzberger] came down stairs
to see me and we talked about it in another office.
Then later…
K: …no [matter how] much I would oppose a Congressional action, the
idea that the Secretary of State could collude with a Soviet Ambassador is
unbelievable.
O: I just cannot defend and have no intention of defending the Saffire
piece. I just have to say to you what is the absolute truth and what Punch
has already said. The columnist[s] are absolutely independent.
K: OK. I made my protest and there’s nothing you can do about it.
O: I’m really thinking out loud. Is there anything you would want to state
for publication.
K: I don’t think the Secretary of State should write a letter saying no, I did
not collude with the Soviet Ambassador.209 (italics mine)
Safire obviously had his own personal reasons for being resentful towards Kissinger.
Whether or not there was any truth to the allegation, the fact that the former speech writer
could charge Kissinger and Dobrynin with collusion was revealing. After six years of
working together, there may have been the perception in Washington (as well as in
Moscow) that they had become too close. Inevitably, this aroused suspicions among
certain circles on both sides, and combined with Kissinger’s reputation for practicing
realpolitik, the possibility of a backchannel conspiracy must not have seemed too farfetched to Safire.
Another incident just prior to the presidential election in 1976 demonstrated the
depth of Kissinger’s antipathy to publicly flaying the Soviet Union over human rights. In
209
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one of their face-to-face meetings Kissinger had mentioned to Dobrynin that some Jewish
visitors were harassed during a recent trip to the Soviet Union. By mutual consent their
discussions were always private, but on October 29 Dobrynin read an Associated Press
story stating that Kissinger had publicly criticized Moscow over the incident:
D: …The Secretary of State Henry Kissinger today protested the
harassment of Jews.
K: Total, absolute, outrageous!
D: This is what [State Department spokesman Robert] Funseth said.
K: Well, god damn these bastards. I said…
D: This is record.
K: I haven’t seen the transcript. What I told him to say was if the question
was asked was that our position on this issue was known.
D: But I have an AP ticker…
K: Let me first look at what was actually said will you?
D: All right.
K: I can’t believe that Funseth said this.
D: This was on AP.
K: I don’t believe he said that. It is inconceivable that he said this. Let
me find out and I will call you back in five minutes.210
After receiving a transcript, Kissinger immediately called Dobrynin back:
K: Anatol, there was absolutely nothing said about a protest.
D: But…
K: Wait a minute, I am just telling you what the text says. It did not
discuss the harassment of Jewish visitors. The answer is “the situation of
Jews in the Soviet Union was discussed.” Then it says can you be more
210
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specific. And the transcript says “I cannot be more specific.” That is all
he said. All he said was the situation of Jews was discussed.
Then later…
D: The whole implication is that it was a protest of the harassment of
Jews.
K: Did you read the whole text?
D: No, I didn’t.
K: I think if you read the text…
D: It is very clear…
K: Look, I think if you read the whole transcript.
D: You have never published our meetings and why was it necessary to do
it today.[?]211
Although Dobrynin thought Kissinger had violated a confidence by publicly discussing
the specifics of one of their private meetings, the conversation between Funseth and the
AP reporter was actually in the context of the 1976 presidential campaign. As Kissinger
explained it, a reporter had asked, “Gov. Carter has expressed concern about what is
going on about Soviet Jews. Has the US done anything on this?” 212 To which Funseth
replied, “I cannot answer specifically but the Soviet Union is very much aware of our
position on Soviet Jews.”213 The exchange had been in regard to the already muchpublicized issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, not about the recent
harassment of some Jewish visitors to the USSR which Kissinger and Dobrynin had
discussed privately. “I regret it Anatol, I genuinely regret it,” pleaded Kissinger. 214 Once
Dobrynin had a proper understanding of the context of the conversation, he calmed down
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considerably. As they had done so often before, Kissinger and Dobrynin had cleared up a
major misunderstanding.
This entire episode was telling in that Kissinger displayed far more outrage at
being accused of publicly criticizing the Soviet Union for human rights abuses than he
ever showed for the actual abuses themselves. His belief in quiet diplomacy as the proper
way to handle these matters would never allow him to embarrass Dobrynin or the Soviets
in such a public way. Although morally questionable, this shared view of Kissinger and
Dobrynin on the impropriety of publicly discussing a nation’s internal affairs was one of
the main reasons why their relationship worked so successfully over the years. While the
Carter administration chose to openly stand on principle and make human rights one of
the focal points of its foreign policy, Kissinger simply avoided discussing the issue
publicly in favor of making progress in other areas.
What was the correct strategy? Through private diplomacy in the backchannel,
Jewish emigration rose dramatically. When the issue surfaced in official channels,
however, it triggered a strong reaction from the Soviet leadership and the numbers
plummeted. From a high of 35,000 in 1973, emigration numbers dropped to 21,000 in
1974 and to a mere 13,000 in 1975.215 Although the total rebounded to 50,000 in 1979
after President Carter promised to repeal Jackson-Vanik, in the 1980s virtually all
emigration stopped.216 Nevertheless, over thirty years from 1975-2005 approximately
1,000,000 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union to Israel with another 573,000 arriving
in the United States.217
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Perhaps the most significant effect of Jackson-Vanik may have been the damage
done to relaxing tensions. The period from 1975 to 1980 featured renewed
confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union around the world through
various proxies. Kissinger was unsure if Soviet moves including increased military
deliveries to Vietnam and arms to communist forces in Angola were signs of Soviet
disillusionment with détente or part of a larger long-term strategy. 218 On the other hand,
it is doubtful whether the economic benefits of increased trade and credits with the
United States would have been significant enough to dissuade the Politburo from their
course of action during the succeeding years anyway. 219

The Helsinki Accords
In the summer of 1945 as the Second World War came to an end, the American,
British, and Soviet allies met in Potsdam, Germany where Moscow received a tacit
acceptance of its occupation of Eastern Europe.220 During the Cold War the Soviets
sought to ensure their security by maintaining communist regimes in the countries along
their western border. After Moscow invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 to halt anti-Soviet
reforms by Alexander Dubcek’s government, the Kremlin must have concluded that
additional measures were necessary. According to Zubok, Brezhnev feared “’falling
dominoes’” in Central Europe just as Lyndon Johnson had feared them in Southeast
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Asia.221 Consequently, at Warsaw Pact meetings in October and December of 1969 the
Soviets proposed a European Security Conference to be held the next year. 222
Initially, Moscow hoped to exclude Washington from the meeting. 223 Kissinger
speculated that the Soviets may have hoped to split the Western alliance and convince the
Europeans to abandon NATO in favor of some new security arrangement. 224 He
considered this an utter fantasy: “No NATO country was waiting to substitute the
declaratory bureaucratic paraphernalia of a European Security Conference for the military
reality of NATO or the presence of American military forces on the Continent.” 225 Since
Washington’s participation was a sine qua non for any security conference, the Nixon
administration used it as another carrot of détente.226 The United States made Soviet
restraint in the developing world, Western access to Berlin, and mutual reduction of
armed forces in Europe conditions for its participation.227
In addition to covering security and trade, the conference would also address
human rights in part to prevent repeats of Soviet crackdowns on dissenters in East
Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). 228 However, during an
address to the Soviet people during his first visit to Moscow in 1972 Nixon had said,
“’We believe in the right of each nation to chart its own course, to choose its own system,
to go its own way, without interference from other nations.’” 229 Reconciling the
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contradiction between this statement and upholding international human rights norms
hampered détente throughout the rest of the decade.
Although many in the West viewed the Kremlin as a violator of human rights, the
issue had to be considered in the context of Soviet history. The loss of twenty million
people during the Second World War undoubtedly influenced the Soviet view that the
right to life was the greatest human right of all. Therefore by preserving peace first and
foremost, you protected human rights. For example, during his speech at the European
Security Conference, Brezhnev remarked, “[W]e would like to stress most emphatically
one of the inherent features of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, of the Leninist
policy of peace and friendship among nations – its humanism.”230 Gromyko perhaps
framed the Soviet position most succinctly: “[O]nly if you are alive can you enjoy all the
other rights – the right to work, to housing, education, medical service, emigration and so
on.”231
On March 15, 1973, just months prior to the opening of negotiations, Dobrynin
inquired about the chance of the US withdrawing its support for a human rights
commission. It is not clear if this referred to the inclusion of human rights at the
European Security Conference itself or more probably to the creation of a group to
monitor human rights compliance thereafter. What is certain is that Dobrynin disdained
any notion of interfering in the Soviet Union’s domestic policies, and Kissinger seemed
only too happy to oblige:
D: Have you by chance mention[ed] to your State Department about this
Human Rights Commission?
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K: I have talked to [US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Kenneth] Rush. I
will have an answer for you within an hour. He was going to check.
D: Oh, check, yes. Okay. Just to know whether he is checking or not on
stopping all this nonsense. [italics mine]
K: Right. 232
A little over an hour later Kissinger called back:
K: On the Human Rights thing, we cancelled the instructions.
D: They cancelled?
K: Yes.
D: I think this is a very good idea and I will send a telegram to Gromyko
right away. 233
Despite Kissinger’s efforts, however, the US government would eventually establish a
commission to monitor compliance with Helsinki’s human rights provisions.
In May, diplomats from thirty-three European countries, the United States, and
Canada commenced negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland for the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). By the following year, negotiations had advanced
sufficiently to consider holding a summit to sign the conference’s concluding
document.234 However, in a conversation with Dobrynin on July 12, 1974, Kissinger
asked for help on “basket III” – human rights, and downplayed the notion of holding a
formal summit meeting:
K: …I want to tell you what we have done on the European Security
Conference, because I think we have got it in a very positive direction
now, if you cooperate a little bit on Basket III.
D: Well, do you have any concrete suggestions.? This is important.
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K: I think we have broken the back on the Summit idea.
D: Already.
K: I think we are well on the way. But don’t go around saying this.
D: No. no, no.
K: No, you won’t, but sometimes your people in the lower regions are not
as subtle as you are.
D: On this only Gromyko and myself are looking, otherwise he will keep
this close to his heart. It is a project he likes very much. 235
The last thing Dobrynin or Kissinger wanted was to have a summit-level meeting calling
attention to human rights – an issue they both preferred to handle privately. In addition,
Kissinger probably opposed a summit for domestic political reasons. In May, 1975, as
the summit approached, he warned Ford that Jackson and others would claim the
conference was a fraud and a sellout of Eastern Europe.236 This would undoubtedly
agitate Eastern European immigrants, as well as those from the Baltic nations of Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia which could not participate because they had been incorporated
into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 237 Ford admitted that a sampling of his mail
from Eastern European émigrés showed 558 opposed to only 32 in favor of the Helsinki
Accords.238 Nevertheless, when the conference was held Kissinger believed Ford felt
compelled to attend in order to maintain momentum on détente and avoid returning to a
state of “Cold War.”239
While Ford sought to preserve détente, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn endeavored to
destroy it. On June 30, George Meany and the AFL-CIO invited the Soviet exile to speak
235
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at a Washington dinner. 240 Kissinger alleged that Solzhenitsyn had been chosen to speak
by the staunchly anti-communist Meany in order to provide ammunition to opponents of
the European Security Conference scheduled for the following month. 241 Speaking of the
impending Helsinki Final Act, Solzhenitsyn asked:
What sort of an agreement would this be? The proposed agreement is the
funeral of eastern Europe. It means that western Europe would finally,
once and for all, sign away eastern Europe, stating that it is perfectly
willing to see eastern Europe be crushed and overwhelmed once and for
all, but please don’t bother us.242
Then a few days later controversy exploded when Ford had an opportunity to meet with
Solzhenitsyn. Kissinger, who professed a deep personal admiration for the Soviet writer,
claimed that the meeting never took place due to a scheduling conflict, but also argued
that it would have been a mistake for reasons of policy as well. 243 Ford noted that both
Kissinger and Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft had recommended
against a meeting.244 Kissinger’s reasoning was that since White House requests
contributed to Solzhenitsyn’s recent release, if Ford met with him it could appear as
gloating, particularly just prior to meeting Brezhnev in Helsinki. 245 Jackson, The Wall
Street Journal, The New York Times, and many others vociferously disagreed.246
On July 30 and August 1, 1975, representatives of thirty-five countries met in
Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE).247 Also known as the Helsinki Accords, the CSCE’s Final Act was intended to
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improve East-West relations on multiple levels. Basket I dealt with security, which for
the Soviets chiefly meant Western acceptance of the communist regimes established in
Eastern Europe after the Second World War. Basket II covered economics, science,
technology, and the environment.248 The most controversial issue – human rights – was
reserved for basket III. The act obligated countries to:
…promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political,
economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person… 249
Finally, a fourth basket outlined procedures to follow up on the first three. 250
Dobrynin admitted that for the Soviet Union basket III was a mere formality. He
claimed that the prime interests of his government were security and trade and that
Moscow “did all it could to diminish the significance of the third basket, for it still
believed humanitarian issues to be domestic matters.”251 When Gromyko reported on the
final document to the Politburo, “they were stunned.”252 Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet Nikolai Podgorny, Chief Ideologist Mikhail Suslov, Prime Minister Alexei
Kosygin, and KGB leader Yuri Andropov were among those most opposed to the human
rights provisions, but Brezhnev clamored for the prestige he would garner back home
from signing an international agreement ratifying the post-WWII borders of Europe.253
Gromyko alleviated the Politburo’s fears when he explained, “We are masters in our own
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house,” suggesting that the Soviet leadership retained the right to determine what
amounted to interference in internal affairs. 254
While basket III caused controversy in the Soviet Union, elsewhere the security
provisions of basket I provoked outrage. Brezhnev referred to these provisions as “a
necessary summing up of the political results of World War II.” 255 The Soviet effort to
legitimize the boundaries of Eastern Europe dated back to the 1950s. 256 For Moscow,
permanent boundaries not only signified security, but also the acceptance of communism
across half a continent.257 Nelson called the Helsinki conference “an East-West
compromise in the best sense of the word.”258 However, David Pryce-Jones charged that
it had “confirmed the Soviet Union in its invasion and occupation of Eastern and Central
Europe.”259 He likened it to the 1938 Munich Agreement between Britain and Nazi
Germany which Hitler violated shortly thereafter, prompting World War II: “In effect, the
Soviet Union had won that stage of the Cold War, and was poised to move to complete
supremacy over the remaining European democracies.”260 East Germany’s Erich
Honecker believed that his nation had finally achieved legitimacy, and therefore any
reunification with West Germany “could now only be on Soviet terms.” 261 Similarly,
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Poland’s General Wojciech Jaruzelski was convinced that the Communist bloc had never
been stronger.262
Kissinger viewed Western acknowledgement of the permanency of Europe’s
borders as a harmless token thrown to the Soviets in order to enhance their sense of
security. He argued that the American delegation only conceded that borders could not
be changed by force, merely echoing the UN Charter.263 Not only did this repudiate the
Brezhnev Doctrine (justifying Soviet military action in order to preserve socialist unity),
Kissinger believed it helped lead to eventual German reunification in 1990. 264
Dissidents behind the Iron Curtain were not as patient as Kissinger. For them the
Final Act was much more than a piece of paper. It signified that human rights had
become part of international law.265 Many viewed it as either a tool for reform in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or at least a means of escape. 266 On April 12, 1976,
eleven Soviet dissidents including Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Sharansky, Ludmilla Alexeeva,
and Elena Bonner founded a Moscow “Helsinki Watch” group to monitor compliance
with the accords and report violations. 267 Orlov explained that although they could not
directly petition their own government, the Helsinki Final Act would allow them to reach
the Soviets “’through the governments of other countries.’” 268 Additional monitoring

262

Ibid.
Kissinger, Diplomacy, 759.
264
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 644, 648.
265
Ibid., 648.
266
Vogelgesang, 223.
267
Anatoly Sharansky with Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy – The Power of Freedom to overcome
Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 129, 130.
268
Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 260.
263

142

groups quickly appeared in nearly all of the communist nations. 269 In theory at least, the
means were in place to hold all thirty-five signatories accountable for human rights. 270
However, the years following the signing of the Helsinki Accords were marked
by poor follow-up and compliance. A provision in the Final Act prohibiting interference
in a country’s internal affairs proved problematic. 271 Furthermore, because the accords
emboldened dissenters to go public, this led to more intense persecution. 272 The seventyfive open members of monitoring groups in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, and other
countries in addition to Russia and Ukraine either ended up in prison, work camps,
psychiatric hospitals, or exile.273 The Moscow Helsinki Watch group was out of business
by 1982, and other monitoring groups like the Working Commission to Investigate the
Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes and the Christian Committee to Defend
Believers Rights in the USSR faced persecution. 274 In 1983, the Soviet Union left the
World Psychiatry Association (WPA) prior to a final judgment on its continued
membership. 275 The USSR’s expulsion from the WPA was probably imminent because
the Soviet state had viewed political opponents as mentally ill ever since Lenin. 276
Furthermore, Soviet psychiatric hospitals were under the Ministry of the Interior, not
Health, and were run like prisons by military officers. 277
Numerous reports of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (US CSCE or US Helsinki Watch) noted that Warsaw Pact countries had not
269
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met the human rights standards agreed to at Helsinki. 278 For example, in 1985 the
commission reported:
Ten years after Helsinki, the Helsinki groups that formed in the USSR
have virtually disbanded, with more than fifty Helsinki monitors presently
in prison or exile. In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 signatories and their
families continue to be persecuted…The Polish Helsinki Committee that
flourished openly during the days when Solidarity was legal has been
forced underground. 279
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey, the USSR
and Yugoslavia were listed as the nine worst violators of freedom of speech, the press,
movement, association, religion, and freedom from political imprisonment and torture. 280
The lack of compliance illustrated the great chasm between the American and Soviet
conceptions of human rights and détente. Although Kissinger and Dobrynin understood
this better than anyone else, as the issue became public there was less they could do in the
backchannel to manage its effects on relaxing tensions.

A Few “Hardship Cases”
In addition to the broader topics of Jewish emigration and international human
rights, Kissinger and Dobrynin handled numerous cases involving individual Soviet and
American citizens. Kissinger described “a list of hardship cases” which the White House
occasionally provided to the Kremlin involving people who had been denied exit visas,
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separated from their families, or imprisoned – often for political reasons.281 He claimed
that many of the requests were successful, including 550 out of 800 in 1973. 282
For example, on June 6, 1972, Kissinger inquired about a Soviet citizen who was
married to an American. The conversation did not emphasize humanitarian interests or
principles, but simply addressed the case in terms of political pressure and its potential
effects upon detente:
K: Now let me raise an issue with you. It has to do with Shapiro. We are
not taking an official position. We’re being deluged with phone calls from
senators and Senator Jackson called yesterday and he was going to make a
public statement and I urged him to keep quiet and I just wanted to express
the view that if this thing could be diffused. I don’t know a damn thing
about it. I don’t know what the fellow did. I think he’s the fellow who
married this American girl.
D: But the question was he was subject to the military draft. He evaded it
and then he met this American girl and married. So…
K: He’s not American. We can’t get into the Soviet side of it. It’s merely
a case where we are under a lot of pressure. This is not going to be made
a matter of record and we will never even acknowledge that I have even
talked to you about it.
D: The difficulty is he evaded the military draft. Well, I will mention to
my people about what you mentioned.
K: Just mention really we are under terrific Senatorial pressure and we are
not making an official reference to it.283
While Dobrynin could not guarantee anything, he was willing to take the Shapiro case to
his superiors because he understood the political pressure Kissinger was facing.
Likewise, Kissinger acknowledged that this was not an ordinary case of a citizen seeking
to emigrate. Shapiro had violated Soviet law, thereby complicating the situation further.
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Two months later on August 2, Kissinger returned the favor. The Chairman of the
Evangelical Baptist Church of the Soviet Union, Alexi Eychkov, was visiting the United
States and requested to meet with President Nixon. When Dobrynin expressed his
concerns, Kissinger did not hesitate:
K: …we have a request here that the Chairman of the Evangelical Baptist
Church of the Soviet Union.
D: What’s his name?
K: Schweitkof (sp.?)
D: He is the Chairman of the Baptist Church?
K: In the Soviet Union. The General Secretary of the Church, Alexi
Eychkov and two others want to call on the President. They are traveling
in this country and the reason for doing it is because the President attended
his church in Moscow. Now this is of course an informal request. Can
you give me an…
D: When will it be?
K: I think tomorrow or the day after.
D: Tomorrow. I don’t think it is in general a good idea. That’s my
impression.
K: OK, well I’ll stop it. It’s easy to stop. I see no reason to do it to tell
you the truth.
D: Yeh, I think it is not a good idea.
K: No, we just won’t do it.284
What did Eychkov want to say to the President? Was it simply a friendly visit or did he
seek to lodge a complaint against the Soviet government – perhaps relating to the denial
of exit visas to Soviet Jews or about the issue of religious freedom in the Soviet Union?
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Whatever the reason may have been, Dobrynin was opposed to it and that was all that
mattered to Kissinger.
A much more prominent case involved a Lithuanian sailor named Simas Kudirka.
In November, 1970, Kudirka attempted to defect from the Soviet Union by boarding a US
Coast Guard vessel off of Massachusetts.285 Although he sought asylum, the American
crew permitted Soviet sailors to forcibly retrieve the would-be defector.286 The
Lithuanian was then promptly placed in prison where he had remained for four years.
The United States government later discovered that Kudirka’s mother had been
born in the United States, suggesting the possibility of American citizenship. On August
14, 1974, President Ford met with Kissinger and Dobrynin in the Oval Office. 287 Calling
it “a personal favor,” Ford requested that the Soviets release Kudirka. 288 Dobrynin said
he would pass it along to his government.289 Over the next two weeks Ford and
Brezhnev negotiated Kudirka’s release and later his emigration to the United States.290
On August 29, Kissinger thanked his counterpart for his assistance:
K: I called you because of the Kidirka [sic] case. We have been informed
that he [has] been released and the President [wanted] to express his
appreciation but he didn’t know how to do it. - - in a way that wouldn’t be
difficult for you.
D: No, no. Let me make it - - I will give you tomorrow something and we
can discuss this then. No appreciation is necessary. We will talk
tomorrow about it. I am expecting a message from Brezhnev.
K: I will tell you what he [Ford] said….they should not make a big fuss
over it but he wants them to know this was a result of peaceful
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relations…and this is an example of what can be done without pressure
but in a ….relationship.
D: I understand. I understand.
K: He is going to tell some people on the Hill about this… 291
Once again, quiet diplomacy had come through, and the White House would make sure
Congress knew it.
The Soviets often denied exit visas for security reasons. These claims could seem
arbitrary and certainly aroused suspicions in the US, but Moscow’s concerns about a
Russian woman married to an American professor may have been quite genuine.
Dobrynin’s candid statements from January 21, 1975, suggested that the woman may
have been involved with Soviet agents:
K: There is a professor [name expunged]
D: A difficult case.
K: It is. Can you tell me personally what the problem is. He is married to
a Russian…
D: Yes. This is the problem. Only yesterday I received some information
on this and it is a difficult case. The [girl] is involved in a certain kind of
thing dealing with our security. Don’t mention this please.
K: No, but it will affect my action on this. He [the American professor]
has been decent in the manner in which he is pushing it.
D: I know. There was some White House-State Department influence.
K: I have stayed out of it up to now.
D: One of your assistants mentioned it to me and I checked it with
Moscow two weeks ago: Just yesterday I received a telegram.
K: I don’t know the [situation?] at all.
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D: It is nothing for herself as such but she was involved in - - nothing
specifically about her and I know nothing really. But this is why I am
prepared to give you an immediate answer. Only yesterday I received
information telling me it is a difficult case. [The Kremlin?] did note your
views - - in any case they know about the State Department views. I am
being honest with you by telling you I received this information just
yesterday.
K: You know the problems on humanity grounds. It is a deserving case. I
don’t know the security situation.
D: It is in Moscow. She worked with some of our agenst [sic] - - I should
not say this.
K: I understand.
D: That is why they don’t want to let her go. This is very personal
information I am giving to you. She is not a professor really and she is not
a brilliant girl at all but she knows something because of the character of
her record. While in Moscow I will mention it again to Gromyko. 292
Even in a case such as this where Dobrynin doubted that his government would be able to
grant Kissinger’s request, he felt confident enough about the interpersonal relationship to
disclose classified information, perhaps even against his better judgment.
Finally, when an American received a death sentence in Angola, a Soviet ally,
Kissinger did not hesitate to call Dobrynin among others. Although the United States
supported a rival faction during the Angolan Civil War and had not recognized the new
Marxist regime, on June 29, 1976, Kissinger inquired if Dobrynin could intervene:
K: …Now Anatol, I am calling you about this death sentence to the
American in Angola. I know it isn’t a question of the Soviet Union having
anything to do with it directly, but we would appreciate it very much since
we have no diplomatic relations [with Angola] if our concern could be
conveyed to the Angolan government or if you could use your influence
on a personal basis. I think you know what will happen here if this is
carried out…
D: How many Americans - - one or two?
292
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K: One…
Then later…
D: Well I will send a telegram that you mentioned it…
K: That is right.
D: No specific obligations, but at the same time human concern.
K: O.K. Anatol, thank you very much. 293
Although Kissinger claimed that he was acting for humanitarian reasons, he also
intimated that if the American was executed by a Soviet ally, it would further turn
Congressional and public opinion against détente.
The telephone transcripts showed that Kissinger and Dobrynin understood the
domestic political pressure each faced as human rights became an increasingly salient
issue in US-Soviet relations. The transcripts also revealed that for the Soviets human
rights was a domestic affair and therefore out-of-bounds in international diplomacy. As
Dobrynin put it in one telephone conversation with Kissinger regarding the European
Security Conference, the inclusion of human rights was “nonsense.” This sentiment was
further demonstrated by the fact that whenever Moscow was accused of transgressing
human rights norms, its response was not to charge Washington with hypocrisy and cite
discrimination against African-Americans, women, or the poor in the United States.
Rather, the Kremlin’s typical answer amounted to: “It’s none of your damn business.”
In the short run, the injection of human rights into détente hurt many of the people
it was meant to protect and strained US-Soviet relations. Jewish emigration slowed to a
trickle after Jackson-Vanik. The Helsinki Accords emboldened many dissidents, but
brought increased repression as a result. However, such measures helped to establish a
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legal and institutional basis for human rights advocates in the East and West to mount a
successful defense of individual freedoms. An argument could be made that this not only
had a positive effect for the state of human rights, but also contributed to delegitimizing
totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and eastern bloc and helped lead to the end of the
Cold War. Although Kissinger and Dobrynin had success with their private approach
while engaging in detente, in the long run publicly standing on principle was the right
thing to do for reasons of both humanity and policy.
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CHAPTER 3
Foreign Interventions: Preserving Stability or National Liberation?
“…I believe détente mitigated the succession of crises that differences in ideology and
geopolitical interest had made nearly inevitable; and I believe we enhanced the national
interest in the process.”
-Henry Kissinger 1
“…the crisis [the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War] demonstrated that tension could be
localized and prevented from disrupting relations between Washington and Moscow.
This was the first serious international conflict under the conditions of détente, which was
strongly affected by it.”
-Anatoly Dobrynin2
During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union never fought each
other directly on the battlefield. However, they did battle indirectly via proxies in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, with the international competition reaching a crescendo in the
1970s. These interventions included massive arms sales around the world totaling
billions of dollars.3 When considered alongside cases of direct involvement by one or the
other superpower as with the Americans in Vietnam or the Soviets in Afghanistan, the
global extent of the ideological struggle at times resembled a kind of world war. British
historian Paul Johnson likened the period to that just preceding World War II: “The
extension of the Cold War, during the Seventies, to virtually every part of the globe, gave
the decade the air of chronic insecurity so characteristic of the Thirties – the same
syndrome of unemployment, economic decay, armaments and aggression.” 4 However,
the deterrent effects of the atomic age prevented a head-to-head hot war which could
have escalated into nuclear Armageddon.
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Although the Cold War never turned hot, the conflicting views of relaxing
tensions nevertheless extended into the military sphere. The Americans had an allencompassing conception of détente and objected when the Soviets intervened in the
national liberation movements of former European colonies in the developing world. The
US viewed these as destabilizing and not in the spirit of relaxing tensions. However, the
Soviets saw no contradiction between conducting razryadka with the Americans while
also assisting young nations in their efforts to achieve true political and economic
independence from the West. For the USSR, one had nothing to do with the other.
In this chapter I will argue that foreign interventions posed the gravest challenge
to détente and the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship. Due to the possibility of direct
conflict and even war, conversations dealing with the US-Soviet global competition
dominated the telephone transcripts. The transcripts showed that even during détente,
Moscow’s actions and Washington’s reactions were often driven by ideology.
The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I will examine the contrasting
views of scholars regarding whether Cold War foreign interventions represented a
traditional great power struggle driven by security and economic interests, or an
ideological conflict between two nations with irreconcilable philosophies. Then I will
provide excerpts of telephone conversation transcripts as Kissinger and Dobrynin worked
to end the Vietnam conflict, were pushed to the nuclear brink during the October, 1973
Arab-Israeli War, and attempted to save détente and SALT II during the Angolan Civil
War of 1975-1976.
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Foreign Interventions and Détente
Initially the scholarship on foreign interventions and détente was mixed. To some
observers, the US-Soviet competition in the developing world was just another example
of the great power rivalries which have punctuated world history. After all, nations and
empires have always battled in defense of their security and economic interests. To
others, foreign interventions during the Cold War represented something else as well – an
ideological competition. That is, in some sense both the Soviets and the Americans were
nations on a mission to promote their respective belief systems. As archival documents
have become more readily available since the end of the Cold War, the second view
appears to have taken hold and formed a consensus amongst scholars.

A Traditional Great Power Rivalry?
Ever since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote that communists “openly
declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social
conditions…they have a world to win,” 5 there had been some who feared a radical
communist conspiracy to take over the globe. Adding to these concerns was the phrase
“world revolution” which appeared frequently in the writings and speeches of various
Soviet leaders over the years.
However, George F. Kennan, considered the father of containment, wrote in 1977
that such language simply functioned as part of “the millennial hope” of a “secular
religion” he called “Russian communism.” 6 The security of the Russian state and the
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survival of the regime were the paramount concerns for Moscow, asserted Kennan. 7
Nevertheless, he added that China’s badgering about “betraying true Communist
principles” occasionally drove the Soviet Union to make provocative declarations and
take international actions in order to re-establish its revolutionary Marxist credentials. 8
In 1980 Henry Bienen argued that for the Americans the decision to intervene in
the developing world was based upon whether a policymaker viewed a conflict from a
globalist or a regionalist perspective. Bienen explained that globalists focused upon
“behaviors, motivations, and threats of the Soviet Union or other large powers.”9 They
tended to emphasize security concerns over economic interests.10 Meanwhile,
regionalists sought to understand a local conflict apart from a Cold War or global context,
and then determine if US interests were at stake.11 In their view, American economic
influence in terms of trade, foreign aid, and corporate investment was so great that it
could withstand local political changes. 12
Several scholars in the mid-1980s also claimed that security concerns led to
conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union in the developing world. R.P.
Barston explained that one of Brezhnev’s most pressing goals was solidifying the postwar boundaries of Eastern Europe, particularly the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany).13 In addition, a continuing deep fear of and antipathy towards the People’s
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Republic of China drove Soviet efforts to form alliances for its safety and protection. 14
Meanwhile, Gelman described the Politburo as “determined to ensure the ‘irreversibility’
of its authority,” by maintaining stability “inside the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe,
and also in such areas, particularly those adjacent to the USSR, as history and the balance
of forces may from time to time reveal.” 15 Nevertheless, both Barston and Gelman
conceded that ideology played a role in Soviet foreign policy as well. Barston wrote that
finding and exploiting opportunities to continue the class struggle and achieve victories
for socialism remained an objective at a “formal and operational level.” 16 Similarly,
Gelman said that the Soviets sought American acknowledgment of Moscow’s right “to
make incremental use of emerging opportunities and capabilities in order to become a
fully global actor.” 17
In a similar vein, S. Neil MacFarlane blamed US-Soviet geopolitical conflicts on
differing conceptions of regional security. 18 According to MacFarlane, the views of each
superpower in this regard were “incompatible,” and led to competition in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.19 He asserted that US foreign policy towards developing nations
emphasized stability, non-violent reform through “existing political institutions” or
“orderly constitutional renovation,” and a belief that where instability existed, it was
caused by external (usually communist) forces and not internal conditions. 20 In contrast,
MacFarlane claimed that the Soviet Union viewed instability in under-developed
14
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countries as “unavoidable and, in general, desirable,” in order to achieve national
liberation.21
More recently, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro argued that Cold War foreign interventions
were nothing new. He noted that world powers had always undertaken “risky diplomatic
and military interventions in the periphery,” which he defined as “regions that do not
directly threaten the security of a great power’s homeland.” 22 The reason was “leaders’
aversion to losses in their state’s relative power, international status, or prestige.” 23
Furthermore, the fear of such losses was so great that many countries stayed the course
“even when they incur[red] mounting political, economic, and military costs.”24 The
American expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia and Laos in 1970-1971 to gain
leverage on North Vietnam, as well as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to install
a friendly regime there were two prime examples. 25

An Ideological Competition?
Other scholars argued that superpower foreign interventions in the developing
world were more than mere efforts to protect security and economic interests. They
claimed that Marxist-Leninist ideology played a crucial role in Soviet actions. Observers
disagreed as to whether the ideological concept of “wars of liberation” started with Lenin,
Khrushchev, or Brezhnev. Meanwhile, some suggested that both the United States and
the Soviet Union were motivated by ideology to become involved in the “Third World.”
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Writing in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, author, historian, and
former army lieutenant colonel F. Charles Parker claimed that the nations of the “Third
World” remained part of a Soviet strategy “fundamentally unchanged since 1920.” 26
Furthermore, Parker argued that the Soviet Union had consistently sought “to create
tensions and divisions in the non-Communist world, including both the advanced
capitalist nations and the backward areas of the Third World, in order to achieve strategic
gains for the Soviet state,” and “Soviet domination of the world.” 27 According to this
line of reasoning, when Vladimir Lenin (r. 1917-1924) realized that the instability
brought on by World War I had dissipated and his predicted workers’ revolutions in the
West were not imminent, he proclaimed at the Second Congress of the Communist
International in July, 1920, that Soviet foreign policy should seek to exploit differences
among non-communist nations. 28 By depriving Europe and America of colonies in the
developing world, the Soviets would ensure that the capitalists had less material wealth
with which to “bribe” workers into accepting the class-based status quo.29 According to
Parker, every Soviet leader since the revolution claimed to be both a Leninist and a
supporter of the same foreign policy objectives. 30
More recently, Volkogonov asserted that what became known as the Brezhnev
Doctrine in the West actually had a much older pedigree and was in fact “LeninistStalinist-Cominternist in origin.” 31 He called the 1968 Soviet intervention in
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Czechoslovakia “a warning to other satellites that their sovereignty was secondary to
their ‘international duty’” as part of the global socialist movement. 32 Volkogonov
implied that similar reasoning led to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. 33
Ulam argued that although there had been “precedents” under Lenin, the
ideological concept of “’wars of liberation’” from capitalist domination actually emerged
under Nikita Khrushchev (r. 1953-1964).34 Tompson agreed, stating that as long as a
newly independent nation was anti-imperialist in its orientation, Khrushchev offered his
support and thereby pre-empted indigenous communist parties.35 According to
Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Khrushchev became convinced by the decline
of European colonial empires after World War II “to revive the Leninist dream” of world
socialism. 36 Furthermore, he believed that the Soviet success with rapid industrialization
in the 1930s could be replicated in former colonies across the globe. 37
Several scholars traced Soviet involvement in the developing world to the era of
Leonid Brezhnev (r. 1964-1982). Garthoff wrote, “Detente and peaceful coexistence
with the United States did not…mean any lessening of the global ‘class struggle’ or of
Soviet support for progressive historical change.”38 He noted that Moscow made this
point at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971 when presenting its conception of
detente.39 The Soviet leadership voiced similar sentiments at summit meetings with the
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US in 1972 and 1973.40 Meanwhile, Daniels claimed that under Brezhnev there was “a
vigorous political offensive,” as Moscow sought to draw “one developing country after
another away from dependence on the capitalists and making them allies of the socialist
camp.”41 Although he believed that the strategy was “probably more opportunistic than
premeditated,” it nevertheless resulted in “America’s reversion to the worst Cold War
fears.”42 Likewise, Pryce-Jones argued that in Asia “’proletarian dictatorships’” emerged
in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.43 In Africa, “a historical process of gaining
independence from the colonial powers was reversed,” and the Congo, Benin, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, and Angola became “Soviet clients.”44 Finally, Central America became
“destabilized” after the Soviet-supported Sandinistas took control of Nicaragua. 45 He
added that while other empires made “profit-and-loss calculations” leading to
decolonization, communism renewed the imperial drive through its fundamental doctrine
of “’world revolution.’” 46
Zubok claimed that “the majority of the post-Khrushchev leadership shared the
ideological (revolutionary) component of the international paradigm.” 47 However, he
suggested that rather than being pure ideologues, the détente-era generation of Soviet
leaders were “prisoners of ideology,” who knew of no other way and therefore were
unable to change course.48 Leffler was blunter. He argued that Brezhnev “killed détente
with the United States, the policy he had helped to launch a decade before,” by invading
40
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Afghanistan in 1979. 49 He added that Brezhnev “shamelessly defended Soviet actions”
and claimed that Moscow was merely “answering the request of the Afghan government”
for protection.50
Georgi I. Mirski, a chief research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations in Moscow, Russian Academy of Sciences, argued that détente
ended “mainly, although not exclusively, because of developments in the third world.” 51
Wanting to assert their role as the leader of international communism, the Soviets felt
compelled to assist national liberation movements before the Chinese took action. 52
Furthermore, with nuclear parity and the division of Europe into eastern and western
halves, the US-Soviet competition was at a relative standstill. 53 The nations of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America represented the only remaining potential battlefields.
Consequently, Mirski concluded: “It was in the shifting sands of the third world, a
battlefield of maneuver warfare, that new and unforeseen collisions between the
superpowers could be expected, and they did not take long to materialize.” 54
Other scholars argued that both superpowers took actions in the developing world
for ideological reasons. Edward J. Brennan, Ireland’s ambassador to Moscow from
1974-1980, stated that the United States and the Soviet Union were “by history and
national character…prone to ideology in the conduct of their foreign relations.” 55 For
example, Thomas Jefferson believed that the United States would serve as a “’standing
49
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monument and example for the aim and emulation by the rest of the world.’” 56 Brennan
also pointed to the ideological tenor of American foreign policy under President Ronald
Reagan, who in a 1982 address before the British Parliament launched a “’crusade for
freedom’” which would “’leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history.’”57
Likewise, Brennan claimed that two ideological principles drove Soviet foreign policy,
specifically proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence of states with different
social systems. 58 The first referred to “the historic mission of the working class to
establish socialism on a world scale,” while the second applied exclusively to relations
between states, with the international class struggle continuing.59
Similarly, Nelson claimed that “neither party to détente had promised to stop
‘assisting’ history or trying to head off what it considered to be unnatural developments
in the Third World.”60 He suggested that during the 1970s decolonization spread to
nations which were utterly unprepared for it, causing many countries to be thrown “into
anarchic independence.”61 Nelson argued that the Soviet Union simply took advantage
and “project[ed] itself into other countries’ business” just as the US had often done. 62
According to some, the Soviets and Americans felt compelled by domestic
politics to spread their respective ideologies. James G. Richter argued that the
superpowers “relied heavily on universalistic ideas to create a national identity.” 63 He
asserted that they “justified their foreign policies not only as a means to protect the
56
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national interest but also to protect and even propagate the way of life (whether Sovietstyle socialism or liberal democracy) these ideas would prescribe.” 64 These ideas or
“myths” became part of each country’s domestic politics and were “difficult to dislodge,”
he added. 65 Likewise, Odd Arne Westad wrote that Washington and Moscow “were
driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in their politics.” 66
Furthermore, Westad explained that the United States and the Soviet Union “needed to
change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies.” 67
Finally, Gaddis asserted that “ideology often determined [italics in original] the
behavior of Marxist-Leninist regimes: it was not simply a justification for actions already
decided upon.”68 Consequently, the United States had to choose between upholding its
own ideological principles – including the right to self-determination – and preserving its
economic and security interests.69 In no case was this paradox more evident than with the
American intervention in Vietnam – something Gaddis called “the single greatest error
the United States made in fighting the Cold War.”70

Vietnam
The roots of the Vietnam War lay in the global movement towards colonial
independence after World War II. In September, 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared
Vietnamese independence from France, even quoting from the American Declaration of
64
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Independence.71 Ho had worked with the American Office of Strategic Services –
predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency – during the war. However, on February
14, 1950, he met in Moscow with Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin to request assistance in
expelling the French.72 Stalin may have preferred to avoid providing direct assistance so
as to not hurt the electoral chances of the French communists in Paris, and instead
directed Mao to aid Ho’s forces in Southeast Asia. 73 That year Beijing recognized the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and began sending supplies. 74 Mao later sent advisers
to create Chinese-style reeducation camps as well. 75 Ho also adopted Mao’s tactics of
terror including executions of land owners, intellectuals, and other “class enemies.” 76
As the French attempted to maintain their empire, they sought support first from
the British and then the Americans.77 Nevertheless, France was defeated in 1954 at Dien
Bien Phu with Indochina being divided into the three states of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. 78 Vietnam itself was split into a communist north and a non-communist south
along the seventeenth parallel. 79
Depending on one’s point of view, the US began supporting South Vietnam as
either a bulwark against communism or in order to establish a “satellite regime” 80 in the
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region. Many Americans saw communism as an aggressive force opposed to democracy,
human rights, and free markets, with the last of these being particularly concerning for
the US as it worked to rebuild Japan after World War II.81 Furthermore, America’s
economically devastated British allies needed access to rubber and tin from their nearby
Malayan colony. 82 If communism triumphed in Vietnam, many feared that other
Southeast Asian countries would fall into line “like dominoes,” thus threatening US and
Western interests. It was this “domino theory” which resulted in American military
involvement, particularly after 1965. Years of fighting abroad and turmoil at home
ensued for the United States. When the Americans finally left in 1973, they had dropped
a greater amount of high explosives in Vietnam than during the Second World War.83
In the North, things were more complicated. After Stalin’s death in 1953,
ideological differences drove the Soviet Union and China apart. According to Arbatov,
one of these dealt with Chinese accusations of “betraying the revolutionary cause and the
liberation movements.”84 Then in October, 1964, Beijing exploded its first nuclear
weapon and Khrushchev was overthrown.85 From 1965-68 Hanoi received hundreds of
thousands of troops from Beijing and thousands of military advisors from Moscow. 86
Washington’s intervention in the South may have “forced the Politburo’s hand,” 87 but
China’s increasing influence in the region was another reason why the Soviets became
involved.88 Eventually Moscow’s military buildup allowed them to assume primary
81
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responsibility while Beijing withdrew after realizing that it had created a strong, proSoviet ally on its own border.89

Prior to the Vietnam War there had been a bi-partisan consensus, both in
Washington and amongst the American electorate, supporting the Cold War doctrine of
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containment. Many Americans believed that halting the spread of communism around
the world was the proper role for the United States. However, as early as 1966 Senator J.
William Fulbright held several hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee debating the
value of President Lyndon Johnson’s policies in Vietnam and even containment itself. 90
Then in January, 1968, “the Vietcong’s Tet Offensive exploded in living rooms across
America.”91 Although the guerilla attack resulted in a communist defeat, the American
military and people were completely caught off guard and disillusion set in. By 1974 a
study reported that public concern in the US over war, communism, the strength of the
military, and the Soviet Union had dropped significantly over the previous ten years. 92
Many intellectuals who had formerly supported containment grew skeptical of the
policy as well. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and
economist John Kenneth Galbraith cited rifts between the Soviet Union and China as well
as the different agendas of individual communist states as evidence that communism as
an international conspiracy no longer existed. 93 Therefore, what sense did it make to
have one uniform approach everywhere?94 While others, including Norman Podhoretz of
Commentary and William F. Buckley, Jr. of National Review, may have believed that
America’s exit from Vietnam demonstrated a loss of confidence in its role as leader of
the free world, others argued that the US should never have aspired to play such a part in
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the first place. 95 Due to the length of the conflict, its location on the other side of the
globe, as well as the enormous cost in blood and treasure, Americans became divided
over whether all of the sacrifice had been worth it. 96
Thus with the advent of the Nixon Administration the stated goal in Vietnam was
to attain “peace with honor.” This referred to an American withdrawal, but not before
conditions had been achieved that would provide the South Vietnamese with at least a
chance to survive alongside their communist rivals to the North. Nixon and Kissinger
believed that a poorly maneuvered exit would damage American credibility and hamper
the maintenance of international stability. 97 Thus they sought to exploit the SovietChinese rivalry through “triangular diplomacy,” (balancing the interests of China, the
Soviet Union, and the United States98) while also understanding that neither Moscow nor
Beijing directly controlled Hanoi. 99 Nixon and Kissinger linked progress in Vietnam to
areas of Soviet interest, including arms control and trade. According to Kissinger, his first
overture to Hanoi occurred before Nixon had even been inaugurated.100 However, the
North Vietnamese demanded an unconditional American withdrawal as well as the
toppling of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu’s government in Saigon
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before they would release American prisoners of war.101 For the Nixon White House,
complete capitulation to an enemy and abandonment of an ally would certainly not have
qualified as “peace with honor.” Hence, in 1969 Kissinger and North Vietnamese
Politburo member Le Duc Tho began private peace talks in Paris. 102 These were in
addition to the official talks at Paris’s Hotel Majestic, which included South Vietnam and
the Vietcong.103
Meanwhile in the backchannel, Kissinger sought Dobrynin’s help in getting North
Vietnam to come to an agreement. Kissinger said that Dobrynin frequently downplayed
Moscow’s influence on Hanoi.104 This may have reflected Soviet fears that applying too
much pressure on the North Vietnamese would drive them towards China, the Soviet
Union’s rival for the title of “leader” of the communist nations. 105 Moscow may have
also been concerned that Hanoi would resent being asked to make concessions for the
sake of US-Soviet détente.106 Along with North Vietnam’s insistence on an end to
Thieu’s regime, this could explain why negotiations dragged on for several years. 107
According to Nixon, in early 1972 his administration received intelligence that
large amounts of Soviet arms were pouring into North Vietnam. 108 Moscow may have
been attempting to reassert its influence with Hanoi to spite Beijing after Nixon’s visit
there in February. 109 Then on March 30, 1972, North Vietnam initiated a full-scale
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invasion of the South.110 South Vietnamese communist guerillas known as the Vietcong
were joined by 120,000 troops of the North Vietnamese regular army equipped with
Soviet tanks and artillery. 111 With the arrival of troops from Hanoi which were backed
by Moscow, Kissinger argued that the notion of the Vietnam War as simply a popular
uprising of guerillas in the South had been destroyed. 112 Despite a scheduled visit with
Brezhnev later that month, on May 8 Nixon announced “Linebacker I,” the bombing of
North Vietnam and mining of Haiphong Harbor. The purpose was to halt further delivery
via rail or ship of military supplies from Moscow.113 The first American-Soviet summit
since 1961 was in great jeopardy.114
According to Dobrynin, the Politburo was divided over how to proceed. Defense
Minister Marshall Andrei Grechko wanted the meeting cancelled, Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko desired to press forward, and Chief Party Ideologist Mikhail Suslov
remained undecided.115 Arbatov claimed that KGB Chief Yuri Andropov told him
privately that there had been great pressure on Brezhnev to punish Nixon by
cancelling. 116 Some Politburo members were convinced that if the Soviets went ahead
with the summit, “we would be politically humiliated and would lose our authority in the
eyes of the world, particularly the Communist world, and with liberation movements,”
wrote Arbatov.117 He believed that in the end Moscow forged ahead because it did not
want to disrupt several pending agreements with the Federal Republic of (West)

110

Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 257.
Aitken, 436.
112
Kissinger, White House Years, 1097.
113
Aitken, 437.
114
Arbatov, 183.
115
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 253.
116
Arbatov, 183.
117
Ibid.
111

170

Germany, an American ally. 118 However, Dobrynin claimed that Moscow chose to hold
the summit because “the alternative would amount to handing Hanoi a veto over our
relations with America.” 119
The Chinese-Russian rivalry must be factored in as well. Nixon’s visit to Beijing
in February may have intensified Soviet fears of a Chinese-American alliance.120 Thus
Moscow, desiring a top-level meeting of its own more than ever, may have been more
inclined to look the other way on American military activities in Vietnam. 121
Kissinger and Dobrynin probably also deserved some credit for the summit
proceeding as scheduled. Both well understood the complexity of conducting
superpower diplomacy while simultaneously supporting one’s allies. Just prior to
Nixon’s bombing announcement, Kissinger asked to see Dobrynin. 122 (Dobrynin noted
that whenever Kissinger asked to see him before Nixon was going to make a speech he
knew bad news was coming!123) Upon hearing of Nixon’s plans the Soviet ambassador
was clearly disappointed.124 Two days later when Dobrynin arrived at the Map Room of
the White House, Kissinger held his breath out of fear that Moscow might cancel the
summit.125 Instead, Dobrynin merely read a note from his government registering what
Nixon called “a relatively mild and private protest,” with no mention of cancelling. 126
The next day over lunch Dobrynin told Kissinger, “You have handled a difficult situation
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uncommonly well.”127 He also credited Kissinger with understanding how difficult it
was for the Soviets to proceed while their allies were being bombed by the Americans. 128
Following the successful summit in May, on June 30th Kissinger spoke to
Dobrynin from California to explain that Hanoi was attempting to gain leverage by
injecting American domestic politics into the peace process:
K: Okay. Two things - - One, about the Vietnam talks. I wanted to say
one thing about your friends there.
D: Where?
K: Hanoi. And I must say it very seriously to your leadership. One is
they’re already starting again what we told you at great length we would
never tolerate.
D: What namely?
K: Well, now they’ve made a statement today saying they have forced us
back to the conference table.
D: Henry, you know I mentioned to you the other day when we went over
this, some kind of statement they will do it. They didn’t specifically tell
us what kind of statement.
K: Now they’ve invited Joe Kraft and some Labor leaders to Hanoi.
D: Joe Kraft?
K: Yeah. And you know what the purpose of this is.
D: No.
K: You know, they are going to float whatever proposals they’re going to
make publicly before they speak with us.
Then later…
K: If they play domestic politics here, we will do what we did in May. We
will break off and escalate because we have nothing to lose that way.
127
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Then we will have to try to force them to their knees…I mean, I am telling
you frankly. This is not to be transmitted in quite this brutal language.
D: Yeah, I understand. Well, the only thing we should really put in the
promise is what you said in the middle. I mean, if they are really going to
tell everything to all the people who come to them having nothing to do
with the Administration and just give out publicly, then there is no sense
to negotiate. …Yeah, this I am prepared to ask on your behalf of my
people in Moscow to tender to Hanoi. This I could do.129
Kissinger believed that Hanoi was not negotiating honestly. If this continued, he
threatened that the US might intensify its aerial strikes. Dobrynin said that he understood
and would relay the message to Moscow, but also politely explained that he would omit
the part where Kissinger pledged to “force them to their knees.” 130
On July 6 Kissinger again phoned Dobrynin from the West coast. Hanoi had
extended an invitation to yet another American from outside of the administration –
Labor leader James Hoffa.131 “…sometimes Hanoi is beyond my comprehension,” said
Kissinger, adding “…it isn’t even dangerous to us except that it’s awfully hard to see how
they can be serious if they keep doing idiotic things like this.” 132 “No, I understand this,
but sometimes in their own way of thinking this is very difficult to…Do you
understand?” asked Dobrynin. 133 “Yeh, well, it’s not a major thing,” said Kissinger, who
later expressed a greater concern:
K: …Look, we’re not going to bring a new negotiator in now – they’re
stuck with me. Because I’m afraid if I let them get away with it you’ll ask
me for a new negotiator.
D: I don’t want a new negotiator except for you.
129
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K: OK. Thank you.134
Although Kissinger had previously stated that the White House would “break off and
escalate,”135 in response to Hanoi’s latest tactics, now he said “it’s not a major thing.” 136
Dobrynin, who often seemed to have a calming effect on the more animated Kissinger,
had successfully made the case that this was just the way the North Vietnamese
negotiated. By this time, Kissinger seemed much more concerned that negotiations
between him and Dobrynin would continue as before.
As the presidential campaign of 1972 played out through the summer and into the
fall, Nixon looked to be in an excellent position for re-election. The bombing and mining
campaign in North Vietnam as well as triangular diplomacy appeared to be paying off.
The last American combat troops were withdrawn from the North on August 12 as part of
Nixon’s Vietnamization policy (reducing the American role while increasing that of the
South Vietnamese).137 Later that month, Nhan Dan, a publication of the North
Vietnamese Communist party, complained about the effects of the bombing while
expressing frustration that Moscow and Beijing had abandoned the proletarian cause in
favor of pursing détente with Washington. 138
Consequently, the White House had leverage in its talks with North Vietnam. In
early October, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached a tentative settlement around four
agreements: a ceasefire, a return of prisoners-of-war, a total American withdrawal from
South Vietnam, and the creation of a National Council of Concord and Reconciliation. 139

134

Ibid.
[May 1972-June 1972. Box #27.]
136
[July 1972-September 1972. Box #27.]
137
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 259.
138
Ibid.
139
Ambrose, 402.
135

174

The membership of the council would be drawn in three equal parts from the existing
South Vietnamese government, communists, and neutrals, with the assigned task of
setting up elections.140 Remarkably, Hanoi had dropped their long-standing demand for
an end to Thieu’s government in Saigon. 141 Although there were several remaining
issues, perhaps the most difficult problem would be getting Thieu to accept an agreement
which gave the communists a political role and permitted more than 150,000 North
Vietnamese troops to remain in the South. 142
On the morning of October 15 Kissinger explained to Dobrynin that the White
House viewed the presence of these North Vietnamese regular army units in the South, as
well as the flow of Soviet arms to them, as the main obstacles to getting South Vietnam
to settle.143 Since the administration had no interest in a confrontation with Saigon so
close to the November 7 election, Kissinger inquired if the Soviets could intercede with
Hanoi to obtain a partial withdrawal. 144 “We recognize they can’t pull them all out, but if
there could be at least some token movement and most importantly the question of
military supplies to them. And what the President wants to do is write a letter to
Brezhnev,” said Kissinger.145 “I understand. This is just for his [Brezhnev’s]
consideration,” replied Dobrynin. 146 Although Dobrynin met with Kissinger later that
afternoon to receive Nixon’s letter, the Soviet ambassador said that since the ongoing
negotiations were between Washington and Hanoi it would be “premature” for Moscow
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to make any promises about reducing weapons shipments to North Vietnam. 147 However,
he would pass along the request in regard to North Vietnamese troop withdrawal.
This exchange demonstrated how Soviet cooperation was not only essential to get
the North Vietnamese to negotiate, but also to enable the US to make progress with its
own ally in the South. At times, Kissinger seemed to view Saigon as being just as
intransigent as Hanoi, and claimed that without some North Vietnamese troop withdrawal
it would take much longer to come to an agreement.
From May 9 until October 23, 1972, the US made 41,500 aerial attacks on North
Vietnam, 148 but on October 24 Kissinger told Dobrynin that the White House would stop
all bombing north of the 20th parallel as long as negotiations continued. 149 The following
day the White House was prepared to go further. Although Hanoi requested Kissinger to
visit North Vietnam, he believed that would alienate Saigon. Instead, he offered a halt to
all bombing of North Vietnam if Le Duc Tho would meet him in Paris for further
negotiations. 150 Kissinger told Dobrynin to inform Moscow that Washington’s offer had
come as a direct result of a positive message from the Kremlin the day before in regard to
how “issues of prestige should not stand in the way when peace is so near.” 151
However, on October 26 North Vietnam publicly announced the tentative
agreement reached earlier that month between Washington and Hanoi. 152 This was
almost certainly a tactic to apply pressure on Saigon and portray Thieu as an
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obstructionist to peace.153 Perhaps against his better judgment, Kissinger felt compelled
to confirm the story by announcing, “’We believe peace is at hand.’” 154
Richard Nixon was overwhelmingly re-elected in a 49 state landslide on
November 7, 1972. The outcome had implications far beyond the President’s personal
political fortunes, however. It ensured that Soviet-American relations would continue
with the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel as the main point of contact. The next day,
Dobrynin relayed the congratulations of the Soviet government. Although it is tempting
to dismiss this as just polite diplomacy, it is highly probable that the Soviets were
genuinely pleased by the result of the contest between Nixon and South Dakota Senator
George McGovern, for it guaranteed that they would be dealing with the same
administration – at least for a while. As usual, Kissinger found it hard to be humble:
D: Good morning, Henry.
K: We didn’t carry Siberia.
D: Oh. My impression on the contrary, [you] carried all my country
because even now in my Embassy I am listening “Four more years, four
more years.”
K: Is that what you’re saying?
D: Exactly. In my Embassy everybody is shouting with beginning four
years this 12 o’clock at night. So I hear even from Moscow the same - - I
mean, the same sounds…
Then later…
D: Well, once again, Henry, from deep in my heart I really like this
development because I really have a very nice relationship - K: I don’t know whether one can have a feeling of personal friendship
with a Communist diplomat but I have it.
153
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D: (laughter) So my best personal regards towards you and to the
President. Please regard my personal regards too.
K: Thank you.155
Just as everything seemed to be progressing more or less smoothly towards an end
to the war, the North Vietnamese launched a renewed offensive on the South in late
November. Hanoi had lost patience with Saigon’s refusal to settle and was outraged that
Kissinger had recently visited South Vietnam, but skipped the North. On November 26,
Kissinger gave Dobrynin the news in his typically colorful way:
K: Well, your friends have gone crazy.
D: I look at things…and I figure that Thieu – you couldn’t handle him
from this point of view. You know from both sides I don’t need to tell
you because you know them probably the best because you have a chance
to observe them…from a short distance. I only from a long distance.
K: Right. Well, where we are – you know I don’t know what influence
you have over them [Hanoi]. We will give a rather moderate response…
Then later…
K: It’s very stupid because if they had followed what we told them there
would certainly have been an agreement in three weeks.
D: Well, you see I think one of the reasons was that they really wanted
you to come there [to Hanoi]... I still don’t see – well I know your reasons.
K: Because it would have led to an explosion in Saigon. 156
Dobrynin believed that Kissinger had made a tactical mistake by snubbing the North
Vietnamese: “They have really high emotions . . . . . in Hanoi. This I can tell you quite
frankly.”157 To which Kissinger replied, “I’ve told them again and again that I would
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have to get the approval of Saigon and elsewhere. They just always said no…” 158 Once
again, a mutual understanding of the complexity of engaging in superpower détente while
also seeking to mollify one’s allies was apparent. Kissinger and Dobrynin had been over
this before, and though they still disagreed, each was able to appreciate the other’s
position.
A couple of days later, Kissinger discovered that the Soviet embassy was asking
questions about his future. Although Nixon had just been re-elected, it was not a
foregone conclusion that all of his various cabinet advisors would be retained. On
November 28, 1972, Kissinger assured Dobrynin that he had nothing to worry about:
K: Well, I read in the papers that you people are inquiring whether I’m on
the way out.
D: Who inquired?
K: I saw a newspaper article saying officials of the Soviet Embassy made
inquiries all over town last week.
D: Oh, I think it was just, you know, sometimes the press just try to make
up things. It’s important that I know that you are in, no doubt.
K: I’m relaxed.
D: Yes, so there is not any problem. 159
Although he dismissed the press reports, Dobrynin conceded that it was important to him
that Kissinger would be around and that the partnership would continue. This exchange
and others like it reveal the comfort and even a degree of dependence between Kissinger
and Dobrynin which developed over time. Such a relationship helped to promote trust, a
willingness to give the benefit of the doubt, and forbearance during trying situations.
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Over the next several weeks, the American and North Vietnamese delegations
continued negotiations to put the final touches on a settlement. However, Thieu still
refused to agree to a ceasefire as long as North Vietnamese troops remained in the
South.160 In early December Kissinger travelled to Paris to convince Le Duc Tho to
remove the troops, but he refused and the talks once again broke down.161 When
Kissinger returned to Washington on December 13 he explained the situation to the
White House.162 Nixon believed he had to show Saigon that he would come to its rescue
if Hanoi violated the ceasefire, as well as show Hanoi the price they would pay for such a
violation.163 On December 14 he decided on another round of full-scale bombing.164
The renewed bombing campaign, “Linebacker II,” targeted shipyards, radio
transmitters, armaments factories, and military bases. 165 Hanoi utilized Soviet surface-toair missiles (SAMS) in defense.166 After 729 flights by B-52 bombers and 1,800 sorties
overall in eleven days, 167 (with a thirty-six hour break during Christmas168) on December
29 the North Vietnamese agreed to reopen talks.169 Kissinger and Le Duc Tho then met
in Paris on January 8, 1973, to begin final negotiations to end the Vietnam War. 170
Nixon succeeded where Johnson failed in using air power because the nature of
the war had changed. 171 When Johnson personally conducted his “Rolling Thunder”

160

Ambrose, 402.
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
163
Ibid., 403.
164
Hayward, 373.
165
Aitken, 455.
166
Ambrose, 403.
167
Morris, 350.
168
Ambrose, 409.
169
Reed, 153.
170
Dobrynin, In Confidence, 268.
171
Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power – The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The
Free Press, 1989), 205.
161

180

campaign from 1965-68, the US was primarily fighting Vietcong guerillas. 172 Due to the
hit and run nature of guerilla warfare in which prolonged engagements are avoided, the
Vietcong did not require long supply lines which could be destroyed by bombing. 173
However, after the American defeat of the Vietcong during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the
war became a more traditional conflict with Hanoi’s regular army. 174 A large army was
more exposed to the effects of bombing, thus Nixon’s “Linebacker I” and “Linebacker II”
campaigns of 1972 had greater impact.175
According to a discussion between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 16, 1973,
one of the sticking points prior to the most recent round of bombings had been Hanoi’s
insistence on linking the release of American prisoners of war to the release of political
prisoners held by Saigon.176 Kissinger rejected the notion that the release of American
POWs should be contingent on South Vietnam’s actions. After the “Christmas bombing”
however, Hanoi agreed to release American POWs within two months of signing a
treaty.177 Meanwhile, the US promised to “use its influence” in getting political prisoners
released from Saigon.178 Remaining issues included Hanoi’s request for $5 billion in
compensation as a result of the recent bombing and the removal of mines. 179
There had also been progress with South Vietnam. Thieu finally gave his assent
to the agreement even though it permitted North Vietnamese troops to remain in the
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South.180 In several letters, Nixon assured Thieu that aid would be resumed if needed,
but also threatened to abandon the South Vietnamese President if he did not settle. 181
On January 22, 1973, Kissinger spoke with Dobrynin just before embarking for
Paris to sign a peace accord ending the Vietnam War.182 The conversation revealed a
sense of anticipation, but also uneasiness due to so many past disappointments:
AD: Talk about protocols - - does - - is it all right everything in Paris?
HK: We have a few minor problems, but it’s inconceivable they’ll hold us
up. We need from them a very, very minor concession as a face-saving
thing for Thieu - AD: On protocol?
HK: On protocols and they are so minor - - they are all crazy - - the
Vietnamese are crazy so you can’t assume it will be done, but that’s only
the real problem. It’s so complex - - you have to be half Vietnamese to
understand it.
AD: But I gather now you are more than half Vietnamese. . . .
HK: Oh I am. It is inconceivable that the thing will not succeed now.
AD: They may prolong for two-three days.
HK: An extra day, but
AD: In this case when you are going to initial it should be by this time
[on] Monday [or] Tuesday - - everything should be initialed by this time?
HK: We would like to initial everything together because once you let
these maniacs loose, it’s going to start all over.
Then later…
AD: Well, good luck, Henry.
HK: Thank you Anatol and I need not tell you what a joy it has been to
work with you. . .seriously we have done a lot of good things together.
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AD: Yes, Right. Henry.
HK: It took us two and a half years really to get started in the last
administration - - this one we can start with a running start.183
Kissinger and Dobrynin must have felt vindicated when representatives of the US, North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Vietcong signed the Paris Peace Accords on January
27, 1973.184 They hoped to accomplish even more during Nixon’s second term.
However, by the spring of 1973 the accords were already unraveling. According
to Kissinger, North Vietnam had maintained forces in Laos and Cambodia, moved eleven
of its twelve divisions into South Vietnam in early 1975, and obtained military equipment
well in excess of agreed-upon replacement levels – all violations of the Paris
agreement.185 Indeed, Moscow increased military shipments to Hanoi throughout 1974
and 1975.186 Meanwhile, the US Congress ended funds for any American military
purposes in Indochina in June, 1973.187 US economic aid to Saigon also declined from
$2.3 billion in 1973, to $1.1 billion in 1974, and to $700 billion in 1975. 188 It must have
been a bitter pill for Kissinger after his efforts to obtain “peace with honor.” A Nobel
Peace Prize had followed for him and Le Duc Tho in 1973, but it could stop neither the
North Vietnamese offensive nor the flow of Soviet military equipment in support of it.
What of Dobrynin? What role did he have in Moscow’s actions? Although he
may have approved of the developments in Vietnam, it is highly doubtful that he had
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anything to do with effectively sabotaging his work with Kissinger. The walls between
the various Soviet government bureaucracies made it unlikely that an ambassador in the
Foreign Ministry had knowledge of the Defense Ministry’s plans or activities.
Additionally, Dobrynin often differed with his superiors on matters of policy as in the
case of emigration restrictions. It seems probable that he would have preferred for
Moscow to be less egregious in the way it assisted Hanoi.
After receiving intelligence that Saigon could only hold on for another three or
four weeks, President Ford addressed a joint session of Congress on April 10, 1975. 189
Although Kissinger advised the President to blame Congress and even wrote a “’go down
with the flags flying’” speech, 190 Ford opted for a more conciliatory approach. He
requested $722 million in military aid and $250 million more for economic and
humanitarian assistance. 191 However, when he met with the Senate Foreign Relations
committee on April 14th, Senators Jacob Javits of New York, Frank Church of Idaho, and
Joseph Biden of Delaware only pledged support for evacuating Americans. 192
In a highly redacted conversation from April 18, 1975, Kissinger and Ford
discussed the possibility of obtaining a ceasefire in order to stage an evacuation. 193 “I
called in Dobrynin tomorrow morning. I want to ask him for a temporary cease-fire to
permit evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese,” said Kissinger. 194 “Do they have
control or the power to effect a cease-fire?” inquired Ford.195 “No probably not,” replied
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Kissinger, “but I want to ask him not to ship any military equipment during that time. I
am for taking the 2 chances in 20 that they may help…”196
Ford then implied that congressional limitations on the Central Intelligence
Agency had helped to precipitate the crisis: “No President including myself, can operate
with a crippled intelligence community. It doesn’t make sense to destroy the agency for
one mistake they made.”197 Of course, it had been more than one mistake. CIA director
William E. Colby later handed over to Congress an institutional study revealing hundreds
of cases of civil liberties abuses at home as well as excesses in covert activities abroad
over the life of the organization.198 CIA personnel referred to the warrantless wiretaps,
assassination plots and break-ins as the “Family Jewels.”199 Following investigations by
a presidential commission as well as special committees of both the House and Senate,
the agency’s reputation became badly tarnished by the end of the 1970s. 200
On April 24, Dobrynin relayed a message from Brezhnev through the
backchannel: “The position of the Vietnamese side on the question of evacuation of
American citizens from South Vietnam is definitely positive…they have no intention to
put any obstacles in the course of military actions to the evacuation of American citizens
from South Vietnam…” 201 Washington had received Moscow’s assistance in obtaining
time to stage an evacuation. Hanoi had said that it would not interfere. 202 Nevertheless,
two days later Dobrynin received a message from Ford stating that the North Vietnamese
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were bombarding the Saigon airport as well as several buildings in the vicinity of the
American embassy. 203 When Kissinger charged Hanoi with seeking to humiliate
Washington, Dobrynin cited complaints in Congress and the media that the American
evacuation had taken too long.204 As the end drew near, more than 6,000 Americans and
South Vietnamese escaped from the roof of the embassy as helicopters made repeated
trips to off-shore Navy ships to rescue them. 205 Saigon fell on April 30, 1975.
Following the North Vietnamese takeover, thousands of South Vietnamese were
executed and tens of thousands imprisoned. 206 Over the next few years, more than one
million people fled Indochina as South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos all fell to
communist regimes.207 Hundreds of thousands became refugees as “boat people,”208
risking their lives on barely sea-worthy vessels with many coming to the United States.
A united Vietnam was just one of ten new communist regimes which emerged
around the world from 1974-1980.209 To what extent was this driven by Moscow? On
the other hand, could there have been a “bandwagoning effect” or “’psychological
domino effect’” leading countries to align with the seemingly ascendant Soviet Union? 210
Certainly for those viewing the Cold War as a global “zero-sum reputational game,”
Moscow was winning and Washington was losing. 211
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The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Ever since the creation of the modern state of Israel in 1948, war or the threat of
war between the Jewish nation and its Arab neighbors has been an almost constant
feature of international headlines. After the Israeli War of Independence in 1948-49,
subsequent conflicts occurred during the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the 1967 Six Day
War. The last of these resulted in Israel obtaining the Golan Heights from Syria, the
West Bank of the Jordan River from Jordan, and the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from
Egypt. American support for Israel and Soviet backing of Egypt and Syria ensured that
the Arab-Israeli conflict intersected with détente.

The Soviets established a relationship with the Egyptians as early as 1955 when
Khrushchev and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser completed an arms
agreement.212 According to Kissinger, in the 1960s Moscow was the main arms supplier
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to both Egypt and Syria and provided organization and technical assistance to radical
Arab groups.213 By the 1970s support for national liberation on the one hand and a desire
to pursue détente with the Americans on the other forced the Soviets to walk a fine line.
As the foremost ally of Israel (the Americans had been first to recognize the
Jewish state in 1948 under President Harry S. Truman), the US would oppose efforts to
re-arm Cairo and Damascus. Consequently when Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat,
requested new arms shipments, the Soviets insisted on being paid with hard currency
which they knew the Egyptians did not have – thus preventing a sale in 1972. 214 In a
move to assert his independence, Sadat expelled approximately 20,000 Soviet military
advisors in July of that year.215 This also could have been a shrewd attempt to compel the
Soviets to come through on the promised deliveries. 216 When Saudi Arabia provided
Egypt with five hundred million dollars in January, 1973, Moscow was forced to make
the weapons transaction. 217 While the Soviets probably did not want a confrontation with
the Americans, they did seek the enhanced prestige in the developing world which a
successful Arab war to reclaim lost territories would bring. 218

Saturday, October 6
On October 6, 1973 – the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur – Sadat and Syria’s
Hafiz Al-Assad initiated a coordinated attack on two fronts. The Egyptians used
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makeshift pontoon bridges to send 70,000 troops and 800 tanks across the Suez Canal
into the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula. 219 Meanwhile, the Syrians invaded the Golan
Heights.220 At 9:20 a.m. Kissinger explained the situation on the ground to Dobrynin:
K: Our information is that the Egyptians and Syrians have attacked all
along their [fronts] and also. . .
D: Is it the canal.
K: The Canal and the Golan Heights. [Egyptian Foreign Minister] Zayyat
is claiming the Israelis launched a naval attack on some isolated spot in
the Gulf of Suez and that triggered the whole thing.
D: I saw on a ticker they claim that Israel began attack. Zayyat told you.
K: He told me not along the Canal but in the Gulf of Suez. We are all
going to have to be taking formal positions. You and I know that is
baloney if they [the Israelis] are going to attack they will not launch an
attack in the Gulf of Suez and at the key points. Not their style.
D: I understand.
K: How is it that the Syrians and Egyptians are starting at the same minute
- - all along the front. If it started with an Israel naval attack, you and I are
having a problem in how to get this stopped. We are using our maximum
influence with the Israelis to show restraint…
D: O.K. I will send additional message to Moscow. Really madness.
K: Total madness…We should meet urgently. We should, I think use this
occasion to first not to have everything we have achieved destroyed by
maniacs on [either] side and after quieting it down to see what can be done
constructively.
D: All right. Thank you very much.221
It must have been infuriating for Kissinger and Dobrynin to contemplate that all of their
work in building détente could potentially be undone by the Arab-Israeli dispute.
However, as events unfolded both would take the opportunity to advance his country’s
219

Hayward, 417.
Ibid.
221
Kissinger Transcripts. Department of State.
220

189

interests through support of respective allies. The tension between conducting
superpower diplomacy and simultaneously pursuing security, economic, and ideological
goals in the Middle East would test the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship as never before.
Kissinger probably believed that going before the entire United Nations General
Assembly, including numerous Arab and Soviet bloc nations, would be too time
consuming and result in a less favorable outcome for the United States and Israel. The
UN Security Council, which included only the US, Soviet Union, China, France, and
Great Britain as permanent members, would be a much more hospitable environment.
Around 7:00 p.m. Kissinger pressed for a Security Council ceasefire resolution, but
Dobrynin explained why his government was opposed:
D: …I had rather hear from Moscow but as I understand our position the
difficulties we are now facing is that the Arabs are trying to regain the
lands occupied by Israel. They have been using that argument to us and
for us to tell them you cannot free your land, it is ridiculous.
K: I recognize the situation. I am not saying it is all easy. We have a
different situation. There have not been any raids on Damascus and Cairo
but I would not bet anything on tomorrow.
D: I understand.
K: Is [it] possible for the Politburo to imagine a complete course of action
which we agree on privately.
D: What course of action do you propose besides SC [Security Council].
K: A defacto return to the status quo ante a defacto return of the
ceasefire...
D: I understand.
K: We have a framework out of which we could crystallize. The Arabs
have now proved their point.
D: Henry, how could they?
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K: You see they are going to lose. It is not a case where we are asking.
Not like [the 1971 war between] India and Pakistan.
D: I understand. The military point of view. I cannot argue with you.
You know the situation better. I am trying to understand the situation
better politically. 222
Both diplomats seemed convinced that it was just a matter of time until the Israelis
repelled the Egyptians and Syrians. For this reason, Kissinger explained that there was
no point in the Arabs continuing their offensive. In fact, he intimated that if a ceasefire
did not come soon Cairo and Damascus might become vulnerable.
Kissinger and Dobrynin knew that the way they handled the situation would have
repercussions beyond the Middle East. Détente had opponents in both of their countries,
and a poor outcome would play right into the hands of their critics. “If you and we could
find a way of settling this now then it would be an overwhelming argument in all of the
things we have been going through as to what the practical consequences have been of
our relationship,” said Kissinger.223 “I understand,” said Dobrynin, but since the Soviets
had proclaimed their support for national liberation they felt constrained in what they
could do: “They [the Arabs] would say you have spoken of liberating. It is impossible
for us.”224

Monday, October 8
At 8:30 a.m. Israel launched a counterattack.225 The prospect of the superior
Israeli military pushing back the Arab gains must have induced a change of heart in
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Moscow. At 9:54 a.m. Dobrynin told Kissinger, “We have contacted the leaders of the
Arab states on the question of ceasefire. We hope to get a reply shortly.” 226 Kissinger
replied that the White House would hold off submitting a resolution before the Security
Council for the time being and settle for “a general discussion” instead. 227

Tuesday, October 9
Thus far the only Arab nations involved in the conflict were Egypt and Syria.
However, Dobrynin seemed genuinely shocked when Kissinger told him at 11:29 a.m.
about a message the White House had just received from the Kingdom of Jordan:
K: “The Soviet Charge [d’Affaires] asked to see King [Hussein] and was
received this morning. Charge said Soviets fully support Arabs in conflict
with Israel. He said Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter
battle now.”
D: Soviet, what?
K: “Soviet Union thought all Arab . . .”
D: Soviet Union?
K: Yes.
D: Thought or fought?
K: Recommending to the King.
D: Un-huh.
K: “King considers this a Soviet request for him to send his army into
action..”
D: We asked King to go into action?
K: Yeah.228
226
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“Unbelievable story,” replied Dobrynin. 229 And truly it was. If the Soviets had
encouraged other Arab countries to join the fighting rather than pressuring Egypt and
Syria to agree to a ceasefire as they had claimed, it could have meant the death-knell for
détente. Dobrynin desperately sought a clarification: “Was it ours . .? I don’t have any
information at all…our support of Arab countries is nothing new. But as you said we
asked King to send………yes?”230 After Kissinger told him that he had heard correctly,
the bewildered Dobrynin said he would check with Moscow immediately. 231
Brezhnev had indeed sent a message to the other Arab nations. But why take such
a chance of damaging détente? The answer lies in the fact that two separate Soviet
foreign policy goals came into conflict with the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.
To the Arab world, Israel represented a Western implant and the latest incarnation of
European colonialism, somewhat similar to South Africa. 232 The past partnership of Tel
Aviv and Johannesburg in some military matters and even the production of nuclear
weapons only added to this perception.233 The USSR had to demonstrate its commitment
to national liberation and preserve its influence in the region by assisting the Arabs. 234
However, if it appeared that the Israelis faced destruction, the US would intervene and
Moscow wanted to avoid a confrontation with Washington which could jeopardize
détente.235 Consequently, on October 9 the Soviets initiated an arms airlift to Egypt and
Syria.236 But in order to limit the Soviet role, Brezhnev also sent a letter to President
229
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Boumedienne of Algeria exhorting all of the Arab nations to join the fight. 237 The
Soviets sought to provide enough help to prevent an Arab defeat, but not so much that
Egypt and Syria would achieve an overwhelming victory over Israel. 238

Wednesday, October 10
At 8:13 a.m. the next morning, Dobrynin had an update from Moscow on the
ceasefire question. 239 The Soviets decided that their relationship with their allies
prohibited them from supporting such a measure, however, they would not oppose one
either – the Soviet representative on the Security Council would abstain during voting. 240
This was a logical position for the Soviets to take as they sought a middle ground
between preserving détente and upholding the principle of national liberation. Kissinger
said he would need time to discuss it with Nixon, but gave Dobrynin permission to tell
the Kremlin that it had been “a constructive message.”241
Later that morning domestic politics put the Middle East on hold. Vice-President
Spiro Agnew had been investigated for months by the Justice Department on charges of
bribery, extortion, and tax fraud dating from his time as Governor of Maryland. 242 He
eventually pled no contest to a single count of tax evasion, and was about to resign. 243
Therefore the White House was unable for the time being to respond to the Soviet
abstention proposal. At 11:45 a.m. Kissinger confided in Dobrynin:
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K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you something. We are having a major
domestic problem, which as you will see, even you will recognize it’s
major, which is coming to a head early this afternoon.
D: Yeah.
K: And so there will be decisional delay until I can get you - - But you
will get your formal answer.
D: You mean it happens today or tomorrow?
K: By the end of the day I will give you an answer.
D: By the end of the day.
K: I just want you to know. You will see that this is not a delaying tactic.
D: Yeah. But what is the crisis? Could you tell me that?
K: Well, it concerns the Vice President.
D: Oh, I see.
K: So I wanted you to know that and I’ll be in touch with you around 4:00
or 5:00 o’clock this afternoon.244
Now it was Dobrynin’s turn to be patient. Kissinger closed by saying, “Now what I’ve
told you about this domestic situation, Anatol, is a sign of my great confidence in you.” 245
“No, no, no. I understand,” replied Dobrynin. 246
But by 5:40 p.m. the White House had still not replied. 247 “We consider it a
serious proposal and we have to think this thing through to think how to answer,”
explained Kissinger.248 Dobrynin seemed more concerned about a potential American
airlift to Israel: “Henry, I see in the news media…build-up.”249 To which Kissinger
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answered, “For your information, we are doing next to nothing.”250 Kissinger then
appealed to Dobrynin on a personal level: “Anatoly, you have gone through too many
crises with me. We are trying to get this thing settled. You are going to hear from us
during the course of the evening.”251 He also explained that as Secretary of State he had
to sign all government commissions as well as receive all resignations. 252 Dobrynin
seemed to understand the need for Kissinger’s involvement in Agnew’s departure.
At 9:45 p.m. Kissinger told a disappointed Dobrynin that there had been too much
happening during the day for the White House to respond to the Soviet proposal to
abstain.253 Dobrynin could be forgiven for thinking that he was now the one being strung
along. Then the truth came out. The Soviet decision to abstain from the ceasefire vote
“did not fill us with ecstasy,” admitted Kissinger. 254 “Well, nothing really…nothing
followed after this,” Dobrynin replied. 255 Support for rival Middle Eastern nations was
straining détente as well as the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship.

Saturday, October 13
At 7:55 p.m. Kissinger confronted Dobrynin about a Soviet airlift: “…we cannot
not supply our friends while you are supplying yours.”256 He claimed that up to that
point no American planes had landed in Israel. 257 (According to Thornton, Kissinger was
telling the truth; although the Israelis had been asking for help for three days, the White
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House had resisted out of fear that an airlift would lead to an overwhelming Israeli
victory and thereby destroy Washington’s role as an international peacemaker.258 Benny
Morris speculated that Tel Aviv may have applied pressure by threatening to resort to
nuclear weapons if they ran out of conventional arms. 259) Then on an ominous note for
détente, a frustrated Kissinger asked: “Why do we have to deal with you,…why not deal
with Sadat directly[?]”260 Dobrynin answered that it was “Up to you and the President to
decide,” but that it could have “disastrous results.”261

Sunday, October 14
The following afternoon at 12:36 p.m., Kissinger told Dobrynin that the US had
started airlifting supplies to the Israelis. 262 It would stop as soon as a ceasefire was
declared if the Soviets would also halt their airlift to the Arabs. 263 Kissinger also
reiterated the dangers to détente posed by the ongoing situation, and Dobrynin likewise
had a warning in regard to their conversation the previous evening:
K: You know, Anatol, we all know now what is at stake because if this
goes on much longer, …
D: Well, __________ if you had a chance to read my telegram [to
Moscow] what I sent yesterday it was exactly what I am told. [by
Kissinger]
K: No, no I….
D: I make my own reservations of course, but it was a direct quotation
everything you said. It is not only fair, but it is important for them to
258
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know the mood. At a certain point of our usual thing, I don’t do direct
quotations, but a summary, I make it. But yesterday I was rather in a
detail of what you said because this is what I feel… 264
Normally Dobrynin simply summarized his discussions with Kissinger when he reported
to Moscow. Indeed Kissinger probably owed Dobrynin a debt of gratitude for censoring
some of the Secretary of State’s more bombastic rhetoric over the years. However,
Dobrynin deemed Kissinger’s threat to deal directly with Sadat and thereby cut Moscow
entirely out of the peace process as serious enough to merit a direct quote to the Kremlin.

Tuesday, October 16
As tensions neared the breaking point, word came from Oslo that Kissinger and
Le Duc Tho had been honored with the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts at ending the
Vietnam War. At 11:42 a.m. Dobrynin offered his congratulations:
D: I hope I will be invited to the party.
K: What party?
D: Which you are going to give in connection with the award of the Nobel
Prize.
K: I figure it like Groucho Marx said, “Any club that took him in, he does
not want to join.” I would say anything that Le Duc Tho is eligible for
there must be something wrong with it.
Then later…
D: It does not matter about the present difficulties. I am sure we will
come out of this - - both of our countries…
K: …I don’t see what you and I, our countries, can gain in the Middle East
compared to what we can lose and therefore we cannot let these maniacal
parties drive us into confrontation.
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D: This is the reason I am calling you. To congratulate you. This is for
the second prize.
K: Right.
D: For the second Nobel Prize for you next year.
K: Good. We will aim for that.265 (italics mine)
The effect of past diplomatic successes on Kissinger and Dobrynin should not be
underestimated. Their shared experiences with SALT, Vietnam, and elsewhere provided
reassurance that they would overcome the current crisis in the Middle East as well.

Friday, October 19
During an epic tank battle on the Sinai Peninsula, the Israelis drove between the
Egyptian Second Army in the north and the Third Army in the south, eventually reaching
the western side of the Suez Canal. 266 The Third army was in danger of being completely
surrounded and annihilated.267 Only the depleted First Army remained to protect
Cairo.268 If the Israelis scored another overwhelming victory as in 1967, Soviet influence
in the Middle East could be destroyed. 269 For a change, Kissinger let Dobrynin do most
of the talking as the latter read a message from Brezhnev to Nixon at 11:04 a.m.:
D: “Dear Mr. President:
The events in the Middle East become more and more
dangerous. Our two powers, as we have both agreed, must do the utmost
in order to keep the events from going beyond the limits, when they could
take even more dangerous turn.”
K: Right.
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D: “If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm could be
done even to the immediate relations between the Soviet Union and the
United States. We believe that neither you, nor we want to see it…”
K: Right.
D: “Since time is essential and now not only every day but every hour
counts,”
K: Right.
D: “my colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your
closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to Moscow to
conduct appropriate negotiations with him as with your authorized
personal representative. It would be good if he could come tomorrow,
October 20. I will appreciate your speedy reply.
Sincerely, L. Brezhnev, October 19, 1973”
K: You are friendly, aren’t you?
D: Hum?
K: That’s a friendly suggestion.
D: Of course it is. 270
The more easy-going Kissinger obviously enjoyed teasing Dobrynin about the formal
manner in which he sometimes conducted himself. Half an hour later after conferring
with Nixon, Kissinger said that the White House had agreed “in principle” to accept the
Soviet invitation.271 “Will you come back there [to Moscow] with me,” asked
Kissinger.272 “Yes, if you don’t mind I would like to go both ways,” Dobrynin replied. 273
“Well, as long as you sit in the front compartment,” joked Kissinger.274 “All right. I
would rather sit in the tail but nevertheless,” laughed Dobrynin. 275
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The ongoing international crisis was occurring simultaneously with a domestic
constitutional crisis, 276 further demonstrating the importance of the backchannel. The
day after the above conversation was October 20, 1973 – date of the so-called “Saturday
Night Massacre.” Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox had demanded the full
release of the White House tapes concerning the Watergate break-in.277 Nixon offered to
provide summaries of the tapes instead of transcripts, but Cox refused. 278 When Nixon
ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Cox, Richardson refused and
resigned. 279 When Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus also refused to fire
Cox, he was fired.280 Finally, Solicitor General Robert Bork agreed to remove Cox. 281
Nixon had acted decisively in coming to the aid of the Israelis, but he was no longer in
any position to handle international affairs.
Kissinger’s visit to Moscow was successful. On Sunday, October 21, he and
Brezhnev drafted a cease-fire proposal.282 At 12:52 a.m. 283 (Washington time) on
Monday, October 22, the UN Security Council passed resolution #338 sponsored by both
the US and USSR calling for a ceasefire.284 But before returning to Washington,
Kissinger accepted the request of Prime Minister Golda Meir to first stop in Israel. 285
While there he intimated that the Israelis need not comply with the ceasefire at the exact
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time that it was supposed to go into effect, twelve hours after adoption.286 He had given
tacit permission for Israel to continue fighting, a move which would have grave
consequences shortly thereafter.287

Wednesday, October 24
“Anatol, the madmen in the Middle East seem to be at it again,” Kissinger
lamented at 9:45 a.m. 288 Israeli activity had supposedly ceased on the west bank of the
Suez canal, but now Israel was claiming that the Egyptians were attacking them on the
east bank. 289 Kissinger told Dobrynin that the US had warned both sides to stop any
offensive actions. 290 Then at ten after ten in the morning, Kissinger said that the US was
sending in its military observers from Tel Aviv to verify that the Israelis were only
making defensive moves. 291 Perhaps sensing Dobrynin’s concern, Kissinger reminded
his colleague of what was at stake: “Now the important thing is for you and us to stay
together having made this historic achievement [the ceasefire].” 292 “Now this is the
point,” replied Dobrynin. 293 Five minutes later Kissinger reported that according to the
Israelis all fighting had ceased. 294 He added that the US would send ten military
observers to the battle zone for about forty-eight hours until the UN observers arrived. 295
What transpired over the next several hours would draw the United States and the
Soviet Union closer to war than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
286
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Around 1:00 p.m. Sadat sent Nixon a message accusing the Israelis of violating the ceasefire. 296 Shortly thereafter, the Egyptian government announced that it was seeking a
Security Council meeting to request US and Soviet troops be sent to the Middle East. 297
This was the last thing Kissinger wanted, particularly in such a potentially explosive
region. In his words, “The makings of a crisis were appearing.”298
At 3:35 p.m. that afternoon, Dobrynin read a telegram from Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko.299 Egyptian and Soviet sources were claiming that fighting
was continuing on the Israeli side: “Therefore, information given by Israel to the White
House is Israel stop fighting is false,” read Dobrynin. 300 “Please immediately inform Dr.
Kissinger of the false information and put information before the President,” he added. 301
By 7:00 p.m. Washington time, the Soviet leadership decided that more extreme
measures were warranted.302 The Israelis had completely surrounded the Egyptian Third
Army on the Sinai Peninsula, leaving little in the way of a direct assault on Cairo. 303
Likewise, Damascus was threatened on the eastern front.304 Moscow could not allow
their Arab clients to be defeated again, consequently the Soviets instructed their UN
representative to support a resolution directing American and Soviet troops to the war
zone, provided someone else (presumably Egypt) introduced it.305 At 7:25 p.m. Kissinger
spoke to Dobrynin and the day’s tensions boiled over:
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K: I have been talking to the President and we really want to urge you not
to push matters to an extreme because we will veto any resolution that
calls for sending over any military forces. What we need is more
observers.
D: …I mentioned to you when I was in Moscow it was completely out of
the question to send any troops. Now they have become so angry they
want troops.
K: Why through us. What was achieved?
D: You allowed the Israelis to do what they wanted.
K: When this operation started I pleaded with you to get people to return
from the lines and it took a week.
D: It [the ceasefire] was already agreed upon by you and Brezhnev....
K: Be that as it may, if you want confrontation we will have to have one...
D: You know we don’t want to have a confrontation.
K: It is inevitable that there will be mutual charges in the first 24 hours of
a ceasefire. We introduced two joint resolutions….306 (italics mine)
Kissinger correctly stated that the US sought a ceasefire as soon as hostilities had broken
out and while Israel was on the defensive. He was also probably correct that there would
be a few residual skirmishes after a ceasefire went into effect (leaving out that he may
have encouraged such activities). Nevertheless, although the Soviets initially had resisted
a ceasefire, now that the Arabs were on the defensive Moscow wanted it enforced.
The Soviets sent another letter to Washington at 9:35 p.m.307 “Kissinger sounded
nervous as I read to him Brezhnev’s message over our confidential telephone line,” wrote
Dobrynin. 308 The Soviets were threatening to act even if the US did not join them in
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enforcing the ceasefire. 309 Kissinger proceeded to call an emergency meeting of the
Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) for 10:30 p.m. 310 At 10:15 p.m. he told
Dobrynin that the White House was reviewing the latest Soviet offer:
K: We are assembling our people to consider your letter. I just wanted
you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance
to reply that will be very serious.
D: Yes, all right.
K: This is a matter of great concern. Don’t you pressure us. I want to
repeat again, don’t pressure us!
D: All right.311
The discovery by U.S. intelligence that the Soviets had mobilized and put seven airborne
divisions on alert further indicated that the situation had truly reached a crisis point. 312
Fearing imminent, unilateral military action by the Soviets to enforce the
ceasefire, the US put its forces on a DefCon3 or “Defense Condition” world-wide nuclear
alert at 11:41 p.m.313 Some alleged that Nixon made the move to distract attention from
his ongoing tug-of-war with Congress over the White House tapes.314 However, due to
the President’s distraction with Watergate, it was Kissinger who led the White House
meeting, issued the alert, and generally handled the crisis in the Middle East. 315
The Soviet threat to intervene drove the Americans to pressure Israel to stop its
advance and allow the Third Egyptian Army to be resupplied. 316 Concerned that if the
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Israelis achieved a total victory they would refuse to return any of the occupied
territories, Kissinger threatened to cut off military aid unless they accepted a ceasefire. 317

Thursday, October 25
Cooler heads eventually prevailed. The next morning at 5:40 a.m., the White
House sent a letter to Brezhnev with an offer to send US and Soviet observers as well as
UN forces.318 At 3:40 p.m. Dobrynin called Kissinger with Brezhnev’s reply:
K: Anatoly?
D: Hello Henry. I would like to read to you a letter from Brezhnev to the
President and then I will send you…
K: Is it going to calm me down or make me go into orbit again?
D: No, not orbit…Prefer to stay in orbit quietly…[reading Brezhnev’s
letter] Since you are ready now, as we understand it, now to send to Egypt
a group of American observers, we agree to it jointly in this question.
Soviet group of observers instructed to get into contact immediately in a
businesslike operation with the US group of observers… 319
After Dobrynin finished reading the letter Kissinger said, “I thought you were threatening
us. Don’t …I take threats very badly. We will talk about it sometime.” 320 Dobrynin
agreed, “No, [it] isn’t anything to discuss now…”321
A potential disaster had been narrowly averted. But what caused this colossal
misunderstanding? The success of détente thus far had been in large part due to a sense
of trust and empathy built up over several years between Kissinger and Dobrynin.
Established practice had been that nothing was said publicly or even at the traditional
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diplomatic level without first being discussed in the backchannel. The last thing
Dobrynin heard was at 10:15 p.m. on Wednesday the 24th when Kissinger said the White
House was considering the Soviet offer. Nothing else had been forthcoming until 4:00
a.m., and even then no mention was made of putting the country on an alert. 322 The
prospect of Soviet ground forces in the Middle East shocked the White House, leading
Nixon and Kissinger to believe that past diplomatic procedure no longer applied. The
absence of communication through the backchannel represented a breakdown in the
process and almost proved fatal for relaxing tensions.

Saturday, October 27
At 11:24 a.m. Kissinger and Dobrynin finally had an opportunity to discuss at
greater length the disaster which had almost occurred over the previous couple of days:
K: We had the impression that you were planning a military move. We
did not invent this. Someday soon we have to discuss this. We had no
reason to meet until 4:00 in the morning.
D: …On this, I think, one thing was really a big blunder on your [side],
maybe it was deliberate. For six hours you are just telling us every hour to
wait, there will be a reply. I am sure if you had just mentioned to me that
the President feels it was necessary to make an alert…[and] blow up our
relations…
K: That was a blunder.
D: Seven hours you were telling us [to wait] and then we receive a letter
that didn’t say a word about the alert. It was widely publicized.
K: Whether you ever believe it or not it is not important now. I am telling
you it was not…we were convinced you were planning something
unilateral. We were as [outraged]. We thought the tone in that letter….
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D: You were pretty sure we would do it. If you were so sure, you could
have waited one hour to get some additional information from Brezhnev.
But you didn’t want to have it.
K: That isn’t true. I was very tough. [I said] Don’t pressure us. I sent you
two or three messages to please don’t do anything unilateral.
D: Exactly.
K: You could have said what makes you think we will do anything
unilateral. We have no intention of taking action.
D: What you said was to wait for a reply. I sent four telegrams to Moscow
-- this was a unique situation -- to wait for a reply from the President.
What did they receive...Someday in Moscow…much more easy to discuss.
K: We very truly thought you were threatening us out of the….
D: Exactly, you have it with us. Wait for the reply. By the way nothing
was said…323
Kissinger seemed regretful for what he admitted had been “a horrible
misunderstanding.”324 He also sought to repair the personal relationship: “Too much is at
stake for us to be angry with each other.”325 Dobrynin said that he had only been angry
“for two days,” but that anger in Moscow was “still very high.” 326 He claimed that
Kissinger later admitted that calling the alert had been a mistake. 327
The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War had several long-term effects. First, the
Soviets removed any doubt that they could deliver arms and supplies around the world in
a relatively short time. 328 This had implications for further interventions throughout the
1970s. Second, in 1973 eleven of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) instituted an oil embargo on nations deemed too friendly to Israel, including the
323
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US.329 When the embargo ended the next year, OPEC had increased oil prices by three
hundred percent, contributing to inflation throughout the decade.330 As a leading oilexporting nation, the Soviet Union benefitted from the higher petroleum prices, allowing
Moscow to increase military spending at the same time that Washington was reducing its
by about fifty percent.331 However, the amount of wealth that the Soviets obtained from
petroleum and natural gas also served as a disincentive to developing other sources of
economic vitality through science and technology. 332
Were détente and the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship vindicated during the
October War? Both had complicated matters by prolonging the fighting when their
respective allies appeared to have the upper hand. 333 Kissinger admitted that détente “had
not prevented a crisis,” and that both Washington and Moscow attempted to “reduce the
role and influence” of the other.334 However, he also explained that détente “defined not
friendship but a strategy for a relationship between adversaries.” 335 Dobrynin argued that
the Soviet Union and the United States “cooperated in bringing the war to an end,” but
likewise conceded that they “sought to manipulate events to serve their own ends and to
extend their own influence in the Middle East.”336 Although he believed that both
nations wanted to prevent the war from affecting their relationship, he suggested that
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Kissinger was “prepared to use and even sacrifice this relationship to reduce and if
possible eliminate Soviet influence in the Middle East under the cover of détente.”337
To some extent Kissinger was successful. By forcing Israel to retreat when Cairo
appeared about to fall, the US showed Sadat that it could apply pressure on its ally. 338
Thereafter the US and Egypt resumed diplomatic relations on November 7 after a sixyear hiatus.339 Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” then resulted in the Egyptians and Israelis
signing a cease-fire agreement on November 11 and returning to the positions they had
occupied on October 22.340 Subsequent agreements in January, 1974, and September,
1975, resulted in partial Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai. 341 Kissinger also oversaw an
agreement in May, 1974, whereby the Israelis partially withdrew from the Golan Heights
in Syria.342
Eventually it was President Carter who helped to engineer a long-term EgyptianIsraeli peace at Camp David in September, 1978.343 By signing the Camp David Accords
in 1979 and acknowledging Israel’s right to exist, Sadat regained the rest of the Sinai as
well as earned a Nobel Peace Prize (with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.) 344

Angola
The US-Soviet proxy war in Angola marked a crucial turning point for détente.
After acquiring naval and air bases in South Yemen, Moscow enhanced its ability to
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intervene in Africa, which then emerged as a new battlefield in the Cold War. 345 As in
Vietnam, Soviet actions were driven in part by competition with the Chinese, who by
1975 had established relationships with Zambia, Tanzania, Zaire, and Mozambique. 346
Oil-rich Angola, a former Portuguese colony for 500 years, 347 represented another
of the revolutionary movements on the continent which were either communist or
nationalist and shared Moscow’s disdain for Western imperialism. 348 Soviet economic
and military aid, protection, and “political models” were some of the benefits of this
common outlook.349 Arbatov classified such direct military assistance to liberation
movements as an example of Soviet “errors and political miscalculations, which were
strongly in evidence from the mid-1970s on.”350 He also described the policy as “loaded
with revolutionary jargon and closely intertwined with imperial ambitions.” 351 Soviet
foreign policy specialist Andrei M. Alexandrov even likened Angola to the Spanish Civil
War of the 1930s, and believed intervening represented “our internationalist duty.”352
Dobrynin suggested that Angola “raised the question of whether détente had any
general rules outside our mutual behavior toward each other, and if so, what they
were.”353 For Kissinger the issue was not Marxism. 354 He claimed that when
Mozambique gained independence from Portugal under the Marxist Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Washington extended recognition and
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established diplomatic relations. 355 However, he viewed Angola as problematic because
it represented “the projection of Soviet military power into Africa.”356

According to Dobrynin, the International Department of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) used the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) to first establish
contact with and then provide support to the Angolan liberation movement.357 One of the
most reliably obedient parties to Moscow, the PCP had even backed Soviet actions
against Finland in 1939 and the invasion of Hungary in 1956. 358 In the 1950s the PCP
created the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). 359 Thus it is
possible that the Angolan revolution in 1959 was initiated by Moscow and carried out at
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least in part by the PCP.360 Alongside the rebellion against colonial rule, the procommunist MPLA and the anti-communist National Union for the Total Liberation of
Angola (UNITA) had fought a civil war since the early 1960s. 361
1974 was a pivotal year in the fortunes of Angola. On April 25, the fascist regime
of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was overthrown in a military coup in Portugal. 362 General
Antonio Spinola led the new government 363 which included Alvaro Cunhal, a PCP leader
who in February had been honored with the Order of the October Revolution while in
Moscow.364 In June, Portugal and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. 365
The next month the Portuguese army withdrew from Angola. 366 Finally, in January,
1975, Angola’s competing factions agreed to form a government and hold elections. 367
However, fighting broke out before any votes could be cast. Predictably, the
superpowers backed their respective ideological allies. The Soviets supported the
MPLA, led by former medical student and convert to Marxism Agostinho Neto. 368
Meanwhile, the Americans adopted UNITA as well as a third group, the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).369
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Brezhnev believed that Soviet involvement in Angola was “just,” but it also
presented an opportunity to show China that the Soviet Union was still the leader of
international communism. 370 Meanwhile Ford and Kissinger viewed American
involvement as critical to re-establish US credibility after the loss of Vietnam. 371 Once
again, the United States was being driven by its own ideological impulses to respond to
what it viewed as the further spread of communism across the globe.
Several events during 1975 prompted Ford and Kissinger to dramatically increase
the US role in Angola. Sometime in the spring, perhaps as early as March, but probably
no later than May, Cuban advisers arrived to train the MPLA in the use of Soviet tanks
and weapons.372 On April 17, Lon Nol’s US-backed government fell to the communist
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. 373 On April 19, Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda
requested Ford and Kissinger intervene in Angola to counter the Soviet Union and protect
his and other African nations. 374 By the end of the month, Vietnam was united under a
communist regime. 375 Later that summer, communists took complete control of Laos as
well. 376 To some, these events showed that the tide was turning against US interests as
more countries aligned with the Soviet bloc, particularly in the General Assembly of the
United Nations. 377 For Gates, 1975 was “the worst year in CIA’s history.” 378
Cuban involvement clearly affected Kissinger. He viewed those in the State
Department and elsewhere who opposed intervention as suffering from “the Vietnam
370
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syndrome,” referring to fears that US involvement would lead to a recreation of the long,
drawn-out struggle in Southeast Asia. 379 He reasoned that a diplomatic solution would
not be enough to counter the Soviets and the Cubans. 380 Consequently Ford and
Kissinger increased military support to FNLA and UNITA from hundreds of thousands to
millions of dollars.381 Beginning in July, both factions received armored personnel
carriers, surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, rifles, machine guns and other
supplies and equipment from the CIA. 382 By September, the amount of aid had risen
from an initial $14-$17 million to approximately $25 million. 383
The introduction of Cuban combat troops was a crucial turning point in the
Angolan intervention, détente, and the Cold War. Although the Cuban military had been
involved in numerous African nations ever since Fidel Castro’s revolution in 1959,
previous military contingents usually never exceeded several hundred. 384 However, by
the end of September at the latest, the first of thousands of combat troops from Havana
arrived in Angola.385 Moscow had used military force in Eastern Europe, but Angola
represented the first time Soviet military power had been applied (albeit through a proxy)
into a civil war on the side of a pro-Soviet faction. 386
Despite increased US aid, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA claimed he needed more. If
Washington would not help, he threatened to appeal to apartheid South Africa, thus
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turning Angola into a diplomatic and public relations catastrophe.387 Kissinger never
admitted to working with South Africa, but according to the CIA there was
communication and sharing of intelligence between Washington and Pretoria (Defense
Minister P.W. Botha also reported that the US had asked for assistance.)388 On October
14, South Africa invaded Angola in an attack on the Soviet-backed MPLA in the south,
eventually reaching 500 miles inside of the war-ravaged country.389
For the sake of American credibility around the world, Ford and Kissinger
believed that they had to press forward.390 Since the amount in its contingency fund had
fallen to a mere seven million dollars, the CIA sought Congressional approval. 391
However, agency director William Colby’s testimony on November 6 before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee revealed that Congress had not been fully informed about
either the extent or the details of US involvement in Angola. 392 Senator Dick Clark of
Iowa, recently returned from a visit to the war-torn nation, declared that the CIA and
White House had lied about the extent of the American role and charged that US actions
had drawn Cuba and South Africa into the conflict.393 California Senator John Tunney
later sponsored the Clark Amendment cutting off CIA funding for covert operations in
Angola, 394 adding “’I don’t want to see any more money go down this rat hole.’” 395
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By November there were approximately 4,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola. 396
Although originally transported on Cuban planes and ships, that month the Soviets began
providing long-range aircraft.397 The MPLA took the capital of Luanda and declared the
independence of the People’s Republic of Angola on November 12.398
Meanwhile, Kissinger and Dobrynin worked in the backchannel, discussing the
matter several times during October and November.399 On December 9, Ford told
Dobrynin that détente was being jeopardized by Soviet actions in Angola. 400 The next
day the Soviets suspended their airlift, 401 and Kissinger and Dobrynin addressed the
influx of arms from surrounding nations:
K: …We cannot think of any other solution except to ask outside countries
to promise not to send more arms in. If you are worried about the border
in Zaire, we are willing to consider a UN force there. We promise you we
would exercise restraint on our part and to get all foreign forces out.
D: …The question really is in this case not very easy to control. It is in
the capital of the country and no one knows where they are.
K: But look it will be easily known if something comes in or not. If we
don’t keep our word, that will affect our relationship.
D: Do you have any ideas if Africa could do something? It is their
business. It is not natural for us really.
K: No, but the way we could do it is to have the Organization of African
Unity ask all outside powers, you see, and then we would both have an
excuse to do it…
However, there remained one wildcard:
D: Who is going to control South Africa?
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K: We have nothing to do directly with South Africa, but we would bring
major pressure on them.
D: But if they continue?
K: Look, we are trying to win. We are trying to get everybody out of it. 402
Describing a mutual pullout as a “win” represented quite a lowering of expectations for
Kissinger. He may have already given up hope of receiving further funding to displace
the MPLA, and instead sought a face-saving measure to limit the damage to US prestige.
Kissinger suggested to Dobrynin that if the US and the USSR would support an appeal
from the Organization of African Unity to have all three factions begin talks, it could lead
to a political solution.403 Dobrynin seemed hesitant: “The question is themselves.
Whether they are going to take this from us.” 404 “I think if the two of us agree, we can
get them to agree,” replied Kissinger.405
A little over a week later, the Clark Amendment passed the Senate by a 54-22
vote on December 19.406 An irate Ford lambasted the upper house: “’This abdication of
responsibility by a majority of the Senate will have the gravest consequences for the
long-term position of the United States and for international order in general.’” 407 The
vote and leaked information concerning previous CIA covert activity in Angola may have
encouraged the Soviets to step up their efforts.408 After a brief pause from December 9 to
25, Moscow resumed its transport of Cuban arms and troops.409
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With the arrival of the election year 1976, a favorable outcome in Angola took on
an even greater importance for the White House. On January 3, Ford stated in an
interview with NBC that Soviet actions in Angola violated the principles of détente.410
On the 9th, Kissinger told Dobrynin that the lack of progress in Angola would force him
to “make some bloody statements about the conditions…which can not be in your
interest.”411 Kissinger seemed to be implying that the situation could affect his planned
visit to Moscow to discuss the SALT II treaty as well as its chances for ratification
thereafter. Dobrynin appeared threatened and the conversation grew tense:
D: We are not…we have never considered it [Angola] a test of strength or
will but you…
K: No, it is on the part of Congress.
D: It has nothing to do with Congress…you are forcing this issue…We
have to make a test of will between you and the Secretary General whether
you will come if something happens in Angola?...Either Brezhnev has to
agree to what Henry wants or the whole SALT issue is in the air.
Then later…
K: I was hoping we could settle this thing quietly since neither of us have
an overwhelming interest in Angola.
D: Exactly. But you are forcing the point.412 (italics mine)
Perhaps no other conversation in the telcons better demonstrated the divergent views of
the United States and the Soviet Union on détente. Kissinger insisted that the Soviets end
their support for the MPLA, even after saying that Angola was of little strategic interest
to the US. However, the White House believed Soviet and Cuban intent on aiding the
MPLA made the country strategic. This exchange demonstrated how both superpowers
410
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viewed the outcomes of various conflicts in the developing world as indications of whose
ideology was “winning.” Ford and Kissinger were determined that Moscow would not
“win” in Angola – not after Vietnam and especially not in an election year.
An increasingly frustrated Dobrynin then challenged Kissinger: “OK. You do it.
You make a test. If you equate Angola to détente that is your business. If you feel it is
that important, ok. We don’t think it is...I will send to Brezhnev that you will have to
take into consideration that you may not come because of Angola.” 413 To which
Kissinger responded, “No, I said that the conditions that are being created are not helpful
ones,” and “we trust that you are not working in a direction that during my visit things
will happen that will be humiliating to the United States.”414 Although Kissinger
eventually did travel to Moscow on January 20, 1976, there was no long-term agreement
on Angola or SALT II.415
As expected, the House approved the Clark Amendment to the defense spending
bill 323-99 on January 27, cutting off all CIA funding for Angola. 416 Although Ford
supported the CIA’s actions in Africa, he reluctantly signed the legislation in February
because it also funded the B-1 bomber, the Trident missile, and the cruise missile. 417 The
Clark Amendment was later repealed during the Reagan administration.418
By March of 1976 the MPLA emerged victorious. 419 At the end of 1977 there
were 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola. 420 A conservative estimate of the cost of the
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Soviet intervention was $300 million, about ten times what the Americans spent, and this
only included the cost of equipment – not troops.421 The ability to fund such an operation
indicated that the Soviet economy, while perhaps only 50-60% as large as that of the US,
nevertheless could provide Moscow with numerous international opportunities. The
Soviet Union had demonstrated to other liberation movements, the Chinese, and the
Americans that it could intervene in support of its interests anywhere around the world. 422
However, as Dobrynin explained the price for this victory was high because
Angola “soured Americans on détente.”423 He claimed that the Soviet embassy attempted
to tell Moscow that Washington viewed Angola as “a test of détente,” but that these
warnings went unheeded by “the morally self-righteous” in the Kremlin. 424
Foreign interventions were the coup de grace for détente. Although the policy
limped on for another few years into the Carter Administration, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 was the last straw. Through the backchannel, Kissinger and
Dobrynin had established empathy and achieved numerous diplomatic successes.
However, the telephone transcripts show that even at a détente, both the United States
and the Soviet Union continued to view themselves as a nation and a cause, complicating
the work of diplomacy. Ultimately, Kissinger and Dobrynin were unable to reconcile the
conflicts between their respective national ideologies, and détente became little more than
a short respite from the Cold War.
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CONCLUSION
The Role of Relationships
“He understood that a reputation for reliability is an important asset in foreign policy.
Subtle and disciplined, warm in his demeanor while wary in his conduct, Dobrynin
moved through the upper echelons of Washington with consummate skill.” 1
-Henry Kissinger
“To Henry, opponent, partner, friend.” 2
-Anatoly Dobrynin’s inscription on a copy of his memoirs presented to Kissinger.
When détente ended along with the 1970s, the chances of a return to relaxing
tensions appeared remote. No one seemed less likely to resume détente with the Soviet
Union than Ronald Reagan, who was elected President of the United States in 1980. At
his first presidential press conference Reagan called détente “a one-way street”3 which he
believed the Soviet Union had exploited to acquire a strategic and geopolitical advantage
over the United States.
Supporters of this view would argue that in addition to maintaining superiority in
ICBMs and SLBMs (but not bombers) throughout the 1970s, in 1977 the Soviets had
deployed new tactical nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe, the SS-20s.4 These
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with multiple warheads were capable of
hitting Western European capitals, thus enhancing Moscow’s regional nuclear
advantage.5 Left unchecked, such developments presented the theoretical possibility of
the “Finlandization” of Europe, a reference to Finland’s perceived acquiescence to the
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neighboring Soviet Union on foreign policy in exchange for maintaining some measure
of domestic sovereignty. If Europe as a whole felt compelled to take a similar path, it
could split the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and leave the United States
diplomatically isolated. Some Western European governments including Great Britain
and West Germany were so concerned that they requested NATO to respond with a
similar deployment of its own, which it did in 1983.
In addition to the changes in the US-Soviet relationship, there were significant
global developments as well. The “convergence theory” of liberal economist John
Kenneth Galbraith postulated that multinational corporations in the West and communist
state enterprises would become increasingly similar.6 Such a view implied that
communism remained a viable economic system and may have even been superior to
capitalism in terms of managing industrial development.7 Furthermore, around the world
ten additional countries had adopted communist governments from 1975-1980. By the
end of the decade Freedom House, a non-governmental organization (NGO) tracking the
progress of democracy, noted that autocratic regimes of both the left and the right
outnumbered democratic ones 2:1. French conservative scholar Jean-Francois Revel
even warned of a “totalitarian temptation,” arguing that many had come to believe
dictatorships might be better suited to provide for people’s needs than liberal democracies
could. 8
President Carter increased US defense spending as well as aid to the Mujahideen
rebels fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, Reagan’s first term was marked by
6
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still greater increases in both as well as declarations of ideological warfare including
describing the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire.” Nevertheless, beginning in 1985 he
and new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev held the first of four summits.
Two years later they signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty whereby
both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear
weapons. Additional negotiations commenced to drastically reduce – not simply limit –
long-range strategic weapons, culminating in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
(START I) after Reagan left office. Unlike SALT, the START negotiations also included
verification measures to ensure compliance with any agreement. US-Soviet relations
continued to improve until the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended.
What happened? How did the United States and the Soviet Union go “[f]rom the
second cold war to the second détente”9 and ultimately to the end of the Cold War? It is
one of the most intensely argued questions in the entire historiography of US-Soviet
relations. Some scholars credited Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of glasnost
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring). They pointed to reforms granting Soviet
citizens a greater role in their government as well as the release of Eastern Europe from
Moscow’s influence. However, they also acknowledged that Gorbachev lost control of
the reform process, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.10 For many scholars on the left Gorbachev was a great reformer and man of
peace. However, observers on the right argued that Gorbachev’s reforms were intended
9
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to salvage communism and find a way to make it more competitive with the West. He
certainly did not plan to abolish the communist party and the Soviet Union itself.
Furthermore, critics argued that Gorbachev’s military response to independence
movements in the Baltic States and elsewhere undermined the notion that he was simply
a man dedicated to peacefully ending the Cold War.
Gorbachev’s “new political thinking” about foreign policy was another proposed
explanation for the Cold War’s end. Advocates of this view contended that American
fears of Soviet expansion had driven US-Soviet tensions ever since George Kennan’s
article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1947.
Consequently, some cited Gorbachev’s removal of ideological considerations from
foreign policy such as support for the international “class struggle,” as crucial to ending
the East-West conflict.11 This narrative may have appealed to those on the right who
considered the Soviet Union to be motivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology to establishing
global domination. However, for those on the left who believed such concerns to be
misguided at best and paranoid at worst, this thesis was probably not as satisfying.
Others argued that none of Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign policy reforms
would have taken place without the hard-line policies of the first term Reagan
administration from 1981-1984. They suggested that the Soviet Union only changed
course from its aggressive posture after being confronted by counteroffensive measures
taken by the United States including dramatic increases in defense spending and support
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for resistance movements in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Furthermore, they pointed to
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as presenting a technological challenge to the
Soviet offensive nuclear arsenal which Moscow lacked the ability to duplicate. The
cumulative effect of these policies was said to have forced Gorbachev to liberalize
politically and economically, and ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Cold War.12 However, some on the left argued that rather than
bringing about or hastening the Cold War’s end, Reagan’s hard-line stance inflamed
tensions and dragged the confrontation out longer than it needed to be. They also pointed
to the enormous US national debt resulting in part from Reagan’s defense spending. On
the other hand, many on the right pointed to several developments in the 1970s including
the Soviet arms build-up, the use of Cuban surrogates in support of Marxist revolutions in
the developing world, and the invasion of Afghanistan as evidence that US-Soviet
relations were already at their nadir by the time Reagan came into office. Consequently,
they argued that an aggressive response from the Americans was precisely what was
required. Additionally, they contended that the installment of a reformer, Mikhail
Gorbachev, as General Secretary of the Communist Party demonstrated that Reagan’s
approach did not result in an equally hard-line response from the Soviets.
Finally, several observers emphasized the role of personal relationships and trust
which developed between key American and Soviet officials, somewhat reminiscent of
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that between Kissinger and Dobrynin via the backchannel over a decade before. They
argued that despite Reagan’s reputation as a hard-liner, he was genuinely interested in
relaxing tensions. Gaddis claimed that Reagan shocked “his own hard-line supporters”
when his foreign policy “turned out to be a more solidly based approach to détente than
anything the Nixon, Ford, or Carter administrations had been able to accomplish.” 13
While some in the administration like Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger viewed
Reagan’s arms build-up as an effort to “debilitate the other side,” Gaddis explained that
Reagan eventually sided with pragmatists like Secretary of State George Schultz in using
it to compel the Soviets to negotiate. 14 In fact, Kiron K. Skinner, associate professor of
International Relations at Carnegie Mellon University and research fellow at the
conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University, argued that negotiations with
Moscow were “as important as the military buildup,” for Reagan’s strategy. 15
However, if US-Soviet relations were to improve it required a counterpart on the
Soviet side. As Gaddis explained, only when Mikhail Gorbachev became General
Secretary in 1985 did Reagan have a negotiating partner “imaginative” enough (or who
lived long enough) with whom to do business. 16 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan’s
ambassador to Moscow, agreed and explained that beginning in 1983 the Reagan
administration “tried to establish a pattern of discussing new proposals with the Soviet
Communist Party leader in private before making them public.” 17 This included the use
of letters (many hand-written by Reagan personally) as well as meetings between
13
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diplomats.18 However, “it took two or three years to catch on and be reciprocated,”19
suggesting that real progress did not commence until Gorbachev arrived on the scene.
By the time of the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit in 1985 at Geneva,
Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy advisor Anatoli Cherniaev observed “some sort of
human rapport between the two leaders that gave hope for change.” 20 Cherniaev added
that after Reagan’s positive reaction to Gorbachev’s 1986 proposal at Reykjavik to
eliminate half of all strategic nuclear weapons, “Mutual trust between the two leaders was
another touchstone of the new political thinking that was crucial in bringing the cold war
to an end.”21 Ultimately, both Reagan and Gorbachev stopped viewing the Cold War as a
zero-sum game or in the words of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. as if “a gain for one side
was by definition a defeat for the other.”22 The old outlook had led not to “negotiation,”
but rather “to a demand for capitulation,” said Schlesinger.23
However, the change in approach was not limited to the two men at the top.
Citing the memoirs of numerous Soviet officials as well as archival documents, William
D. Jackson argued “the interest displayed by the second-term Reagan administration in
improving relations with Moscow and the personal trust [italics mine] that gradually
developed in high-level contacts between Soviet and U.S. officials” altered U.S.-Soviet
relations and led to the end of the Cold War. 24
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Like American and Soviet officials during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, the
telephone transcripts show that Kissinger and Dobrynin developed a relationship while
developing détente. The backchannel had four qualities which helped to facilitate this:
privacy, durability, ease and frequency of communication, and the personalities of its
participants.
As the scholarly literature on back channels has argued, privacy allows
representatives from opposing sides to begin talks when more strident voices on both
sides may be opposed to any form of negotiations. This was certainly true during the
détente era as relaxing US-Soviet tensions faced opposition from hard-liners in Moscow
and both liberals and conservatives in Washington. Additionally, Kissinger and
Dobrynin worked jointly to keep the substance of their face-to-face meetings and
telephone calls secret, creating a bond while establishing trust.
Second, the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel had durability. For eight years,
Kissinger and Dobrynin were the main point of contact for each other when addressing
US-Soviet relations. While previous back channels had dealt with a specific issue or
emergency, as with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Kissinger-Dobrynin
backchannel was a permanent link between the White House and the Kremlin for all
aspects of US-Soviet diplomacy. It lasted through a presidential election in 1972,
Kissinger’s appointment as Secretary of State in 1973, Nixon’s resignation in 1974, and
even when Kissinger was stripped of his National Security Advisor duties by President
Ford in 1975.
Third, the structure of the backchannel provided an ease and frequency of
communication unlike any other channel. Since Dobrynin was stationed at the Soviet
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embassy in Washington, he could conveniently meet with Kissinger in the Map Room of
the White House. Initially they met on a weekly basis, however the frequency increased
as time went on. Furthermore, the ease of access provided by the hotline from
Dobrynin’s office at the Soviet embassy to Kissinger’s office in the White House
probably encouraged more frequent communication than would have taken place
otherwise.
Finally, the backchannel was effective due to the personal chemistry of its
participants. This was its most intangible quality, but nevertheless a significant one. To
put it simply, Kissinger and Dobrynin “hit it off.” Dobrynin in particular appreciated
their shared sense of humor, which he said “helps to reach the heart as well as the mind
of your partner.”25 Indeed, their banter was often comical, occasionally bordering on
bawdy. Horne described some of their conversations as more typical of “old college
roommates” rather than representatives of the superpowers.26
Through a common purpose and shared experience, Kissinger and Dobrynin built
a relationship and established empathy. However, empathy does not equal sympathy.
Ralph K. White, a political scientist and psychologist at George Washington University,
wrote that empathy is “’simply understanding the thoughts and feelings of others. It is
distinguished from sympathy, which is defined as feeling with others – as being in
agreement with them.’” 27 Consequently, “’even when a conflict is so intense that
sympathy is out of the question,’” empathy is nevertheless possible. 28
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Recent scholarship about the failure of détente focused on the issue of empathy.
As James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang explained, “empathy is a central concept in such
fields as anthropology (especially ethnography), clinical psychology, and conflict
resolution, among others,” but not in Cold War historiography. 29 Nevertheless, they
contended that the initial March 1977 arms control meeting in Moscow between the new
Carter administration and the Kremlin was a turning point in US-Soviet relations due to a
lack of empathy on both sides. According to Blight and Lang, both the Americans and
the Soviets agreed that this was the beginning of the mistrust which eventually ended
détente.30
The authors examined the published proceedings of the Carter-Brezhnev Project,
part of the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. A May, 1994,
conference in Musgrove, Georgia entitled “SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust,”
featured many of the most significant players from 1977 including President Carter’s
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Dobrynin, and Russian translator Viktor Sukhodrev. The goals of the conference were to
identify mistakes, look for missed opportunities, and draw lessons from the 1977
Moscow summit.31 Blight and Lang explained that by using critical oral history, a
process “combining, in structured conferences, decision-makers, scholars, and
declassified documents (which provide added accuracy and authenticity to the
conversation),” the participants were able to establish empathy and “begin to develop the
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capacity to see pivotal events more or less the way their former adversaries saw them at
the time.”32 Blight and Lang explained that this method “often yields rich and surprising
insights into what it was really like for decision-makers, then and there, thus yielding
more accurate analyses and applicable lessons for decision-making, here and now.”33
The inclusion of testimony from both sides, plus questions from scholars “armed with
declassified documents,” helps to provide greater certainty of what happened, as much as
this is possible in the search for historical truth.34
The 1994 conference revealed that the Soviets had taken offense at the 1977
summit when the Americans proposed a much more radical arms limitation agreement
than the one agreed upon between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at
Vladivostok in 1974.35 The Soviets viewed this as a unilateral change, while the
Americans were offended at the lack of any counterproposal. 36 The use of critical oral
history enabled both sides to understand what the other thought at the time. Blight and
Lang concluded that the history of détente could have been more successful if only the
two sides had been able to see the other’s point of view. 37
While at the conference Dobrynin reflected on his experience negotiating in the
backchannel. He explained that while it was not a panacea for successful diplomacy, it
did allow both sides to make proposals in an informal way, and thereby gauge the other’s
reaction as well as the chances for success:
I don’t say that it is something of overriding importance, but it has some
importance. Specifically in one sense: it gives you a chance to explain
32
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things. It helps provide preliminary explanation of the position of the
other country. It’s simple. It doesn’t always matter who the channel is;
things are decided by the president. But the backchannel helps elaborate
on your thinking a bit. Not always. 38
However, without this line of communication, Dobrynin claimed that the Soviets were
unsure of what the Carter administration wanted to do and where they wanted to take the
relationship:
There was one situation when the secretary of state [Cyrus Vance] brought
one proposal-drastic reductions-and someone else brought another one.
And someone would raise human rights. It was difficult to know how to
deal with this [the Carter] administration at all. 39
In short, Dobrynin explained that the backchannel allowed for elaboration and
clarification of positions. “It is important not just to have people come with very big
proposals, accompanied by some other things which were not acceptable. You need
contacts to explain things,” he added.40 Although Dobrynin had attempted to initiate
backchannel negotiations with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the new
president opposed “secret diplomacy” and insisted that all business be done with the State
Department and its Secretary Cyrus Vance. 41
It is apparent that from Dobrynin’s point of view, the American-Soviet
relationship no longer possessed empathy by the time of the March, 1977 meeting. The
Americans did not understand that the Soviets felt they had neither been consulted nor
respected when Vance made a new arms control offer. The agenda and the proposals
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stemming from that agenda had been created by the US.42 As Dobrynin put it, “If we
want to understand the fight we had for years with your administration, we have to look
at your agenda. Wrongly or rightly, that is how we saw things. That’s why we were so
angry, and didn’t even want to discuss your proposals.”43
However, there was plenty of blame to go around. At the same 1994 conference,
former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance expressed his frustration at the unequivocal Soviet
rejection of the American proposal in 1977:
The problem that really arose, it seems to me, was that when we put our
proposals on the table, nobody would listen to them, and contrary to usual
practice, nobody said, ‘Well, let’s sit down and talk about that and see if
we can find a way to get around this thing.’ We got a wet rag in the face,
and were told to go home.44
President Carter’s stated goal was to eventually rid the world of all nuclear weapons. 45
Representatives of his administration believed that they had made an honest attempt at a
first step towards that objective. It was then immediately rejected. Vance called the
rejection a crucial “tactical mistake” and claimed that several years later Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed with him. 46
As Blight and Lang explained, even though nuclear arms control “was by far the
top priority on their mutual agenda,” both sides came away from the March, 1977 summit
believing that the other was “not serious.”47 Regardless of who was to blame, it is
extremely difficult to imagine such a situation occurring in the days of reliance on the
backchannel. The channel was more than a preliminary means of communication. It
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facilitated understanding and compromise. Any new proposal for a radical reduction in
nuclear arms would have first been discussed between Kissinger and Dobrynin before
either side presented it at a formal summit meeting. One of the things which might have
been discovered was Brezhnev’s strong emotional attachment to the November, 1974,
Vladivostok Accords. The Soviet General Secretary believed that the difficulties he
encountered while getting the Politburo to accept this agreement contributed to the stroke
he suffered shortly after Vladivostok.48 In short, Brezhnev thought he had sacrificed his
health to forge the deal.49 This kind of information could have been shared privately in
the backchannel before taking any new proposal to either side’s leadership.
To be very clear, the emphasis in this dissertation on the relationship between
Kissinger and Dobrynin is not to make a value judgment on them, their politics, or their
successors. Nor is it an attempt to blame the collapse of détente entirely on the end of the
Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel. Rather, it is intended to offer a possible explanation
for the relative success of détente during its early years despite the conflicting American
and Soviet views of relaxing tensions.
The concept of empathy in international relations has its critics, however. After
all, as Blight and Lang put it, “can anything intelligible and helpful to historians be said
about a term that means ‘putting yourself in the skin’ of another or ‘putting yourself in
the shoes of the other?’” 50 Mark Garrison, part of Vance’s delegation to Moscow in
March, 1977 conceded, “Blight and Lang are right to point out the importance of
empathy in the failures of the Carter-Brezhnev period. The usefulness of understanding
where the other side is coming from is widely accepted in principle but not easy to put
48
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into practice.”51 On the other hand, even if empathy is employed, it can only go so far. A
policy maker may determine that there are irreconcilable differences. If those differences
are potentially dangerous, “one must be prepared to deal with them by whatever means
are appropriate,” explained Garrison. 52
Garthoff, the US ambassador to Bulgaria at the time of the Vance trip, agreed that
empathy is often overlooked in international relations. Empathy is necessary “to
understand why another party holds views or objectives that sharply conflict with one’s
own.”53 This can empower diplomats to determine how to resolve disputes or if they are
even solvable. 54 However, if not just the perceptions but also the objectives of the two
sides are incompatible then empathy will only confirm this, and not necessarily provide
any solutions. 55 Garthoff added that oral history can likewise be useful, but it is not a
substitute for documents and other written sources.56
As with Garrison and Garthoff, Thomas W. Simons, Jr. was also skeptical about
the utility of empathy in analyzing international affairs. Simons, a former Soviet analyst
in the American embassy in Moscow, noted that there were “third rails” in the U.S.Soviet relationship. 57 For the Soviets it was support for national liberation movements in
the developing world and for the Americans it was support for human rights. 58
Consequently, Simons argued that what happened in March, 1977, was not a failure of
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empathy, but a failure of policy: “the makings of what it took to understand Soviet
motives and intentions were present in the U.S. government before the Carter
administration and throughout the Carter administration, as were the makings in the
Soviet government of what it took to understand the Carter administration.” 59 However,
neither side used that knowledge to craft workable policies because they were more
concerned with defeating the other in the negotiating process. 60 “The leaders on both
sides did not want [italics in original] to do better.”61
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Moscow in
1977, was more receptive to applying empathy to diplomacy. “New U.S. administrations
often continue campaign rhetoric after taking office and think more about the impact on
the U.S. public than on the countries with which they have to deal,” he wrote.62 In
addition, Matlock declared “ignoring the advice of professional diplomats trained to
understand other societies is folly.” 63 According to Matlock, if the American embassy
had been asked, it would have informed Washington that the new arms proposal carried
by Vance would have had a better chance of being accepted if it had been privately
presented to the Soviets before any details were made public. 64 Although this may not
have required a “backchannel” as in the Kissinger-Dobrynin era, a private meeting of
ambassadors beforehand would have been constructive. 65
Likewise, Robert Pastor, director of Latin American affairs on the National
Security Council in 1977, agreed with Blight and Lang: “both sides lacked empathy; both
59
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sides missed each other.”66 The Soviets needed to understand that in 1976 Carter had not
just run against Ford, but also against Kissinger and his “traditional conservative
realism.”67 For this reason, it was unlikely that Carter would simply pick up where
Kissinger had left off with the 1974 Vladivostok arms control proposal. 68 On the other
hand, Pastor added that Carter did not understand how his pronouncements about human
rights and eliminating all nuclear weapons caused the Soviets to believe that the new
president was trying to push them around.69
Even if one does accept the value of relationships and the empathy it helps to
create, it raises another question. Does this type of interpretive tool cause the historian to
focus too heavily on a few individuals, thereby missing the larger picture? This is a
possible danger. After all, not every diplomatic success or failure can be attributed to the
actions of individuals. Sometimes, there is simply no common ground between the
various interests of states.
Nevertheless, Deborah Welch Larson applied social psychology to make the case
that sometimes countries fail to reach agreements “even when they have compatible
preferences.”70 This occurs “because policy-makers make incorrect inferences about the
opponent’s motives and intentions.”71 However, states and diplomats who establish a
relationship over an extended period of time may learn to cooperate despite great
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differences, because they can empathize with each other’s efforts and recognize the
potential benefits which can accrue to both sides from sticking things out.72
Differences between state systems can impede this process. For example, a nondemocratic nation may “inspire distrust of their motives,” but a democratic state can
“elicit doubts of their resolution.”73 In a country with a democratic form of government,
there is always the possibility of new leadership coming to power at the next election and
hence a change in policy. 74 Therefore, the transition from the Nixon/Ford/Kissinger Era
to the Carter administration may have presented an obstacle to détente not for any
partisan, personal, or policy reasons, but simply because it represented a break from the
past where a degree of trust had been established, particularly through the KissingerDobrynin backchannel. On the other hand, in a long-term relationship (diplomatically
speaking) such as the one which occurred between Kissinger and Dobrynin from 19691977, both sides can develop the belief that the other means well, and even “discount or
overlook the other state’s misdeeds or lies because such evidence is inconsistent with
[their] image of the state as friendly.” 75
According to Larson, one way a nation can establish trust is though “a
conciliatory gesture” which does not appear to benefit it in any way, and may even be
potentially detrimental.76 Such an action can enhance a nation’s credibility if it is
“noncontingent,” “irrevocable,” and increases its “vulnerability.” 77
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The early détente period provided an apt example of such a “conciliatory
gesture.” Human rights were not on Moscow’s agenda, and the specific issue of
emigration from the Soviet Union arguably threatened Soviet security with the possibility
that the government could lose control over its population. Furthermore, the notion that
Soviet citizens might want to leave their country was inherently embarrassing for
Moscow. Nevertheless, through the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel and without a great deal
of attention, beginning around 1970 the Soviets gradually increased the number of exit
visas granted to Soviet Jews. Meanwhile, the Americans reciprocated by keeping
discussions of Jewish emigration in the backchannel and not using the issue for
propaganda purposes. These early actions undoubtedly contributed to an improved
climate in Soviet-American relations and helped lead to some of the greatest
achievements of the détente period.
For eight years, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed numerous topics as they built
détente. The subjects ranged from arms control to human rights to foreign interventions
in the developing world. With each successive crisis they faced, these representatives of
the two superpowers built a relationship based upon a mutual commitment to relaxing
tensions and avoiding nuclear war. A common purpose and shared experience created
empathy and enabled both to navigate tumultuous diplomatic waters. After all, they were
in it together. It may not even be an exaggeration to say they became friends – they
clearly became friendly.
When détente failed, it was because of fundamental ideological differences
between the United States and the Soviet Union about relationships between states and
the relationship between a state and its people. These differences had long been a part of
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US-Soviet relations, but détente’s early successes had made them seem less significant.
The inability or unwillingness of the Americans and Soviets to get at the root causes of
the Cold War may have made the end of détente inevitable. However, it also
demonstrated the challenges with which Kissinger and Dobrynin were forced to contend
over the years. In this light, their successful “special relationship” was all the more
noteworthy and provides a case study of the effectiveness of back channels in
international diplomacy.
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